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JPRS-NEA-84-148

2 October 1984

Near East/South Asia Report

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2 October 1984

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

GULFWIDE MEASURES TO PRESERVE SHRIMP, OTHER FISH RESOURCES

Manama AL-MAWAQIF in Arabic No 527, 28 Jul 84 pp 5-7

[Article by Sami 'Imarah: "A Regional Plan To Survey and Develop Fish Resources in the Gulf"]

[Text] It appears that with the exception of shrimp, which are subject to intensified fishing, marine fish resources in the Gulf, especially ocean floor and surface fish resources, are suffering from reduced exploitation, although these fishing areas offer numerous opportunities for their development.

The total fish catch in the Gulf at present comes to 150,000 to 200,000 tons a year. This volume can be tripled without harming the fish resources.

As regards domestic fishing areas, Iraq is to be considered the only country in the region in which domestic fishing areas can play a major role in increasing fish supplies, since while the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and the lakes, swamps and ponds feeding into them (whose area, in all, comes to 20,000 square kilometers) produce about 14,600 tons of fish a year, the sound exploitation of the fishing areas in these waters could realize an annual production ranging from 80,000 to 100,000 tons of fish.

A Regional Project to Survey and Develop Fish Resources in the Gulf

The region, in participation with the United Nations Development Program, has carried out a regional project to survey and develop fish resources in the Gulf which has resulted in the identification of resources which are characterized by inadequate exploitation. This project covered such fish reserves as large and small surface fishing areas, ocean floor fishing areas, the secondary shrimp fishing area and semi-surface fishing areas. In providing evidence that the exploitation of these resources has been inadequate, the project stated tht it is possible to double the current catch in the major surface fishing areas, which is 21,000 tons a year, observing that the current fish catch, which now ranges from 9,000 to 11,000 tons a year, should be considered trivial in comparison with the available fish resources, which total 400,000 tons, and can be increased to 100,000 tons.

As regards ocean floor fishing areas, estimates indicate that the total catch from these comes to close to 25,000 tons a year in the Gulf, in addition to 23,000 tons from the Gulf of Oman. The quantities that can be caught have been determined at about 246,000 tons a year from the Gulf and 57,000 tons a year from the Gulf of Oman.

In another area, the method followed now, which is embodied in the removal of large quantities of fish caught along with shrimp, results in benefits of high value. This secondary catch is estimated at between 50,000 and 100,000 tons a year and this can be considered an additional source of fish for food. At the current time, 10 percent of the catch is being marketed in the region and 50 percent outside it, which makes it possible to benefit from fish with fins which are involved in the fishing operations and total about 50,000 tons a year.

Shrimp Account for the Most Important Fish Catches in the Gulf Region

Shrimp have accounted for the most important fish catches in the Gulf region, since the shrimp catch on the west coast of the Gulf (from Kuwait to Oman) reached its peak and came to about 12,000 tons in 1976-77. After that, the volume of the catch started to decline sharply, especially in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (where the volume of the catch came to more than 10,000 tons in 1976-77 then dropped to less than 2,000 tons in 1979-80). Some of the decline can be attributed to the removal of many trawling vessels from this region, but the main reason for this drop is embodied in the shortage of the reserves available. It is also possible to attribute the drop in the shrimp catch to excessive fishing and natural fluctuations or to the destruction of sites where small shrimp have their habitation on the coast. This is very important as far as they are concerned, although it is certain that the main reason for this drop is the recent increase in the catch by industrial fishing fleets and professional fishing, especially in the late seventies.

Prof Fathi al-Shaykh, director of the United Nations Information Center in the Gulf, says that by recommendation of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, a season for prohibiting shrimp fishing was initiated in 1980 and has been extended to most of the countries of the region on a yearly basis. It is now necessary to devote attention to determining the optimum model for the optimum economic exploitation which these fishing areas can realize.

Prohibiting Shrimp Fishing by Directive of the Food and Agriculture Organization

The region's water resources are considered among the few remaining areas in the world which will allow further expansion in the volume of the fish catch. Perhaps the surface fish resources in the Arabian Sea can provide the best horizon and outlook, since conservative estimates indicate that these fish resources are close to half a million tons a year, while the current size of the catch is less than 100,000 tons, about half of which consists of sardines. As regards the great surface varieties, which include Spanish mackerel, which is in wide commercial circulation, most of them are not viable from the economic standpoint.

In the northwestern Indian Ocean, it appears that there are large quantities of semi-surface fish which live in relatively shallow waters close to the coast. Preliminary estimates indicate that the quantities which can be caught range from a few hundred thousand to a million tons a year.

It seems that the other areas of the region, such as the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, are less productive, although there are possibilities for increasing the volume of the catch since the surface fish reserves of the Mediterranean, such as sardinella and French mackerel, are still being inadequately exploited in many areas of the region. The development of these resources is contingent on the introduction of improvements into the areas of processing, distributing and marketing this sort of variety.

It appears obvious that the shortage of water is to be considered a factor restricting the development of fishing areas in many parts of the Near East region, although there is some potential in some areas for increasing and developing the volume of the fish catch through natural resources, as is the case in the Sudd region in the southern Sudan, or through vast extensive cultivation in river waters in Iraq and Egypt or in coastal bays with brackish water which extend throughout the areas of the region. In the area of the Mediterranean, in particular, there are great possibilities for developing the cultivation of water organisms on a broad scale in lakes and coastal waters, and it is possible to realize some increases in the levels of fish production by reviving and renovating the fishing areas which previously were brimming with fish but have now been subject to damage as a result of human intervention in the environment. In this regard, the technical aid offered to the regions in the future must include the measure of evaluating the effects which the many forms of use of domestic water have brought to bear on fishing activities.

Raising Water Organisms in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain

Prof Fathi al-Shaykh, director of the United Nations Information Center in the Gulf, said:

"It appears that the intensified cultivation of fresh water fish also provides great resources. The yield from this sort of activity can be large and viable if the suitable technology and technical expertise are available. In Iraq, for example, the area exploited for raising water organisms does not now exceed 128 hectares, which the government and the private sector own jointly. Their contribution to the fish catch is considered very minor. In another area, government policies assign great importance to the promotion of concentrated fish cultivation activities in the context of cooperatives, within the development projects in the region. If it is possible to create expansions in intensified fish cultivating activities to 20,000 hectares, for example, in the next 10 years, and if it is assumed that the average production per hectare there will come to 500 kilogram per year, it will be possible to produce about 10,000 tons of fish of high commercial value.

"Survey activities have been carried out to the end of determining the possibility of raising water organisms in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and, on a narrower scale, the United Arab Emirates. These surveys

indicate that broader resources are present than had been expected. Preliminary surveys have determined that shrimp and rapidly-reproducing fish are the best types of water organisms to raise.

"In the early seventies the Kuwait Scientific Research Institute started to perform research on shrimp cultivation which was basically aimed at enriching and strengthening shrimp reserves. This was followed by similar efforts which were concentrated on the raising of fish in Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

"However, we cannot say at the present time that there are significant commercial activities for cultivating water organisms in the Gulf countries, except in Kuwait. It is totally unclear what obstacles have arisen in this area. It is probable, for instance, that it has not yet been feasible to adapt the technological methods which have been introduced to the harsh environmental circumstances in the region, or that the bodies concerned have not given adequate attention to establishing activities for raising water organisms which can become able to survive."

The Problem of Pollution Does Not Affect Fishing Areas Greatly

The marine environment in the region, in addition to drainage water, receives [water] left over from industrial activities, which causes it substantial harm. It is also harmed by activities of cleaning out and reclaiming land. In spite of the drop in the level of pollution in fish in general, high concentrations of heavy metals have been found in waters close to industrial complexes. In the Gulf area, the intensive movement of oil tankers and also oil production close to the coast have caused apparent oil pollution problems, and the coasts have generally been polluted with tar. Since March 1983, oil wells destroyed in the course of war have poured out about 7,000 barrels of crude oil a day. Nonetheless, there is no evidence to show that the current pollution levels in the Gulf are inflicting damage on the fishing areas.

In 1979 the plan of action bearing on the protection and development of the marine environment and the coastal areas began to be carried out in Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Regional Marine Environment Protection Zone, whose headquarters are in Kuwait, is coordinating this plan of action in cooperation with this region's Marine Center for Mutual Assistance in Cases of Emergency, whose headquarters are Bahrain.

Prof Fathi al-Shaykh, director of the United Nations Information Center, said "The world conference for the management and development of fish areas will meet in the period between 27 June and 6 July 1984, and that will be the first important international initiative for discussing the practical execution of the provisions of the United Nations agreement on the law of the seas. This conference has the objective of realizing three main goals. First will be to attempt to reach agreement on individual and work strategies and programs, to increase the fishing areas' contribution to world food supplies and the attainment of domestic economic, social and nutritional goals. In this regard, the conference will devote similar attention to

marine and domestic fishing areas and the raising of marine organisms. The conference will also try to strengthen self-reliance among developing countries in the management and development of their fishing areas through the exchange of information and expertise among them and the provision of technical aid. The conference will lastly also work to increase international cooperation in the field of fishing areas among the developing and advanced countries and among the developing countries themselves.

"The international conference will try to reach consensus on a specific strategy for fishing areas and their management and development, including guiding principles and outlines to which governments and international organizations may refer in studying the individual and joint measures to be taken to increase the fishing areas' contribution to the attainment of domestic economic, social and nutritional goals.

"The conference will also be presented with five specific recommendations on work programs related to the management and development of marine and domestic fishing areas, the development of small fishing areas, the stimulation of water organism cultivation, increased participation by developing countries in fish and fish products trade, and the pursuit of the fishing areas' role in limiting deficiencies in nutrition."

Prof Fathi al-Shaykh, the director of the United Nations Information Center, went on to say,

"We are on the verge of the convening of the world conference on fishing area management and development at the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome. This will start 27 June and will be attended by the state of Bahrain, among 150 countries at the ministerial level, in addition to 70 international and regional organizations."

The World Fishing Fleet Is Recording Slow Growth Despite Technological Development

However, will the fishing areas in the world be able to double the fish crop over the next 2 decades?

Prof Fathi al-Shaykh replied, "It is estimated that when the world fishing management and development conference is opened, the total world fish crop will come to about 750 [sic] million tons a year. The volume of this catch has approximately tripled in the course of the last 40 years, since the volume of the annual world crop did not exceed 20 million tons in the late forties. The volume of world production has increased rapidly and constantly, now reaching about 7 [sic] million tons. This increase may basically be attributed to the growth of the international economy, although it has received a strong impetus from two elements of technological development in this sector, the use of fishing nets made of synthetic fibers and the introduction of mechanical trawling methods, making it possible to use large floating fish nets with sacks, and the introduction of freezing into fishing vessels on the open seas. All this, and the development in the technology of fishing by trawling nets that has accompanied it, has led to a tremendous increase in the size of operations of fishing vessels and in the expansion of their scope of activity.

"However, the rate of growth of world fish production has witnessed a noticeable slowdown since 1970, as it has risen by a rate of just 1 percent a year.

"Total fish production in the Near East area is estimated at about 1.2 million tons (mostly originating from the sea); this represents 1.6 percent of the total world fish crop.

The New Law of the Seas and Its Effect on the Fishing Areas in the World

"Fishing activities, over a number of centuries, continued to be carried out in the context of the principle of the freedom of the seas and in accordance with the notion that fish represent a resource that is the property of everyone. However, this principle was contradicted in 1947 when Chile and Peru expanded the scope of their sovereignty and national dominance of the fish resources present in the waters of the ocean to a distance of 200 miles from their coasts. After that, a number of other developing countries emulated them in the fifties and sixties.

"When the United Nations agreement on the law of the seas was approved in April 1982, more than 100 coastal countries unilaterally declared their national dominance over the fish resources that were actually close to their shores; these were given the designation of special economic areas extending for a distance of 200 miles from the coast.

"This new law of the seas has had a radical effect on fisheries in the world. The traditional notion which calls for freedom in the acquisition of jointly-owned resources has been substituted and replaced by the principle of extending national sovereignty over these waters, in which more than 90 percent of the fish resources in the world are to be found, and whose area, in totality, is equal to approximately the whole world's land area. The extended national sovereignty has created a wholly new group of circumstances for the development and administration of fishing areas. A coastal country now has the right, indeed it is its responsibility, to manage these resources, and it also has the opportunity to improve the methods by which they are exploited.

The Challenge Which Must Be Faced: Doubling Available Fish Supplies

"These changes which are now transforming the nature and patterns of world fishing areas are occurring at a time in which this sector is facing a great challenge. In the light of the anticipated growth in population and incomes, one can predict that world demand for fish for human consumption will increase by 2000 to between 90 and 95 million tons a year. Most of this increase will be created in the developing countries, which could dominate more than 60 percent of total fish consumption at the end of this century.

"The world fish crop is now estimated at close to 76 million tons a year, of which about 55 million tons go directly for human consumption. The rest is used for the manufacture of fish meal, which is used as fodder for poultry and pigs. Therefore, the challenge here is embodied in the need approximately to double the available supplies of fish for human consumption in the

course of the next 15 or 20 years. To make the description of the nature of this challenge more vivid, we can point out that the current production tendencies are allowed to continue, the annual yield in 2000 will not exceed 90 million tons. To fill the likely gap between supply and demand, it will be necessary to develop the world fishing areas in two parallel directions, first, improving the use of the resources being used now by raising the level of management and reducing waste, and second, seeking to create ways to guarantee that production of marine resources that are neglected or not exploited in full is increased and that the production from domestic fishing areas and the raising of water organisms is strengthened.

The Fishing Areas of the Near East Are Small and Conventional

"The characteristic of fishing areas in the Near East area is that they are conventional in general and are small in scale by their nature. Shrimp are an exception in these fishing areas; the method of fishing by trawling is followed in them and this is distinguished by the intensity of the capital invested in it. Professional fishing areas which rely on concentrated labor provide many job opportunities in rural coastal area and many governments assign priority to them in the development of this sector."

Mr Fathi al-Shaykh, the director of the United Nations Information Center in the Gulf, went on to say:

"The resources of the fishing areas extend the length of the coasts of the Arab countries -- the northwestern Indian Ocean, including the Gulf of Oman and Aden, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the southeastern coasts of the Mediterranean and the coasts of Morocco and Mauritania along the Atlantic.

"To that one should add that in some countries of the region (Egypt, the Sudan and Iraq) a large amount of fish production comes from domestic fishing areas, from fresh or brackish water or from the raising of water organisms.

"The total fish crop in the region, as we have pointed out, comes to 1.2 million tons. The small size of the current crop, in spite of the abundant local fish resources in which the marine and domestic fishing areas abound, may be attributed to external factors, not to the shortage in availability of fish. Although some regions are witnessing excessive use of their fish resources and it is not possible to realize a large increase in the yield from fishing there, there is scope for promise of a possibility of realizing massive increases in the annual production of fish in the region as a whole which will rise from its current level of 1.2 million tons a year to about 3 million tons a year.

"There is no doubt that the immensity of production resources in this form will afford many investment opportunities. This must receive special attention from these countries, in which fish are considered rare living resources, since these resources give these countries opportunities for increasing their inhabitants' protein supplies, establishing export industries, creating greater labor opportunities and contributing a large amount to the diversification and growth of the economy.

"The volume of the fish crop from the waters of seas in the coastal countries has been estimated at about 1 million tons, that is, 88 percent of the total fish production in the Near East area. Most fishing activities, in general, occur in the countries which lie in the northwestern area of the Indian Ocean and adjacent oceans, that is, the Gulf of Oman, the gulf extending between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea. This fishing crop constitutes more than 60 percent of the total fishing crop from seas in the Near East area, coming to 673,000 tons.

One Must Not Ignore the Importance of Fishing Areas As a Renewable Resource

Although fish are of relatively minor importance in the international context, they are to be considered an extremely important resource in many countries of the region which are not endowed with valuable natural resources such as oil. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, for instance, fish constitutes 40 percent of the animal protein supply, and this ratio comes to more than 20 percent in Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Fishing also provides an important source of foreign currency. Although fish exports (and the economic effects of the fishing industry in general) appear minor in some countries in comparison with the oil industry and other extractive industries, one must not ignore the importance of fishing areas over the long range, since they are a renewable resource.

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FUTURE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL DISCUSSED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 70, 11 Aug 84 pp 8-10

[Article by Bakr 'Uwaydah: "Blazing Peace: Fire of Camp David Peace Stirring Under Ashes and Red Sea Mines Put Peace in Balance"]

[Text] London -- Is it a mere coincidence that mine shrapnels are flying in the Red Sea at a time when Egyptian-Israeli relations seem likely to experience further tension that brings them closer to the brink of confrontation, whether in connection with Egypt's sovereignty over all its territories, including the disputed Taba, or in connection with the clash over Lebanon and the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza? This question has been raised by more than one observer watching developments in the area as a whole and developments in Egyptian-Israeli relations in particular. Some of those who have analyzed the reasons for mining the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez have not excluded the Israeli finger, considering that any preoccupation by Egypt and the other Arab countries overlooking the Red Sea is likely to work in the Israeli interest. In any case, it remains to be considered if a flareup in the Red Sea leads, among other things, puts the Camp David peace itself in the balance. This peace does not seem as likely to develop into a comprehensive peace in the area as much as it is likely that the fires under the ashes of this peace will flare up. Such a conclusion requires a review of the procession of this peace, which from the start surprised the decision makers and which still carries within itself the elements of an explosion.

Five days after the Israeli elections were held, namely on Saturday, 28 July 1984, and while Israel was watching the struggle for power between Yitzhak Shamir and Shimon Peres as a consequence of the inconclusive results of the 23 July elections, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak was addressing a clear and specific message to the people concerned, whether in Israel itself or those outside Israel watching the developments.

Mubarak's message was not carried by an envoy and was not confidential. It was open and expressed by him personally when journalists took the opportunity of his inauguration of the Roman Museum and the Qaytabay Citadel in Alexandria to ask him for his evaluation of the future relationship with Israel in light of the outcome of the elections. It seems that the Egyptian president also wanted to use the occasion and thus addressed his clear and specific message, including in it the following three provisions:

1. Egypt will deal with any Israeli government, whether led by the Labor Party or under Likud administration, with the aim of "giving the area's peace process a strong boost."
2. The return of the Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv is tied to three fundamental conditions, namely A) full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, B) revival of the issue of Taba and C) revival of the Palestinian issue.
3. Egypt will take no new steps on the path of normalizing relations with Israel, such as receiving a high-level Israeli official (the foreign minister, for example) before the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

Mubarak's words have found their way to the ears of Israeli officials, despite their being preoccupied with the "dilemma" of the outcome of the elections. Twenty-four hours after Mubarak's statements, the Egyptian charge d'affaires was visiting the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive what has been described as an "official" protest of the contents of President Mubarak's statements. Among other things, the words of the Egyptian charge d'affaires heard in Tel Aviv included a reference to the affect that the Egyptian president's conditions for continued normalization and for the return of the Egyptian ambassador constitute a deviation from the spirit of the Camp David accords. For its part, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cairo was alert to the Israeli reaction to Mubarak's statements. This alertness came in the form of anticipating the kind of reaction that would come from Israel. Moreover, the summoning of the Egyptian charge d'affaires in Israel and the "protest" he received were not surprising to Dr 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid, the minister of foreign affairs, who had a statement prepared in the name of the ministry, not in his name, containing a reply which makes it permissible to assume that it was a heated reply to the tepidity in Egyptian-Israeli relations -- tepidity that is more like a fire buried under its own ashes.

The heated reply, following Mubarak's clear and specific message, was also clear and specific and included the following:

1. The accords concluded between Egypt and Israel contain nothing about Egypt's opposition to Israel's aggressions against the Palestinians and against Lebanon.
2. Egyptian-Israeli relations are not only tepid, there are fundamental issues facing these relations. These issues are, specifically, the issue of Taba, withdrawal from Lebanon and the continued Israeli aggressions against the Palestinian camps in Lebanon.

These harsh words in the language exchanged between Egypt and Israel have not surprised observers of the relations between the two sides, especially the progress of the Camp David peace between them. Since the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat on 6 October 1981, the graph of the Egyptian-Israeli peace has been falling. Moreover, some observers who are careful in observing the manifestations concerning a certain event date the countdown of the Egyptian-Israeli peace back to

the final days of Anwar al-Sadat himself. In this regard, the observers note that al-Sadat's decision of August 1980 actually constituted the beginning of the shakiness of the Camp David peace and of the shrouding of the future of this peace with ambiguity. But these observers make a distinction at the same time between the readiness of the (late) President Anwar al-Sadat to display flexibility on whatever could eliminate, and quickly, the causes of the tepidity in Egyptian-Israeli relations -- a readiness justified by the fact that the man was the initiator of a plan for which he wanted success at any price -- and the disinclination of President Husni Mubarak to display flexibility in the wrong place just to bring success to a relationship for whose creation and consequences he is not fundamentally responsible.

Moreover, inasmuch as Anwar al-Sadat was eager to strengthen the mainstays of the Camp David peace, Husni Mubarak is eager to put the Egyptian-Israeli relationship within its natural dimensions. This eagerness on Mubarak's part has, among other things, required Egypt not to be the party that turns a blind eye to Israel's expansionist actions, whether in terms of the multiplying settlements or in terms of the invasion of Lebanon, just so it might not shake the relationship with Israel. President Husni Mubarak, whom circumstances destined to become vice president of the republic on 19 November 1977 and thus prevented him from accompanying al-Sadat on his sudden visit to Israel at that time, did not wish to rush into the enthusiasm for the Camp David peace by visiting Israel on the morrow of his assuming top responsibility. His refusal to visit Israel at the time was a clear indication that he did not plan to get mired in a plan which did not at all seem profitable.

It was not long after Husni Mubarak's refusal to visit Israel that the war in which Israel invaded Lebanon and reached the outskirts of Beirut, its capital, was launched. So President Mubarak decided to withdraw the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv. This decision took at the outset the form of summoning the ambassador for consultation. It was then declared that Egypt would not send its ambassador back to Israel before a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. More than one informed Arab source close to the Egyptian decision-making circles believes that President Mubarak wished that Israel would act similarly and withdraw its ambassador from Cairo and reduce the size of its diplomatic representation, with Mubarak thus moving Egypt one step further from Israel and two steps closer to its natural place in the Arab nation. But this did not happen because the Israeli calculations contain something much more than reciprocal treatment insofar as relations with Egypt are concerned. Israel wants these relations to play a specific role of keeping Egypt away from being involved with the Arab-Israeli conflict or, at least, of neutralizing Egypt in this conflict. President Mubarak's administration has not been unaware of this plan and has always swum in the opposite current. This is what has caused the graph of the Camp David peace to fall steadily downward. In this respect, it is worth noting the following indicators:

1. President Mubarak's administration has displayed no wish to resume the negotiations concerning the future of the West Bank and Gaza as long as Israel has not stopped the construction of settlements in them.
2. The course followed by the Egyptian policy under President Mubarak's administration in dealing with the other Arab countries has not been pleasing to the Israelis, considering that President Mubarak's softening of the atmosphere of Egyptian-Arab relations is in itself a necessary prelude for eliminating the causes of the estrangement caused by the Camp David peace.
3. Egypt's opening up to a number of Arab capitals and the response of these capitals to the positive features in President Mubarak's administration have been very much like another matchstick lighted under a part of the so-called Camp David peace. In this respect, it is worth noting that Egypt's frank and open support for Iraq in the ongoing war with Iran has been in itself enough reason to convince the Israelis of the presence of the burning ember under the ashes of the peace with Egypt, especially since Israel for its part has not been reluctant to support Tehran with weapons and spare parts so that Iraq may not stand on its feet and may not resume its developmental role, which has stood at the threshold of the nuclear age on the one hand, and so that the Iraq-Iran war may, on the other hand, continue to divert attention from the Arab-Israeli conflict.
4. Egypt's support for the legitimate Palestinian leadership in the Tripoli, Lebanon, crisis and Egypt's performance of a military role in securing the necessary protection for the legitimate Palestinian forces departing from Tripoli came to draw the attention of the Israeli administration to what may be assumed to be a determination on the part of Mubarak's administration to convey a specific message to the Israeli --a message whose content is summed up in that the Camp David peace will remain deficient unless it develops into comprehensive peace and that unless this comprehensive peace is established, Egypt will not hesitate to align itself with its Arab brethren. Therefore, as much as the visit of Yasir 'Arafat, the PLO Executive Committee chairman, to Cairo evoked Palestinian and Arab protests, criticism and objection, it also greatly angered the Israelis. Radical Israelis called at the time for considering Camp David an abolished peace just because Cairo and the president of Egypt received the Palestinian leader.
5. In the scenario of the steadily retreating Camp David peace, the observers have noted that Egypt has taken a firm position on the issue of considering Jerusalem a "unified and everlasting capital of Israel." On the day Egypt declared the severing of its relations with the countries that have moved or will move their embassies to Jerusalem, more than one observer dumped another heap of dirt on the Camp David peace.
6. The issue of the dispute over the border village of Taba has emerged as strong evidence to two facts: first, that the Camp David peace has not eliminated Israel's greed for expansion and, second, that Husni Mubarak's

administration does not intend to preserve the Camp David peace just for the sake of preserving it, regardless of the cost. The Egyptian administration's position on the issue of full sovereignty over Taba has reached the state of readiness -- not officially declared -- to regain it by force if necessary. Such readiness makes the Camp David peace a peace liable to flare up at any moment.

7. Moreover, the cool relationship between Mubarak's Egypt and Israel has been preceded and ushered in by the rejection by the Egyptian man on the street of the idea of dealing with Israel and of establishing normal relations with it. This has been expressed by Egyptians in a number of negative manifestations which started with the search for a premises for the Israeli Embassy and which did not end with the attempt to assassinate the Israeli consul in Cairo.

8. Egypt's opposition to the Israeli role in Lebanon, Egypt's frank and clear stance in support of preserving Lebanon's unity and opposing its partition and its insistence on a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Lebanese territories are an important manifestation in the context of observing the manifestations that make the peace built on the pillars of Camp David more of a peace that is liable to explode than a stable and guaranteed peace.

9. The restoration of normal relations between Cairo and Moscow cannot be viewed in isolation from the reality of the Camp David peace and of its future. The Soviet Union was the world power damaged most by the Camp David deal. What is more, the Americans did not find it embarrassing to claim that they wanted to prove through the Camp David deal their ability to achieve exclusively an Arab-Israeli peace started by Egypt. If the progress of this deal has proven the faultiness of this American view, then the Egyptian decision to normalize relations with the Soviet Union contains that which is likely to restore the balance to the area on the one hand and to reassert, on the other hand, the Soviet Union's role in the area's peace.

10. Furthermore, more than one observer views Egypt's clear support for the proposal of UN Secretary De Cuellar to hold an international conference for Middle East peace in which all the parties to the conflict, in addition to Washington and Moscow, participate as a support that bolsters Egypt's visualization of peace as a comprehensive and just peace and not a peace that carries within itself the elements of its explosion. What is noticeable is the Egyptian-Israeli clash in this regard, considering that the Israeli and U.S. rejection constitute a stumbling block in the face of implementing this plan for an international peace conference.

Whoever ponders these manifestations in their entirety cannot conclude that what is between Egypt and Israel is that kind of peace that is founded on warm relations and that is capable of developing this relationship and of raising it to higher levels. A Western correspondent in Tel Aviv has said that the Israelis who saw President Husni Mubarak next to President Reagan in the White House and heard him speak from the same place

which witnessed the conclusion of the Camp David accords of recognition of the PLO and of the Palestinian rights as an objective condition for the lasting and comprehensive peace realized that the distance between them and peace is still great, especially if the ruling mentality in Israel continues to be as it has been in connection with dealing with Palestinian rights. What an examiner of the Camp David peace process concludes is that not much effort is required to put the finger on the fact that a peace that has burnt both its heroes [al-Sadat and Begin] without advancing a single step is a peace like a fire that still hides burning embers under its ashes. Unless the development that brings about the comprehensive peace in the area materializes, Egypt's separate peace with Israel does not seem likely to last long. However, it is worth noting the three following points:

1. At the official level, Egypt avoids, with intelligent diplomacy, giving Israel any opportunity to claim that Egypt is not serious in its peace. In other words, Egyptian officials seem to go to excess in their eagerness to declare "adherence to the Camp David accords" and "not straying from the accords" and "Egypt's genuine character in safeguarding covenants and treaties" and other such statements which play skillfully the game of politically dealing with an opponent who lacks neither the experience in deception and cunning nor the ability to disavow all international traditions and treaties. Therefore, unless Egypt has an adequate reason and the right circumstance to abandon Camp David openly, then nobody should expect such abandonment to happen.
2. Despite this, prominent Egyptian officials are not reluctant to note their pessimism regarding the separate peace with Israel. In their private meetings, a lot is said regarding this pessimism. But in public statements, the most that is said about this pessimism comes in phrases such as the "tepid relationship" or the "cold peace," as Dr Butrus Ghali has described it in an interview with AL-TADAMUN published in this edition. It is a cold peace if compared with the rules of warm relations between countries and an inflammable peace if measured by the guarantees of its non-destruction in the future.
3. It is the assessment of more than one Western observer that the determination of a number of Arab countries not to restore relations with Egypt before Egypt fully abrogates the Camp David accords in some sort of insistence on putting the cart in front of the horse. It is the opinion of these observers that there is no better way for Egypt to prepare the right circumstances for abolishing Camp David than its return to the Arab League. The argument cited by these observers is summed up in this question: if the Camp David accords have retreated so far when Egypt has not yet restored its influential position and role in Arab decision making, then how far will the accords retreat if Egypt restores its position and role and finds itself in daily confrontation with Israel?

It remains to be said that in light of the tension being experienced by the Egyptian-Israeli peace, in light of the developments with which the area is pregnant -- developments which do not seem encouraging insofar as stability is concerned, especially with the wave of explosions that has turned the Red Sea into a mined sea -- and in light of the U.S. Democratic Party's determination to give Israel absolute support, not from an election standpoint but from a political-strategic standpoint, which means that in case Mondale gets to the White House there will be greater confrontation with the Soviets in the area and greater determination to impose the Camp David accords -- in light of all this, the question that haunts observers, those who follow developments, the decision makers is: will Egypt's peace with Israel last long before it explodes from all these pressures?

8494

CSO: 4504/398

JUDGES CLUB HEAD DISCUSSES RECENT ELECTION DISPUTES

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2594, 11 Jul 84 pp 10-11

[Interview with Justice Wajdi 'Abd-al-Samad, President of the Judges' Club, by Suahyr al-Husayni in Cairo: "Head of Judges' Club Discusses How Election Contestations Are Investigated: The Latest Elections Were Conducted Under The True Supervision of The Courts; The Responsibility of The Court of Cassation in The Investigation"; date not specified]

[Text] The Court of Cassation is looking into 150 contestations from the recent elections filed by various political parties. Away from complaints and contestations and with a disinterested look at the events, we find that there is a consensus on the domestic and foreign levels that these elections were held amid a series of precepts and measures that were truly based on the principle of impartiality and democracy in practice and application. It is the same practice followed by Interior Minister Hasan Abu Pasha and all the security and police agencies. Now, what parties are involved in the investigation of these contestations? How are these contestations verified? What is the time limit for settling them? What is the content of these contestations? Who filed them? If the contestations are upheld, will the People's Assembly members be dismissed? How is that done? Is the verification of the electoral contestation different from the verification of the validity of the membership of the People's Assembly deputy? Can the contestor withdraw the contestation after submission? Is there a specific penalty imposed on the contestor if the contestation is not verified? And finally, what are the new electoral law amendments put forth for debate?

It was all these questions that prompted us to interview Justice Wajdi 'Abd-al-Samad, vice-president of the Court of Cassation and president of the Judges' Club.

The interview with Justice Wajdi 'Abd-al-Samad, vice-president of the Court of Cassation and president of the Judges' Club, began with the following question:

[Question] What do you think about the integrity of the electoral system in Egypt in light of the prevailing democratic practice?

[Answer] I begin by saying that democracy started out as a theoretic concept that spread and encountered success in practical application, becoming an inevitable principle. Many countries amended their electoral laws out of their desire to achieve democracy in practice. The majority of countries espoused the principle of general elections and the American constitution stipulated the inadmissibility of restricting this principle for reasons of sex or color. In 1919, Britain issued the people representation law which provided for the right to vote law which Lord Kearson described as the largest political revolution witnessed by Britain since 1831.

In Egypt, the first free elections were held in 1881 during the Sharif Pasha cabinet era. There were also the parliamentary elections held in 1882, the Shura Council and the General Assembly elections in 1882, the Legislative Assembly elections in 1913 and the parliamentary elections in 1924 which brought direct elections to one level. However, the 1930 constitution, while maintaining the phenomenon of general voting, was so restrictive in many ways that it could be said that it dropped it. With the abrogation of the constitution, Egypt returned to the principle of direct general voting. I would like to make it clear that free elections are considered a mirror for public opinion and reform of the electoral system is the cornerstone of the edifice of the political reform movement.

[Question] In your opinion, what is the guarantee for the integrity of the electoral process and was this method applied in the recent elections?

[Answer] The main guarantee for the integrity of the electoral process is to put it under the supervision of the judicial power and to give this power broad jurisdiction enabling it to put an end to any meddling in the elections. That is to say, judicial control is the one thing that ultimately leads to the integrity of the legislative body make-up via its representation of the voters. The judiciary did actually and truly supervise the recent elections, but it was possible for the judges to head all the sub-committees that numbered 23,000 districts, although it would have been possible to hold the elections in stages, as many countries.

150 Contestations Before The Courts

[Question] Are all the contestations, 150 of them, filed by the opposition parties?

[Answer] Contestations have been filed by various parties.

[Question] What is the time limit for settling the contestations filed in the Court of Cassation?

[Answer] According to the 1956 constitution, contestations must be settled within 60 days from the date of verification results are presented to the People's Assembly. Law 246 of 1956 appointed, through the issuance of the People's Assembly membership law, the Supreme Court which is the Court of Cassation and stipulated that after the court completes its

verification measures for the contestation, its president shall send the outcome of the verification process to the People's Assembly president within 6 months from the date the contestation was brought before the Court.

[Question] If the Court of Cassation ruled the election of a People's Assembly member invalid, will he be dismissed from the assembly?

[Answer] The last word in this regard, that is, the validity or the invalidity of membership, belongs to the People's Assembly since the decision of the Court of Cassation after verification of the contestation is an advisory opinion not binding on the assembly.

[Question] What is the content of the contestations concerning the validity of the People's Assembly deputies' membership after their election?

[Answer] Electoral contestations and verification of the validity of parliamentary memberships constitute a control over the integrity of the elections and the practice of democracy. Electoral contestations are of two kinds:

--Contestation of the validity of the elections.

--Contestation of the eligibility for representation.

The first kind is limited to voters and candidates of a certain district. In other words, the contestation is not accepted unless submitted by a voter or a candidate concerning the election in his own district.

The second kind of contestation is not aimed at the electoral measures, but is built on cases concerning the deputy's person. It is not restricted by time or conditions, and may be filed by any person at any time, provided the petition is signed by the contestor and contains his address because unsigned petitions are discarded. Concerning the first kind of contestation, it must be submitted to the Assembly's president within 15 days following the announcement of the election results, must contain the reasons on which it is built, must be signed by the contestor and certified and the contestor must naturally be a candidate or a voter from the district where the contested elections were held.

[Question] Is the verification of the electoral contestation different from the verification of the validity of the membership of the People's Assembly deputy?

[Answer] There is no difference. They both entail looking into two matters which are:

--The soundness of the election measures, and

--The eligibility for representation which means the presence of all conditions prescribed by law and the absence of preclusive factors. The

burden of proof in this regard falls on the contestor and the facts on which the contestation was built must be specific. Facts presented in an uncertain or vague manner are not suitable for contestation, such as those not directly connected with or related to the electoral process.

[Question] Can the contestor retract the electoral contestation after submission?

[Answer] This is allowed in France, but in Britain the withdrawal of the contestation is accepted only after the presentation of an official statement by all the contestors explaining their reasons for dropping the case and stating that it was not due to an agreement with the contestee. British law makes an agreement to drop a contestation for a sum of money or in exchange for the resignation of the elected member a criminal offense punishable by jail or a fine. In Egypt, however, there is an opinion that favors the inadmissibility of retracting the contestation because the assembly can always verify eligibility even without an electoral contestation and because contestations, on the other hand, are either based on well-founded reasons or groundless arguments. In the first case, justice and the public interest decree that the matter takes its legal course before the assembly and be settled by law. In the second case, the interest of the contestee decrees that the contestation be verified.

[Question] What body specializes in the settlement of electoral contestations?

[Answer] The process of examining and settling electoral contestations and verifying the validity of the mandate of members of parliament is, above all, a judicial task that requires discussion and careful examination as well as impartiality on the part of the judges. Constitutional systems differ in jurisdiction and we can distinguish between two basic systems: one that vests jurisdiction in parliament itself and one that vests jurisdiction in the judiciary or a special council in which the judicial element is represented.

[Question] What are the pros and cons of each system?

[Answer] The main argument on which the system that entrusts parliament with settling contestations is the principle of the separation of powers and the independence of the legislative power from the executive powers. As you can see, it is a refutable argument because parliaments, when they exercise this jurisdiction, they settle cases brought before them and electoral contestations are no more than conflicts between two or more individuals, and settlement of conflicts, as is generally known, is limited to the judicial power alone. This system in fact constitutes an encroachment by the legislative power on the judicial power. Besides, verification of the validity of membership through parliaments does not provide any guarantees for the elected candidate because the decision on the validity of the members' mandate is a political process that has no legal guarantee. It is inconceivable that friends would vote against each

other and impossible for a political council to be calm and impartial. Moreover, the party of the majority sometimes invokes the right to examine the validity of the members' mandate as a weapon. This is incompatible with the required neutrality of the judiciary.

[Question] Which of the two systems does the Egyptian constitution observe?

[Answer] In Egypt's contemporary history, many constitutions have been issued. The first one was a century ago in 1866 when the bylaws for the founding of the Shura Council were enacted. These bylaws adopted the system that gives parliament the power to decide the validity of its members' election. In 1883, an electoral law was issued stipulating that contestations should be submitted to the president of parliament within a certain period of time and he, in return, referred it to the Cairo Court of Appeals to pronounce final judgment after hearing the prosecutor general's testimony.

The 1923 constitution divided parliament into two councils: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, and vested in each the power to decide the validity of their members. Mandate is invalidated by a decision issued by a two-thirds majority.

The 1930 constitution vested the power of settling electoral contestations in the judiciary. In September, 1935, the 1923 constitution was put back in force, then Law No 141 of 1951 was enacted vesting the Court of Cassation with the power to decide the validity of the mandate of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies' members.

[Question] What happened after the July 1952 revolution?

[Answer] On 10 December 1952, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, in his capacity as chief of the army movement, issued a constitutional declaration saying that "the country has reached a state of corruption and decay that had led to the domination of a reckless king, a disgraceful political life and unsound parliamentary rule. Instead of making the executive power responsible to parliament, which has always been under that power, the abrogation of the 1923 constitution was announced."

In 1953, a 50-member committee was formed to draw up a bill within 60 days from the date of the result of the investigations was presented to the assembly. Membership is not considered null and void until a decision is issued by a two-thirds majority of the assembly.

[Question] How competent are parliaments in settling electoral contestations alone?

[Answer] A study of history shows the incompetence of parliaments in assuming the task of settling electoral contestations filed against one of their members because this process is essentially a judicial process. There are many cases in history that attest to the truth of this statement. Let us take an example from France. The popular front made up of leftist

parties won the May 1936 election by a majority and this majority sought to nullify the election of a number of rightist party members out of spite. So parliament issued a decision by a majority of 236 votes for a new constitution for Egypt [as given] and the committee followed the system that vested the judiciary with the power to settle electoral contestations. The 1956 constitution tried to reconcile these two aforementioned systems by stipulating in Article 89 that "parliament shall have the function of settling the validity of the mandate of its members and a supreme court appointed by law shall have the function of investigating contestations submitted to parliament in accordance with a committal order from its president. The outcome of the investigation shall be submitted to parliament which shall settle the contestation. Membership can be invalidated only by a decision issued by a two-thirds majority of parliament."

(Justice Wajdi 'Abd-al-Samad goes on to say:)

The 1964 constitution followed the same course as the 1956 constitution and the 1971 constitution adopted the same rule, making it mandatory that investigation be completed within 90 days from the date the contestation is referred to the Court of Cassation, the outcome of the investigation and the court's opinion be submitted to parliament to decide on the validity of the contestation against 169 votes by nullifying the election of "Phillip Henrico" who was known for his anti-left party stances despite the statements by the rapporteur of the committee who examined the contestation of his election that the said election file was totally clean.

(Justice Wajdi 'Abd-al-Samad also says:)

In Egypt in 1929, two contestations of the election of Ahmad Qasim Jawdah and Ahmad Jalal-al-Din al-Hamamsi were filed on the ground that each of them was under the age of 30. Parliament decided to throw the contestations out. These two deputies, who were journalists by profession, rebelled against their majority party and criticized government behavior. A deputy submitted a new contestation of the validity of the election of Ahmad Qasim Jawdah on ground of his young age. The contestation did not include anything new but parliament issued a decision to strip him of his membership. In the same session, a deputy petitioned parliament to strip Jalal al-Hamamsi of his membership also on grounds of age, and parliament decided in abstentia to do just that, without referring the matter to the contestations committee and without hearing the testimony of the contestee.

[Question] There is a consideration to amend the recent elections law. What do you think about what is being said concerning the anticipated amendments?

[Answer] First of all, I agree that election must be by proportional slates because one of its advantages is to bring to parliament qualifications that shun election campaigns for one reason or another. However, I have an observation regarding the 8 percent rate made mandatory by the existing

law for the representation of parties in parliament. This rate, although it is not an innovation in the Egyptian election law since it is paralleled in the countries of the world that follow this system such as Germany and Israel, I believe that the 8 percent rate is high especially if we bear in mind that the literacy rate in Egypt is close to 70 percent while in Germany it is 5 percent and in Israel, 1 percent. My personal view is that this rate must be lower than 8 percent especially since the recent elections resulted in the Labor Party receiving over 7 percent, but nonetheless was unable to enter parliament.

[Question] To end the interview, I asked the vice-president of the Court of Cassation whether the contestor is penalized for filing a contestation that cannot be verified?

[Answer] The mere fact that a contestation is thrown out and the validity of the membership declared does not in itself place any responsibility on the contestor unless the contestation contained lies that constitute a crime, and the contestor was aware of the lie when he filed his contestation for the sole purpose of hurting and slandering the contestee, and unless the condition of candor demanded by law to inflict punishment for false account is fulfilled.

12502

CSO: 4504/349

ECONOMIC ISSUES FACING NEW ASSEMBLY DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 3118, 13 Jul 84 p 17

[Article: "Controlling Rise in Local Incomes"]

[Text] Concerning the most important issues to be raised by the People's Assembly economic committee, committee chairman Fathallah Rif'at has this to say:

"When we speak in the interest of the economy, we must deal with the subject of training the labor force, rationalizing spending and providing popular help to the government in all matters related to consumption and its patterns, in addition to taking care of state institutions, be they government, public sector or private sector.

"The way people conduct themselves at work and on the street influences the economy in that it either helps it grow or becomes an obstacle on the road to national economic progress."

Fathallah Rif'at adds: "We must always remember President Husni Mubarak's constant call for increased production and his new slogan--the production open-door policy--from the view-point of technology and training for the labor force in the country and abroad. Everything that leads to increased production is what covers all faults and shortcomings and drives production means to support the economy as a whole."

He goes on to say that the most important thing to be raised and considered at this stage is the question, "how." The state, for example, wants to achieve a 4 percent growth rate in the field of agriculture and 8 percent in industry, so how do we arrive at this increase, especially since 95 percent of the agricultural sector is private, represented by the farmers? How can one deal with them to achieve a 4 percent growth rate and what is the crop composition that can drive agricultural production, be it for consumption or export, to a point that will cover all the requirements of the 5-year plan? The same thing goes for the industrial sector. The way I look at it is that when we concern ourselves with the method of production, for example, we can realize an increase in local incomes and narrow the gap between imports and exports in favor of the balance of payments which is on the rise year after year. We must keep abreast of all state sectors

so as to identify the ones that have realized some progress in their fields and acquaint ourselves with the reasons for such progress in order that other sectors that have not advanced or developed may follow their example, and also to identify the most significant obstacles and impediments that must be avoided in the next stages in order to achieve the desired objectives.

The chairman of the economic committee raises another issue which is the price hikes and their imbalance with the incomes of most classes, the needy classes in particular. Income must be tied to the price index in order to avoid the disequilibrium that exists in the economic structure. Fathallah Rif'at says: "I would like to add one important thing, which is that social conditions in any country dictate that the government follow certain exigencies. Although I am a representative of the people in the economic committee, I place myself as an executor so my method of implementation is to go along with the government and cooperate with it in finding ways to realize the desired objectives.

"Moreover, there are certain economic fundamentals that render price hikes inevitable, such as the available supply of certain commodities at prices within the reach of middle-income people. This supply is not enough against the financial abilities that are available to the working class in the import and export sectors, investment agencies and related professions. The financial level so far achieved leads us to confirm that the available quantity of these commodities, for example, does not help the limited-income class and therefore prices are raised as a result of supply and demand. Therefore, commodity prices in general, be they imported or local, must be fixed and I emphasize that there is not enough interest in fixing prices, not to mention the lack of price control which is the main reason for the greed on the part of exploiters."

The chairman of the economic committee also says that we must deal with the issue of subsidies and how to channel them to the deserving. We mean here subsidies of commodities other than oil and tea, commodities such as fertilizer, cement and reinforced iron that are traded on the black market through various methods of manipulation. Hence, prices and subsidies must be tied to consumption patterns in order to achieve coordination and harmony between them.

Also, the economic committee will ask for a 5-year plan progress report every three months to identify the reasons for slackness in implementing the annual plan which is part of the 5-year plan. Then we will discuss the executory side, taking into consideration that the task of the executor is much more difficult than that of the proposer and the recommender. The recommending side, represented in the economic committee, must participate in formulating solutions to all problems that arise. Thereafter, the outcome of the discussions between the ministers and the committee will be placed before the officials in parliament and recommendations will be directed to the executor side with periodic follow-up.

Concerning the first issue the executive committee will raise in the People's Assembly, Fathallah Rif'at says: "We will begin with the issue of higher production, then the issue of prices and subsidies, followed by the balance of payments whereby surpluses are exported, foreign markets determined, and recommendations to agencies concerned with exportation drawn up to identify those countries that can be dealt with and at what time of year. This will be followed by problems of domestic and foreign trade.

12502

CSO: 4504/349

LOANS FOR FOOD SECURITY DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 17 Jul 84 p 9

[Article by 'Abd al-Wahhab Hamid: "Committee Decisions Regarding Food Security Loans Deprive Projects of Stability"]

[Text] Food security projects require an objective position, even those that are making firm progress toward achieving their goal of providing the citizens with food. The broad base of investors in this sector are raising several points about matters that led to a decline in the volume of funding for these projects. One of the most important is the lack of continuity in decision-making. The proof of that is the issuance of a number of decisions over a not infrequent timespan of meetings of the Supreme Ministerial Committee for Food Security Loans. For example, there were decisions issued in June 1983, another in October of the same year and a third last January, i.e., there were three decisions in 6 months. Why?

At the outset, one of the investors spoke about the need to put an end to contradictory decisions concerning the granting of loans, and to simplify these actions. Apart from their multiplicity, we find that they are not clear, which calls for the need to interpret them, which requires submitting questions from the central bank that have been submitted to the branch committee, which submits recommendations concerning them to the main committee, which has the authority to make a decision. Then all of this is done again, by following the steps in reverse. All of this takes a long time. Here are some examples:

1. In June of last year, the committee decided to limit the subsidy in the field of meat production to red meat only. After a month, it was decided to cancel the red meat subsidy and it was changed to production of poultry and other such projects.
2. Restrictions were put on the granting of subsidized funding which made it difficult to apply them. This resulted in confusion in the executive agencies in the banks, which led to depriving those active in fattening poultry and calves of the subsidy.

Investors also made several observations about the Food Security Committee's recent decisions. For example, with respect to loans for operations, the

committee decided to grant loans for poultry fattening farms to new farms only, established as of 1 July 1982, with a production capacity of not less than 10,000 chickens in a cycle. This affected small projects especially despite the fact that the small owners are the cornerstone of the agricultural development projects, free from the domination of the large merchants over the market. With regard to milk production projects, the committee decided to grant these projects subsidized loans for buffalo, imported cattle and mixed-breed cattle, on condition that one project's capacity was not less than 20 head. This restriction will also deprive the small farms, in addition to ignoring loans for milk projects with local cattle. The committee also barred local incubator projects from receiving subsidized loans, confining that to modern incubator projects.

Fatullah Rifa't, president of the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank remarked that food security loans are disbursed with subsidized interest rates for egg production projects with the closed system, which has obtained the approval of the committee specializing in agriculture, and egg production projects with the battery-operated heating system, with a maximum of 500 Egyptian pounds for one heating unit and a minimum of 1 million eggs per year for the project that obtains the loan. That is on the basis of a feasibility study approved by the committee.

With respect to milk production projects, subsidized loans are allocated for projects of buffalo, imported cattle and mixed-breed cattle, on condition that one project's capacity does not exceed 20 head. Loans are also granted for first milk projects and goat and sheep breeding to projects that have a capacity of 50 head as a minimum. Small projects of rabbit production are granted loans with subsidized interest rates for projects that breed rabbits with the battery-operated system, with a maximum of 500 Egyptian pounds for one battery and its requirements of rabbits and fodder.

Advisor 'Adil Shanan, chief of the investor sector in the bank, added that apart from that, subsidized loans are granted to poultry-fattening farms to install feed and drink lines and automatic or semi-automatic ventilators, after fulfilling the required actions and documents, relying on studies submitted for this purpose. In addition, there are projects involving squid farms, modern incubators, rabbit and duck breeding, fish farms, fishing trawlers and their developments, units to prepare greens and fruits, factories for milk and its byproducts, fruit juice plants and centers, and semi-automated bakeries manufactured locally, which are only built in cities, on condition of the approval of the Ministry of Supply.

Loans are not granted for the subsidized operation of existing projects of this type, nor are subsidized loans granted for projects to fatten calves, or to breed domestic cattle or to establish fencing, or to purchase fishing equipment.

Investors in the field of egg production with the close system method and in milk production are required to furnish a 25 percent share of production

to the quarter determined by the Ministry of Supply and at the prices that this ministry fixes. Projects that do not benefit from subsidized interest rates can obtain loans at usual banking rates, provided that they are proved sound in terms of technical aspect, and within the framework of doing practical business, especially as pertains to providing guarantees.

7005

CSO: 4504/377

FORMATION OF COMMITTEES TO DISCUSS INDUSTRY PROBLEMS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Jul 84 p 9

[Article by Ahmad al-'Attar: "Four Specialized Committees in the Federation of Industries Formed to Study Industrial Production Problems."]

[Text] It has been decided to form four specialized committees in the Federation of Industries to discuss the problems that the Egyptian industry faces and to determine ways to combat them, in order to increase and develop industrial production.

Dr 'Adil Jazarin, chief of the Federation of Industries, stated that the Federation of Industries' Board of Directors has approved a federation plan of action for the next stage, which includes the formation of these four specialized committees. They are: an economic committee, to specialize in the study of all problems pertaining to the regulation of imports and exports, financing, customs and taxes; an industry committee, specializing in the study of technical problems and new projects; a legal committee, which will study all laws pertaining to industry, and a labor and workers committee, specializing in a study of all matters pertaining to workers.

The federation's plan of action also includes holding meetings between the members of the federation and ministers and officials to discuss the problems faced by industry and to arrive at specific proposals to solve them. Forums for specialized industries will also be organized, in addition to a study being conducted concerning all industrial fields.

Dr 'Adil Jazarin added that the federation's plan of action includes establishing a center for industrial information, using computers, so that comprehensive information about members of the federation in various industrial fields can be compiled. This will include complete data about every factory in Egypt, including its capitalization, production and number of workers. This will result in the preparation of a comprehensive and detailed picture of industry in Egypt. It has also been decided to establish an office for foreign relations, so that there will be a communication link between the Federation of Industries in Egypt and industrial federations in other nations, for the purpose of exchanging information, technical expertise and cooperation among these federations.

It has also been decided to amend the federation's law, in order to give it greater effectiveness and capability to serve its members and to work toward industrial growth, in cooperation with the Ministry of Industry and the other ministries concerned.

It has also been decided to expedite the completion of the construction of the federation's building. Work had begun on it several years ago. It will include industrial chambers and the Federation of Industries, and will be furnished with a permanent exhibition of Egyptian products. It is expected that its construction will be completed during the next 2 years. The chief of the Federation of Industries added that he has met with the industrial chambers, during which the plan of action was reviewed. In addition, the idea of holding periodic meetings with the presidents of the chambers in different production centers was approved.

7005

CSO: 4504/377

INCREASE IN SHIPPING TO ALEXANDRIA

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 25 Jul 84 p 9

[Article by Husayn Thabit: "Twenty Percent Increase in Shipping to Alexandria, 2.1 Days Average Waiting Time"]

[Text] Work is currently underway at maximum speed in the port of Alexandria to accommodate the increase in shipping averages during last month and this month. It has averaged 14 ships per day, an increase of 20 percent over the same period last year. Cargoes on these ships have also increased by 42 percent, while waiting time has not exceeded 2.1 days.

Major General Anwar Hijazi, chief of the Alexandria Port Authority, issued instructions to make maximum efforts to accommodate the noticeable increase in merchant ship arrivals during June and the first half of July. The average of arrivals was 14 ships a day, an increase of 20 percent over arrival averages during the same period last year, which never went beyond 11 ships per day. This is despite the fact that this period every year is usually relatively quiet with respect to shipping, due to the completion of old contracts and the beginning of new fiscal year contracts. Captain 'Ali Sulayman, director general of port operations, added that he has noted an increase in the arrival of ships carrying iron which, during June and the first half of July totalled 25 ships loaded with 175,000 tons. There were also 41 ships with 123,000 cubic meters of wood, as well as a considerable increase in arrivals of refrigerated ships carrying meat, poultry and fish. The operation of new port refrigerated facilities, with a 5000 ton capacity, has helped to speed up the unloading process. It has been possible to raise the unloading rate for refrigerated ships to 500 tons per day, instead of 200 tons. During this same period, the port has had its biggest season in the exporting of citrus fruits, cotton, garlic, onions, aluminum and potatoes. Average arrivals of food supply ships has also increased, since work is currently underway to unload 80,000 tons of flour, 25,000 tons of sorghum and 27,500 tons of wheat. Outside of the port, there are two ships loaded with 50,000 tons of wheat each, and another ship with 10,000 tons of flour. Despite this increase in arrival rates, 2.1 days is the average waiting time for ships.

7005

CSO: 4504/377

WAFD PARTY SHARPENS ATTACKS ON NASIRISTS

London AL-TADUMUN in Arabic No 72, 25 Aug 84 p 18

/Article by 'Abd-al-Qadir Shahib: "Although the Nasirist Party Is Not Formed Yet, the Wafd War Against the Nasirists Has Begun"/

/Text/ More than one observer of party life developments in Egypt these days have noticed that the WAFD newspaper has recently intensified its attack on the Nasirists in Egypt. This surprised political observers in the Egyptian capital because the establishment of the Nasirists Party has not been declared yet. On the contrary, this declaration, which was expected to occur several weeks ago, was put off after the Supreme Administrative Court in Egypt decided to postpone until next October handing down its judgment in the suit filed by Kamal Ahmad, attorney of the Nasirist Party founders, against the Parties Committee /of the People's Assembly/ which disapproved the declaration of the party.

Ever since the WAFD newspaper came into existence, it has waged a continuous attack in every single edition against Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, the July Revolution and the Nasirists, either directly or indirectly and in the form of articles, press interviews and allegations.

The attack basically focused on the "undemocratic method Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir followed during his rule." Observers noticed that the WAFD attack on 'Abd-al-Nasir was more powerful and far-reaching than its attack on al-Sadat, thus prompting many writers and political commentators to look upon it as a way for Wafd leaders to settle their account with the July Revolution.

Prior to the publication of the WAFD newspaper, Wafd leaders, Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din particularly maintained a continuous attack on the July Revolution, 'Abd-al-Nasir and the Nasirists. Many people in Egypt have not forgotten Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din's famous statement in which he said that the Wafd Party differed with the Nasirists by a 360 degree angle. This statement was in reply to a statement issued by Kamal Ahmad who led the formation of the Nasirist Organization, saying that the Nasirists differed with the Wafd by a 180 degree angle!

During the election campaign, the Wafd Party was compelled to tone down its campaign against the July Revolution, 'Abd-al-Nasir and the Nasirists. Rather, the party, in its electoral platform, was intent on emphasizing its adherence to all the July Revolution's accomplishments for labor and farmers alike. However, this did not prevent attacks against 'Abd-al-Nasir and the Nasirists, something political observers believed to be a kind of response to some Nasirists who waged a relentless attack during the election campaign against the Wafd Party which they considered their number one enemy.

However, despite the fact that the Nasirists stopped their attack against the Wafd Party after the elections, the party resumed its attack on the July Revolution and the Nasirists in an intensified manner. This time, the attack was aimed at turning the ruling National Party leaders against them and driving a wedge between them and the Egyptian administration, thus--and perhaps this is the core of the matter--sabotaging and undermining the dialogue that has been going on for a while between the Egyptian administration and some Nasirist detachments to persuade them to take part in political action within the framework of the ruling National Democratic Party in order to strengthen and support it.

For three consecutive weeks, the WAFD newspaper had published a series of news items about an agreement among the Nasirist detachments to focus their present efforts on penetrating the ruling National Party with a view to invading it, controlling it from within, taking over its leadership and expelling those elements loyal to late president Anwar al-Sadat.

Furthermore, the WAFD newspaper willfully published detailed news about sharp differences within the Nasirist ranks, particularly over the issue of the dialogue with the National Party leaders and participation in political action from within the party.

This was coupled naturally by a continued attack on the July Revolution and 'Abd-al-Nasir through articles and topics published by WAFD. The phenomenon that stood out most in this campaign was the front-headlines a few weeks ago that cast doubt on the integrity of the measures to enforce the agrarian reform law and the apportionment of land owned by large landowners--after verifying agricultural ownership--to small farmers.

A number of observers explain the Wafd's intensified attack on the Nasirists in recent days, although the Nasirist Party has not yet been established, as a result of the increased activities of the Nasirists in the Egyptian party arena. In recent months, the Nasirists collected about 50,000 signatures for Nasirist party founders which Farid 'Abd-al-Karim, a Nasirist leader in Egypt, intended to submit. The Nasirists are now preparing to collect about half a million signatures nationwide and the various Nasirist

detachments have agreed to put off their differences to prevent their adversaries from using them to their advantage and so as not to provide any justification for the postponement of the official approval to announce their party.

This resulted in the postponement of Farid 'Abd-al-Karim's application to found the Nasirist Socialist Party which he planned to submit to the Parties Committee in anticipation of the Administrative Court's judgment on the appeal filed by Kamal Ahmad against this committee for turning down the Nasirist Party's application on the pretext that it supported dictatorship and class struggle. Therefore, the Nasirists agreed that Farid 'Abd-al-Karim submit the application for the establishment of the Nasirist Socialist Party only if Kamal Ahmad's appeal was thrown out while they were getting ready, if it was approved, to join Kamal Ahmad and announce the establishment of the party the day the judgment was to be handed down, open a number of headquarters in a number of governorates and elect a new leadership for the Nasirist Party to enable it to take in all the Nasirist detachments.

All this pointed to increased possibilities of the establishment of a new party for the Nasirists in Egypt, the postponement of its declaration notwithstanding. More importantly, it indicated that it will be a strong party and a rival for the Wafd Party to contend with more so than the present opposition parties which some observers expect to be adversely affected by the establishment of the Nasirist Party. These observers expect the Grouping Party to be most heavily hit by this because the Nasirists constitute one of its main constituent forces.

Therefore, observers believe that the concentrated attack the WAFD is waging against the Nasirists is a willful and calculated campaign aimed primarily at weakening the Nasirists and sowing the seeds of discord among them and at turning the regime against them on the assumption that their party is the primary rival of the Wafd Party, both politically and popularly.

12502

CSO: 4504/429

LAW ON PREFECTURES, PROVINCES, ASSEMBLIES PUBLISHED

Casablanca LE MATIN DU SAHARA in French 8 Aug 84 pp 3-4

[Royal Decree No 1-63-273 dated 12 September 1963 on the organization of prefectures, provinces, and their assemblies]

[Text] Royal Decree No 1-63-273 dated 22 Rabi II 1383 (12 September 1963) relative to the organization of prefectures, provinces, and their assemblies (BULLETIN OFFICIEL, 13 September 1963, p 1469).

(Revised 30 September 1976.)

God alone be praised!

(Great seal of His Majesty Hassan II)

Be it known by these presents--and may God elevate and strengthen the content thereof!

That Our Sherifian Majesty,

Noting the Constitution promulgated on 17 Rajab 1382 (14 December 1962), particularly articles 93, 94, 95, and 110 thereof;

Noting Royal Decree No 1-59-161 dated 27 Safar 1379 (1 September 1962) relative to the election of communal councils as amended and supplemented;

Noting Royal Decree No 1-59-162 dated 27 Safar 1379 (1 September 1962) regulating elections;

Noting both Royal Decree No 1-59-351 dated 1 Jumada II 1379 (2 December 1959) relative to the administrative subdivision of the kingdom as amended and supplemented, in particular by Royal Decree No 1-63-256 dated 22 Rabi II 1383 (12 September 1963), and Decree No 2-59-1834 dated 1 Jumada II 1379 (2 December 1959) establishing and listing the rural communes of the kingdom as amended and supplemented, in particular by Decree No 2-63-331 dated 22 Rabi II 1383 (12 September 1963);

Noting both Royal Decree No 1-59-395 dated 25 Jumada II 1379 (26 December 1959) ordering a census of the population of the kingdom, and Decree No 2-61-213 dated

13 Hijja 1380 (29 May 1961) authenticating the figures establishing the legal population of the Kingdom of Morocco according to the population census of June 1960 as amended;

Noting Royal Decree No 1-59-315 dated 28 Hijja 1379 (23 June 1960) relative to the organization of communes as amended and supplemented;

Noting Decree No 2-60-905 dated 20 Jumada II 1380 ([day not clear] December 1960) relative to the annual revision of communal voter rolls;

Noting Royal Decree No 1-63-03? [last digit not clear] dated 5 Shawwal 1382 (1 March 1963) on the special status of administrators in the Ministry of Interior, especially articles 29 and 30 thereof;

Noting Royal Decree No 1-58-041 dated 20 Muharram 1378 (6 August 1958) governing public accounting in the kingdom;

Has decided as follows:

Chapter 1

General Provisions

Article 1: The provinces and prefectures are territorial government units in public law enjoying civil personality and financial autonomy.

Article 2: The affairs of a province or prefecture are administered by an assembly under the conditions established in this royal decree.

Chapter 2

Makeup and Election of Prefectural and Provincial Assemblies

Article 3: Members of the assemblies are elected by list for 6 years under a system of proportional representation following the rule of the highest remainder.

However, the mandates of members elected in byelections will expire on the same day that the mandates of members of the above-mentioned assemblies normally expire.

Article 4: Prefectural and provincial councilors are elected from among the communal councilors in their respective prefectures or provinces by an electoral college made up of the communal councilors of the prefecture or province in question.

Article 5: A prefectural or provincial assembly consists of:

Eleven elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of 300,000 or less.

Thirteen elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of between 300,001 and 400,000 inhabitants.

Fifteen elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of between 400,001 and 500,000 inhabitants.

Seventeen elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of between 500,001 and 600,000 inhabitants.

Nineteen elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of between 600,001 and 700,000 inhabitants.

Twenty-one elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of between 700,001 and 800,000 inhabitants.

Twenty-three elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of between 800,001 and 1 million inhabitants.

Twenty-five elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of between 1,000,001 and 1,250,000 inhabitants.

Twenty-seven elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of between 1,250,001 and 1.5 million inhabitants.

Twenty-nine elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of between 1,500,001 and 2 million inhabitants.

Thirty-one elected members in prefectures or provinces with a population of between 2,000,001 and 3 million inhabitants.

Article 6: In addition to the members elected by the communal councilors, whose number varies as set forth in the preceding article in accordance with the legal population as established in the most recent official census, representatives of the chamber of agriculture, the chamber of commerce and industry, and the chamber of artisans in each prefecture or province, as elected for that purpose, will be members of the assembly with a right to speak and vote. Each chamber elects from among its members one representative for each prefecture or province within its jurisdiction. The representative in question is elected by a plurality of votes from among the members of the elected chamber for the respective prefecture or province.

Section 1

Ineligibility and Incompatibility

Article 7: The following are ineligible to serve as prefectural or provincial councilors anywhere in the kingdom:

1. Persons effectively exercising the following duties or having ceased to exercise them less than 6 months before the date set for the election:

- a) Magistrates belonging to the judiciary.
- b) Governors, secretaries general of prefectures or provinces, heads of cercles, chefs de cabinet to governors, heads of urban and rural regions (pashas and caids), and their caliphs, as well as "chioukhs" and "moquadmines."

c) Members of the military and police forces.

2. Persons covered by one of the disqualifications excluding them from inclusion on an electoral list for the communal councils in accordance with the provisions of articles 5 and 6 of the above-mentioned Royal Decree No 1-59-161 dated 27 Safar 1379 (1 September 1959).

3. Naturalized Moroccans whose citizenship was granted under the provisions of article 17 of the royal decree of 21 Safar 1378 (6 September 1958) regulating Moroccan nationality.

Article 8: The office of prefectural or provincial councilor is incompatible with any position remunerated totally or partially from the prefectural or provincial budget or from the budget of a public institution under the supervision of the prefecture or province.

The office of councilor is incompatible with the positions of concessionnaire, manager, or contractor in connection with prefectural or provincial public services.

Article 9: No member of an assembly who is also an attorney or certified defense counsel may plead on behalf of or provide legal counsel for any of the public services referred to in the preceding article or the prefecture or province itself.

Article 10: Any councilor who, at the time of his election, is covered by one of the cases of incompatibility referred to in article 8 above must prove within 8 days of taking his seat as a councilor that he has resigned from posts incompatible with his mandate or, if he occupies public office, that he has requested transfer to the special position provided by his status. If he fails to do so, he will automatically be declared to have resigned his mandate by a decision of the regional court at the request of the governor.

Section 2

Declaration of Candidacy

Article 11: The date of each election is established by a decree published no less than 20 days before the said date.

Candidates on the same list must submit a declaration of their candidacy that is signed by all of them.

Declarations of candidacy must indicate the following:

1. The name of the list being submitted.
2. The surname, given name, date and place of birth, occupation, and domicile of each candidate.
3. The communal council to which each candidate belongs.

4. The order of presentation of the candidates.

5. The name of the candidate acting as the list's representative.

These declarations, prepared in triplicate, must be received by the governor or his representative no later than the eighth day preceding the election.

Article 12: The same name cannot be used by more than one list in the same prefectural or provincial electoral district. Each list must comprise a number of candidates equal to the number of seats assigned to the electoral district in question. No candidate may withdraw after the list has been submitted.

No one may be a candidate on more than one list in the same electoral district or in more than one electoral district. If, contrary to the provisions of this article, a candidate runs for election on more than one list or in more than one electoral district, he cannot be validly proclaimed elected in any electoral district. If a declaration of candidacy is rejected, the representative of the list concerned is notified immediately through administrative channels, with an acknowledgment of receipt being required.

Any list constituted in violation of this article is prohibited and is not registered. Votes for candidates belonging to such a list are considered void.

If the registration of a list is challenged, the candidates on that list have recourse under the terms set forth in article 27.

Article 13: The representative of each list is issued a temporary receipt acknowledging his list's declaration of candidacy. The final receipt is delivered within 48 hours after the declaration is submitted if the list of candidates appears to conform to the legal stipulations in effect. The list is then registered in the order in which it was received, and its registration number is shown on the final receipt.

A color other than green or red is assigned to each list in the order of registration, and that color is indicated on the final receipt.

Article 14: Once registered, each list is immediately published by the local authorities in the form of a public notice and by any other traditional means commonly employed so as to bring it to the knowledge of all the communal councilors in the electoral district concerned.

Article 15: As soon as the decree setting the election date is published, the governor issues voter cards and ballots in accordance with the provisions of articles 18 and 19 of the above-mentioned Royal Decree No 1-59-161 dated 27 Safar 1379 (1 September 1959).

Voter cards are delivered to the communal councilors in person by local authorities, and a receipt is required.

Section 3

Voting Procedures

Article 16: The governor will establish one or more polling places for each prefectural or provincial electoral district, and communal councilors will be notified of their location at least 8 days before the election is held.

Article 17: The governor appoints civil servants or literate voters in the electoral districts to supervise the said polling places. He delivers to them, along with the text of this royal decree, a list in triplicate of the names of communal councilors qualified to vote at each polling place as well as the lists of duly registered candidates. In addition, he appoints an individual to replace each election supervisor when the latter is absent.

Article 18: The election supervisor is assisted by three election officials selected from among literate voters present at the polling place when the ballots are opened. The youngest of the three election officials acts as clerk.

While balloting is underway, the number of members present must at no time be less than three.

Article 19: The maintenance of order is the responsibility of the election supervisor. The officials decide all questions arising from the election process, and their decisions are recorded in the minutes of that process. Registered candidates may participate and take part in the balloting.

Article 20: Ballots are cast and votes are counted in accordance with the provisions of articles 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 of the previously cited Royal Decree No 1-59-161 dated 27 Safar 1379 (1 September 1959).

The polls open at 1400 hours and close as soon as all voters assigned to the polling place in question have voted, but no later than 1800 hours in any case.

Article 21: Immediately after the votes are counted, the provisional results are announced by the election supervisor. The minutes of the process are immediately prepared in triplicate, and each copy is approved and signed by the election supervisor and the election officials.

One copy of the minutes is retained at the polling place.

The second copy, to which challenged and voided ballots are attached, is placed in an envelope that is sealed and signed by the election supervisor and then delivered immediately to the prefectural or provincial verification committee at the administrative center of the prefecture or province.

The third copy is deposited with the clerk of the regional court for that electoral district.

Article 22: The prefectural or provincial verification committee consists of the following:

- a) The presiding judge of the regional court or his representative as chairman.
- b) Two literate voters appointed by the governor.
- c) The governor's representative as secretary.

The candidates or their representatives may be present during the committee's proceedings.

Article 23: The verification committee counts and verifies the votes in the order in which they are received and announces the final results.

Seats are allocated among the lists by determining the electoral quota and then the highest remainders, with the remaining seats being allocated to the vote totals coming closest to the quota.

Article 24: The vote verification process and announcement of the results are recorded immediately in a report that is signed by the chairman and the members of the committee.

One copy of the report is submitted to the governor for retention at the office of the prefecture or province. Another copy, to which all the related documents are attached, is placed in an envelope that is sealed and signed as provided in the preceding paragraph and then delivered immediately to the court having jurisdiction in that province or prefecture.

One copy of the report, also placed in a sealed and signed envelope, is delivered without delay to the office of each polling place in the electoral district.

All copies of the report are signed as provided in the first paragraph above.

Article 25: During the 8 full days following the final announcement of results, the voting records and reports by the verification committee may be consulted at the office of the prefecture or province or at the office of the polling place by any interested candidate with a view to appealing the results, if need be, as provided in articles 28 and following.

Initialed voter lists are kept for inspection by the voters, under the same conditions, at the polling place.

Article 26: The partial or absolute invalidity of an election can be pronounced only under the following conditions:

1. If the election was not carried out according to the forms prescribed by law.
2. If the balloting was not free or if it was invalidated as a result of fraud.
3. If the person elected is incapacitated legally or judicially.

Section 4

Electoral Disputes and Miscellaneous Provisions

Article 27: Challenges to a candidate's filing for office are governed by the following provisions:

Any candidate whose declaration of candidacy is rejected may appeal the decision by the authority responsible for registering such declarations to the court having jurisdiction. This recourse remains open for 3 days beginning with the date of rejection. It is recorded at no charge, and a receipt is issued.

The regional court rules as the court of last resort within 3 days of the date on which the complaint was recorded and immediately notifies the individual concerned and the authority responsible for accepting declarations of candidacy of its decision. The said authority must immediately register candidacies declared admissible by the court and give them the publicity required by article 14.

Article 28: Challenges concerning voting procedures or announcement of the election results are governed by the following provisions:

Decisions reached by the polling places in connection with voting procedures, the verification of votes in connection with voting procedures, the verification of votes, and announcement of the election results may be brought before the regional court having jurisdiction by giving notice of appeal either to the governor, pasha, head of cercle, or caid or to the interested parties.

On penalty of being declared void, the appeal must take the form of a written petition within 8 full days of the date of the report recording the final announcement of election results. The petition must be filed with the clerk of the regional court having jurisdiction. There is no charge for the filing of such a petition.

Every appeal must specify the grounds on which the court is being requested to rule.

Article 29: Within 24 hours after the appeal is filed, the presiding judge of the court to which the matter is referred will appoint a judge to conduct the investigation. The latter will immediately notify the persons involved of the existence of the petition and obtain their oral or written comments as soon as possible.

Article 30: As soon as the matter is ready for trial, the presiding judge of the regional court notifies the governor, pasha, head of cercle, and caid concerned and the parties involved of the date on which the appeal will be heard by the court.

The said hearing must be held within 30 days of the date on which the appeal was filed. The appeal is heard in open court on the basis of the report by the judge in charge of the investigation.

The parties involved may present their remarks in person or through a properly registered attorney or certified defense counsel. The court may order any useful investigation procedures.

In every case, the court immediately notifies the governor and the parties concerned of its decision. Its decision is exempt from stamp taxes and registration fees.

If the court does not render its decision within the time limit specified above, the challenge is considered to have been rejected. The court has relinquished jurisdiction, and the interested party may take his case to the Supreme Court within 15 days after the specified time limit has expired.

Article 31: Decisions thus rendered are not subject to appeal. An appeal may be lodged with the Court of Cassation. Such an appeal, drawn up in the forms and conditions stipulated in the royal decree of 2 Rabi I 1377 (27 September 1957) relative to the Supreme Court, must be filed with the clerk of the said court or with the clerk of the court that rendered the decision within 15 days of the date of notification of the court's decision. The appeal is heard as an urgent matter involving no costs. It is exempt from stamp taxes and registration fees, and there is no obligation to be represented by an attorney.

The councilor or councilors declared elected remain in office until a final ruling on challenges has been made.

Article 32: When, as a consequence of an appeal drawn up as stipulated in articles 28 and following, the results of an election are partially annulled, the next candidate on the list in question is declared elected. If there is no such candidate, a byelection is held to fill the vacant seat.

In case of partial or total annulment of the election results, new elections will be held not more than 3 months after the date of the ruling on the appeal.

The date of the said election is set by a decree of the minister of interior. His decree must be published at least 25 days before the said date.

Article 33: Electioneering and violations of the law during elections are governed and punished in accordance with the provisions of the above-mentioned Royal Decree No 1-59-162 dated 27 Safar 1379 (1 September 1959).

Chapter 3

Functioning of Assemblies

Article 34: (Amended as per (1) below by Royal Decree No 902-65 dated 18 March 1976, BULLETIN OFFICIEL dated 30 March 1966 [as published], p 38.) The assemblies meet twice a year in regular sessions. The first session is held between 15 March and 15 April for a period not to exceed 2 weeks, and the second session is held between 1 and 30 October for a period not to exceed 3 weeks.

The budget consists of an initial budget and a supplementary budget. The supplementary budget for the year in progress is debated at the first session,

and the initial budget for the following year is debated during the second session.

(1) Provisions of this article contrary to those contained in the royal decree governing Law No 1.76.584 dated 30 September 1976 (5 Shawwal 1396) relative to the financial organization of local government units and their organizations are repealed.

The opening date for each of the two regular sessions is set by the governor.

Article 35: Councilors may meet in special session by order of the minister of interior either at the request of two-thirds of the elected members of the assembly, who must present the minister of interior with a written request under the authority of the governor, or at the request of the governor. The minister of interior issues a receipt for that request.

In every case, such sessions must be convened by the governor within 15 days of the date of the order referred to in the preceding paragraph. A special session may not last for more than 5 days.

Article 36: The agenda for each session is prepared by the chairman of the assembly in agreement with the governor and is included with the notice of the meeting. The notice is sent to the councilors 8 full days before the opening date. At any time before or during the session, the minister of interior may add to the agenda for the session any matter he considers appropriate for debate by the assembly.

Article 37: The assembly's sessions are public. However, at the request of the chairman or governor, the assembly may decide to hold one or more closed sessions.

Article 38: The assembly may not deliberate unless more than half of its elected members are present. If there is no quorum on the day set for opening the session, the session is postponed for 5 full days, and a special convening letter is sent immediately by the governor. Deliberations will then be valid regardless of the number of members present. The legal duration of the session will begin on the day set for this second session.

When, in the course of a session, the members present do not constitute a majority of the assembly, deliberations will be postponed until the second day following, and they will then be valid regardless of the number of voting members present.

In both cases, the names of those absent will be recorded in the minutes.

Article 39: Votes are taken publicly. Their results, as well as the names of those voting, are recorded in the minutes.

Article 40: At the start of its first regular session every year, the assembly elects its officers. Those officers consist of 1) a chairman, 2) a deputy chairman and, when the assembly consists of more than 21 representatives, a second deputy chairman, 3) a budget reporter, 4) a secretary, and 5) an assistant secretary of the assembly. Officers are elected by a plurality of votes, and

balloting is secret. If candidates receive an equal number of votes, the eldest is elected. The officers remain in office until the first regular session of the following year, and they may be reelected.

Article 41: Following the same procedures as those stipulated in the preceding article, the assembly appoints its special committees and, in particular, the members of the budget committee, the committee on economic affairs and planning, and the committee on social and cultural affairs.

The committees may meet between sessions at the request of the chairman of the assembly in agreement with the governor. The governor or his representative may attend committee meetings. Officials of the province or prefecture, the state's external services, and public institutions may be called on to assist the committees whenever requested by the chairman through the governor.

The assembly is represented on the Provincial Council for National Development by its chairman, the chairman of its committee on economic affairs and planning, and its budget reporter.

Article 42: The assembly sets its own rules of procedure, which must be approved by the minister of interior.

The chairman or, in his absence, the governor is responsible for maintaining order in the assembly. He may expel any individual causing a disturbance from the audience or have him arrested. If a crime or other offense is committed, the chairman prepares a report and immediately refers the matter to the public prosecutor.

Article 43: The minutes of public or closed meetings are prepared day by day by one of the secretaries and signed by the chairman presiding over the meeting as well as by the governor or his representative.

Two copies of those minutes are sent to the minister of interior within 2 weeks after the session has ended.

Every voter or taxpayer in the prefecture or province is entitled to view the minutes of public sessions at the place where they are kept and to make copies of them.

Article 44: The governor is seated in the assembly at the chairman's right hand. He may speak whenever he asks for the floor and may attend all deliberations except when his accounts are being examined for discharge. He may appoint a representative, in which case his representative shall be the secretary general of the prefecture or province.

In addition, the heads of the external services may be heard by the assembly meeting in public or closed session when a question within their field is being debated. They attend at the request of the governor or that of the chairman conveyed through the governor.

Article 45: Any act or resolution by an assembly relative to matters which are not legally within its field of competence is automatically invalid, and its

invalidity is declared by an order of the minister of interior, who states his reasons.

A councilor may not participate in deliberations regarding a matter that concerns him personally or as an elected representative.

Deliberations that include participation by a councilor having an interest in the matter and who is the object of those deliberations, either personally or as an elected representative, are voidable under the conditions set forth in the first paragraph and within 2 months following receipt of the resolution. Their annulment may be declared at the request of any interested party.

Article 46: Any resolution adopted outside legally authorized sessions of the assembly is automatically void. The governor issues an order, in which his reasons are properly stated, declaring the meeting illegal and its acts void. He immediately informs the public prosecutor for enforcement of the law. If the court decides in favor of the prosecutor, its ruling may exclude the assembly members from the assembly and declare them ineligible for 3 years following their conviction.

Article 47: On the basis of a report by the governor, the minister of interior may take steps to dissolve the assembly. Dissolution is declared by decree and is not subject to appeal. The decree of dissolution can never be a general measure. The same decree must set the date on which a new assembly will be elected. That election must be held within 3 months of the date of the decree except when a general election is being held. The new assembly automatically meets 1 week after its election, elects its officers, and appoints its committees as provided in articles 41 and 42 of this royal decree.

Article 48: When the assembly has lost one-third of its elected members due to vacancies, a byelection is held within 3 months of the date of the last vacancy to fill the vacant seats. However, in the year preceding the general election, an assembly's vacancies are not filled unless it has lost over one-half of its members.

The mandates of councilors elected in a byelection expire on the date on which the mandates of the councilors they replace would have expired.

Article 49: If an assembly is dissolved or if an assembly cannot be formed, a special delegation may be appointed within 30 days by order of the minister of interior. The special delegation ceases to exist as soon as an assembly is formed. A special delegation has three members when the assembly consists of fewer than 21 councilors and five members in other cases. The governor presides over the special delegation.

The powers of the special delegation are limited to acts of purely urgent matters of administration, and it cannot commit the province's finances beyond the amount of funds available during the current fiscal period.

Article 50: Prefectures and provinces may be responsible for accidents suffered by assembly members during the exercise of their duties, either during their

sessions or during the meetings of committees to which they belong or while carrying out a mission assigned to them by the assembly.

Article 51: When a councilor misses two consecutive sessions without a valid excuse accepted by the assembly, he will automatically be declared to have resigned his seat during the last meeting of the second session. The governor will declare the member's resignation with an order stating the reasons.

Article 52: If, during the course of his mandate, an elected member of the assembly falls within the area covered by the rules on ineligibility or incompatibility as set forth in articles 7, 8, and 9 of this royal decree, he will be declared by order of the minister of interior to have resigned his seat.

Article 53: If a councilor resigns, he advises the chairman of the assembly in writing of his resignation, and the chairman immediately forwards the member's resignation to the governor. The resignation becomes final when its receipt is acknowledged by the governor or, if receipt is not acknowledged, 1 month after a second notice of resignation has been sent by registered mail.

Article 54: When assembly members are wage earners, their employers are required to give them the necessary time off to attend the sessions of the assembly and participate in the work of that assembly's committees. The time off thus granted to such wage earners is not paid for as worked time, but the time may be made up. The interruption of work covered by this article cannot be used by the employer as grounds for breaking the work contract.

Article 55: Councilors serve without pay. However, for each session and during its duration, as well as for each committee meeting or any other mission taking place at a time other than during those sessions, the assembly members receive compensation for travel and living expenses, the rates and terms of which are established by a joint decree of the minister of interior and the minister of finance.

Chapter 4

Powers of Assemblies

Article 56: Through its deliberations, the assembly decides all matters falling within its sphere of competence in accordance with the law and regulations.

Section 1

Budget

Article 57 (amended by Royal Decree No 902-65 dated 26 Qa'dah 1385 (18 March 1966): The budget is prepared by the governor and submitted to the assembly at the start of each regular session in the chronological order indicated in article 34 above.

The governor is required to submit the budget bill with supporting documents to the budget committee at least 2 weeks before the opening of the session.

The budget is approved by the assembly. The related resolutions are enforceable only after approval by the minister of interior.

The provisions of the decree regulating municipal accounting apply to the budget, subject to any special provisions enacted by decree.

Article 58 (amended as per (1) below): Revenues and expenditures included in the budget are covered by annual forecasts in accordance with the following provisions:

1. Revenues:

a) Ordinary revenues: taxes, duties, and fees that the prefecture or province is legally entitled to collect.

b) Special revenues: loans, subsidies, aid funds, gifts, and bequests.

2. Expenditures:

a) Operating, maintenance, equipment, and supply expenditures required for the administration of the prefecture or province and for the maintenance of property.

b) Expenditures for equipment and new construction, buildings, roads, equipment for use by the prefecture or province, and participation in useful projects involving the prefectural, provincial, or communal governments.

(1) Provisions of this article contrary to those contained in the royal decree governing Law No 1-76-584 dated 30 September 1976 (5 Shawwal 1396) relative to the financial organization of local government units and their organizations are repealed.

Section 2

Compulsory Expenditures

Article 59: (Repealed by the royal decree governing Law No 1-76-584 dated 5 Shawwal 1396 (30 September 1976).)

Article 60: (First paragraph repealed by the royal decree governing Law No 1-76-584 dated 5 Shawwal 1396 (30 September 1976).)

Second paragraph: If for any reason the assembly is unable to approve the budget or refuses to debate the draft budget submitted by the governor, the minister of interior may automatically establish a budget covering compulsory expenditures secured by ordinary revenues for the fiscal period in question.

Article 61: (Repealed by the royal decree governing Law No 1-76-584 dated 5 Shawwal 1396 (30 September 1976).)

Article 62: Administrative accounts concerned with revenues and expenditures for each fiscal year are prepared by the governor at the close of the year and

submitted at the first succeeding regular session. The accounts are approved by the assembly following their examination by the budget committee.

Section 3

Miscellaneous Powers

Article 63: The assembly deliberates in particular on the following matters:

1. Proposed borrowings.
2. Establishment, within the limits set by law, of the tax base, rates, and rules for the collection of fees, duties, and taxes collected on behalf of the prefecture or province.
3. The acquisition, disposal, and exchange of real property assigned to prefectural or provincial departments.
4. The acceptance of gifts and bequests.
5. Concessions, leases, management, and other forms of administration in connection with prefectural or provincial public services.
6. The establishment of prefectural or provincial public services.
7. Plans or projects for regional development and improvement affecting the prefecture or province.
8. Construction or participation in companies for regional development or outfitting and for territorial planning.
9. Projects for industrial decentralization.
10. Programs for new construction.
11. The classification, maintenance, rectification, or extension of roads.
12. All matters of an administrative or economic nature involving either a prefecture or province and a bordering prefectural, provincial, or communal government unit.

Article 64: Resolutions adopted by the assembly in connection with matters listed in the preceding article are enforceable only if approved by the minister of interior within 2 months of the date on which receipt of the relevant minutes is acknowledged by the minister of interior.

A resolution is rejected if a decision to approve it has not been made within 3 months.

Article 65: All other resolutions are enforceable if, within 30 days after the minutes for that session are signed, the governor has not requested their suspension in a report to the minister of interior that includes his reasons.

The minister accepts or rejects the governor's opposition. If he rejects it, the resolution becomes enforceable immediately. If the governor's opposition is upheld, the provisions of the preceding article apply.

Article 66: The assembly may be consulted by the ministers on questions of prefectural, provincial, or intercommunal interest, particularly in the administrative and economic areas, and it may be invited to give its opinion. It may also, under the authority of the governor and the minister of interior, submit requests to the appropriate ministers in connection with matters in its field of competence and present its opinion on the situation and needs of various public services in the prefecture or province. In particular, it may state its opinion on the use and development of collective lands and on questions involving the seasonal movement of livestock.

The assembly may also express its wishes on questions concerning economic or social administration and general administration.

It is prohibited from expressing any wishes of a political nature.

Article 67: At the start of the first regular session, the governor presents the assembly with a report on activities by the prefectural or provincial departments, the government's external services, and public institutions during the preceding year.

The governor also informs the assembly concerning proposals or plans for new construction or maintenance that have been prepared by the various departments in connection with the following year.

Chapter 5

Governor's Powers

Execution of Resolutions

Article 68: The governor, who is responsible for carrying out the assembly's resolutions in accordance with those resolutions:

1. Executes the budget for the prefecture or province.
2. Takes all necessary steps to ensure that the assembly's enforceable resolutions are carried out.
3. Takes care of and manages the property of the prefecture or province.
4. Is a party to sales contracts, title transfers, exchanges, divisions, and other transactions related to property.
5. Signs contracts and negotiates government contracts for public works, supplies, and services.

Section 2

Judicial Proceedings

Article 69: In carrying out a resolution by the assembly, the governor institutes legal proceedings on behalf of the province or prefecture.

Article 70: The governor may, without prior debate by the assembly:

1. Act as defendant in all suits brought against the prefecture or province in lower courts, appeals courts, and the Court of Cassation.
2. Institute any possessory action or act as defendant in such action, undertake all conservatory acts or those for the interruption of forfeiture, and act as defendant in appeals lodged against statements drawn up for the recovery of debt owed to the prefecture or province.
3. Investigate all petitions for summary proceedings, follow up on summary orders in appeal, and file appeals against those summary orders.

Article 71: On penalty of being declared void, no legal proceedings except possessory actions and actions for summary judgment can be instituted against a prefecture or province unless the plaintiff has first submitted to the minister of interior or the latter's delegated authority a statement of the object of and reasons for his complaint. The plaintiff is issued a receipt.

The suit cannot be brought before the courts until 2 months after the date of the receipt, without prejudice to any conservatory acts.

Presentation of the plaintiff's statement interrupts any statute of limitations in forfeiture if legal action is instituted within 3 months.

Chapter 6

Prefectural or Provincial Property

Article 72: All movable property and real estate acquired by the prefecture or province gratuitously or for a consideration is part of the prefecture's or the province's property. This property comprises public property and private property. Public property includes all assets for the use of the public. An order by the minister of interior, issued at the request of the governor, classifies such assets as being prefectural or provincial public property.

Article 73: To provide the prefectures and provinces with their initial property, the state will transfer to them, under conditions to be established by decree, certain assets from its public and private property.

The same decree will establish rules for the administration of prefectural and provincial property.

Chapter 7

Associations of Provinces or Prefectures

Article 74: By means of a decree issued upon examination of the minutes of deliberations by the provincial or prefectural councils concerned, provinces and prefectures may be authorized to form associations to carry out joint projects or manage funds owned by each of them and for the purpose of financing civic projects and the payment of certain joint operating expenses.

Article 75: Associations of provinces or prefectures are public institutions invested with civil personality and enjoying financial autonomy.

Laws and regulations concerning the supervision of provinces and prefectures also apply to such associations, and the rules governing provincial and prefectural accounting also apply to accounting by such associations.

Article 76: Each association is managed by a committee whose members are elected by the provincial and prefectural assemblies concerned. Each province or prefecture is represented on the committee by a delegate who is chosen from among the members of the provincial or prefectural assembly.

The said delegate is elected by ballot, and an absolute majority is required for election. If no candidate has won an absolute majority after two rounds of balloting, a third round of balloting is held, in which case a plurality of votes determines the winner. If candidates receive an equal number of votes, the eldest is elected.

The term of office for the delegate from the provincial or prefectural assembly expires when that of the said assembly expires. However, if the provincial or prefectural assembly is suspended, is dissolved, or resigns in its entirety, the delegate remains in office until the new assembly has elected its new representative on the association's committee.

The outgoing delegate is eligible for reelection.

If the office of delegate becomes vacant for any reason, the provincial or prefectural assembly replaces him within 1 month.

Article 77: The committee elects from among its members a chairman, who is empowered to administer the association's funds (initiate the work to be carried out at the request of the provincial or prefectural assemblies, settle costs, and order payment of expenses).

Article 78: (Repealed by the royal decree governing Law No 1-76-584 dated 5 Shawwal 1396 (30 September 1976).)

Article 79: All legislative or regulatory provisions contrary to this royal decree are repealed.

Done in Tangier on 22 Rabi II 1383 (12 September 1963).

MEAT PRODUCTION EXAMINED

Casablanca LE MESSAGE DE LA NATION in French No 47, 8 Aug 84 pp 26-28

[Article by Abdelouahed El Mansouri: "From Livestock to the Slaughterhouse"]

[Text] Drought, price hikes for meat, absence of substantial subsidies to stockmen to promote this vital sector of the agricultural economy and the illegal slaughter of livestock are the major problems of this situation. LE MESSAGE DE LA NATION presents a detailed evaluation of meat production and marketing in Morocco.

Since its accession to independence, Morocco has continually improved its agriculture and livestock by all appropriate, modern means. The formation of agricultural cooperatives begun by his majesty the king and the recovery of lands occupied by foreigners have contributed greatly to the spread of agrarian reform and agriculture in general; this reform was begun by royal decree enacted into law on 4 July 1966.

Over the years, agriculture has continued to expand and spread to meet specifically the vital needs of the nation and of the foreign market while increasing the yield and improving the quality of production.

Thus, since 1972, more than 400 agricultural cooperatives have been created under the supervision and with the assistance of the government and thousands of quality cattle, sheep and milk cows have been imported to upgrade the livestock. Despite the fact that most citizens have not made the sacrifice of Aid El Adha for the last 2 years and certain restrictions on slaughtering in slaughterhouses, meat production to date remains far from all predictions made and does not offer consumers a selection of meat suitable and affordable for the pocketbooks of all classes and there should be exports because of Morocco's situation as an agricultural country and a producer.

The Drought and Its Consequences

It is true that the drought which has affected the world in recent years has prevented stockmen in this area from achieving, as they expected, the desired result.

Among the consequences of this drought, the problem of feeding the animals last year was a special concern for stockmen. Obviously, they had to resort to unusual feeding systems and supplement the rations with feed purchased abroad. That created new problems especially about the prices of this feed.

The matter deserved much study, all the more so because agricultural costs were increased by what we call intermediate consumption; in other words, expenses for fertilizers, fuels, import of cereals and the unexpected increase in cattle feed.

Consequently, this year and next year should be more auspicious for stockmen who, on one hand, must learn from the past and, on the other hand, must purchase more food to feed their livestock and set up reserves to avoid any speculation of food products.

Example of Other Countries

Generally, the domestic meat market, which we want to discuss in this analysis, has been marked by fluctuations since 1973, particularly in comparison with the evolution on the world market.

In comparison with 1974 and earlier, beef production has continued to increase but very modestly. For that reason, prices could not be maintained at affordable levels and in 1984 there was a much higher increase than in 1983. Poultry, despite improved production, showed what was considered a moderate increase in comparison with beef and lamb production.

Lamb meat production decreased substantially in 1982 and 1983 in comparison with other years. In 1979, there were 15,992,012 sheep; in 1980, there were 16,509,808; in 1981, there were 15,675,495; in 1982, there were 10,155,047 and in 1983 there were 12,610,673 head of sheep. This drop forced the government to import 3,990 tons of meat this year to compensate for the shortage. As we can see, there was a sheep crisis in 1982 which led his majesty the king to ask his people not to make the sacrifice of Aid El Adha.

If we consider the aid given by some European countries to stockmen, we note that ours have not yet received the necessary grants and organization to enable them to increase their livestock adequately.

In 1974, France, for example, granted exceptional aid to stockmen amounting to 1.7 billion French francs and since early 1975, it has instituted additional exceptional aid of 1,200 French francs per stockman. This measure was aimed to pay part of the increased production costs. Since then, stockmen are still receiving this aid.

Since 1 September 1974 Belgium has granted a bonus to farmers who own cattle. In 1974, 235 million Belgian francs were placed at their disposal for this project and in 1975, 144 million Belgian francs were made available, etc. Belgium also granted aid to the special fund for farmers in hard-hit areas. This measure, which provided 130 million Belgian francs in 1974, aimed to remedy the economic difficulties of farmers located in less fertile areas.

According to information from a reliable source, it appears that the annual fluctuations of the harvests have and always will have a preponderant impact on the outlook for the agricultural market. Consequently, it is not a matter of predicting the levels of production or the prices to be paid in the various sectors in the coming years. On the contrary, the government, carefully considering the evolution of the agricultural market in recent and future harvests and the future increase in consumption and production, reportedly has taken the following measures:

1. An approximate 10 percent drop from previous years in the slaughter of cattle and calves;
2. Increased production of sheep to lower the prices and enable citizens to make the sacrifice of Aid El Adha under the proper conditions;
3. Increased production of poultry and a decrease in the prices to compensate in a small way for the consumption of other meats, etc.

The price of meat, like all other goods, has skyrocketed over the years despite all efforts made in this area. Our analysis generally shows the consequences which are difficult to remedy as long as the situation is not taken seriously and strict controls are not placed on some speculators of livestock, illegal slaughtering and the marketing of cattle feed.

The Evolution of Prices Over the Years

The table below taken from certain statistics presents an overview of the evolution of the prices of regular meat:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Year</u>						
		<u>1961</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Beef	kg	4.49	7.75	14.50	18.75	20.80	22.50	24.00
Lamb	kg	5.59	9.56	15.50	20.00	27.00	27.50	28.00
Chicken	kg	4.60	5.86	5.95	6.25	6.75	7.00	7.60

The rates listed above generally reflect the prices charged over the years in the slaughterhouses of the Governorate of Greater Casablanca and not those charged by the butchers for their meats. It should be point out, from information gathered on the scene, that meat prices have apparently continued to rise since May 1984. Thus the prices for beef and lamb are increasing and more price hikes are expected. Moreover, the tables below show the increase in prices charged on 2 days, one in May and the other in June:

a) - Day of 30 May 1984

<u>Type</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>Slaughtered</u>	<u>Price of</u> <u>Regular Meat</u>	<u>Price of</u> <u>Prime Meat</u>
Beef	kg	229 head	27.00 dh	28.00 dh
Lamb	kg	3,278 head	28.00 dh	30.00 dh
Chicken	kg	12,900 head	7.60 dh	8.20 dh

b) - Day of 11 June 1984

<u>Type</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>Slaughtered</u>	<u>Price of</u> <u>Regular Meat</u>	<u>Price of</u> <u>so-called</u> <u>Prime Meat</u>
Beef	kg	423 head	28.00 dh	28.50 dh
Lamb	kg	4,294 head	28.50 dh	30.00 dh
Chicken	kg	9,500 head	8.00 dh	8.30 dh

From the two tables above, we can immediately deduce that the number slaughtered in the slaughterhouses of Greater Casablanca is mathematically inadequate to the needs of a population of 3 million inhabitants. This reveals that illegal slaughtering exists since, according to a discreet survey of some butchers, we learned that some admit that they break the rules because, in their words, the price set by the government does not permit a profit and does not allow them to pay their taxes, transportation costs, rent, etc.

The prices posted in various butcher shops vary from neighborhood to neighborhood and from city to city. They are as follows:

Beef	From 30 dh to 36 dh a kg
Lamb	From 32 dh to 40 dh a kg
Chicken	From 9.50 dh to 20 dh a kg

We should mention, moreover, that the illegal slaughter is done in several ways, especially in the working class neighborhoods late at night where the supervision is less rigorous. Thus, some butchers own large buildings in remote areas equipped for this purpose; they bring their booty there and kill it on the spot; others do it in their shops and paint their meat red or blue to mix it subsequently with other leftover or fresh meat from the slaughterhouses. They kill cattle outside the town limits, in private properties and transport it in sections to their stores.

Without neglecting the hygienic side, illegal slaughtering presents several anomalies economically and from a regulatory point of view, since it circumvents all duties, whether it be the census, disease detection or taxes charged by the state. However, it is not difficult to apprehend the perpetrators.

It is true that recently a police office has been set up in the slaughterhouses of Greater Casablanca to end the activity of some speculators and swindlers. However, it should be pointed out that the meat situation, a vital matter from all points of view, for all classes of society, must be reformed, as the other sectors, to improve production and quality and make it available to all pocketbooks. Moreover, as is well known, Morocco is an agricultural country and should not be deficient in this area if there were adequate organization and the necessary subsidies.

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CSO: 4519/245

NATIONAL ECONOMY CHIEF DISCUSSES RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Tunis AL-'AMAL in Arabic 7 Aug 84 p 3

/Interview with Economy Minister Rachid Sfar by Bechir Ben Romdhane: "AL-'AMAL in an Exclusive Interview with the Minister of National Economy: 1984 Has Been Distinguished by Our Ability To Control Prices and Price Growth Rates"/

/Text/ In recent days, the political scene has witnessed agitation on the part of many writers concerning indices on price increases in a number of commodities, and others have been appointed to defend the buying power of the citizen. For the sake of clarification, AL-'AMAL got in touch with Mr Rachid Sfar, member of the political bureau and minister of national economy, who gave us a summary interview on the rise in price of indices in some commodities and the rate of this rise and its effects on citizens' buying power.

The Latest Changes in Prices Have Been Accepted

I asked Mr Rachid Sfar, "There has been much talk in recent days about the rise in the price indices of some commodities, and some papers have exploited this. Are there any explanations on this subject?" He said,

"Recently, some papers have talked about the rise in prices without stressing what proof and evidence, which is both firm and categorical, have concluded. The ultimate point is that there have been changes 'that have been agreed upon' affecting certain goods.

"The fact which must be asserted and stated is that 1984 has been characterized by our ability to control the price index and the rate of growth of prices.

We Have Not Imposed a Price Freeze; Rather, We Are Anxious To Control the Development of Prices

"Our economic policy is basically aimed at approving an objective, essential and inevitable modification of prices which will cause us to control them as well as they can be controlled. We have not proposed to freeze prices, but

we have called for, and been anxious to control, their growth so that we will not let conditions become aggravated and let things pass out of our hands with time. We all know that 1983 was the year of pressure on prices and the year of the freeze and control on some prices.

Experts Expected a Rise in the Price Index

"Among many people who claim expertise in this area, it was anticipated that the price index would jump to two figures in 1984, after the great pressure which we sought to exert in 1984, but from the beginning of the year we aimed at a tentative policy of changing prices, agreed on the most important of these in the context of the supplementary financial law, and took care to arrange it that the increase in the price index at the end of 1984 would not exceed 8 percent. Proceeding from that premise, I must observe that by the end of the month of June the price index had risen only 2.5 percent. We were successful at the end of the first half of this year in apportioning out the increases in reasonable percentages which were in keeping with the pressures of costs, could be absorbed by all citizens and did not burden them down, while at the same time observing pressures on production and the need to encourage production.

Constant Alertness and Changing What Has To Be Changed

"On this occasion, in which there has been much talk about prices, I can assert that we will continue to be devoted to this policy, which is distinguished by constant alertness and changing what has to be changed so that we can have our country avoid the dangers of a freeze which is not appropriate."

The Purpose of Failing to Give Advance Notice Was To Prevent Hoarding

Mr Rachid Sfar, the minister of national economy and member of the political bureau, went on to say,

"We are rebuked for failing to give advance notice of changes in some prices. The citizen must understand that the purpose in our failing to give notice of some price changes was to prevent hoarding. In any event, it is well known to all countries that dialogue, as far as prices go, cannot deal with commodity in turn, and that dialogue with the parties on prices is generally oriented toward the rate of development, while the necessary ways of acting in adopting all measures bearing on each sector and all commodities are left up to everyday practice, in the context of controlling the evolution of price indices.

A 30 Percent Rise in the Citizens' Buying Power

"The greatest evidence for this is that from 1976 to this year, 1984, we find that the citizens' buying power has risen at a rate of 80 percent. See the table below."

The Increase in the Minimum Wage and Growth in Prices

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Date of Effect	June	Feb.	May	May	Feb. April	April	Feb.	January	December
Minimum Wage (48 hrs)	75 (sic)	40.144	44.564	48.256	49.704 54.704	64.704	85.072	95.056	95.056
Growth (percent)	30.16	33	11	8.3	3 10	18.3	31.5	11.7	
Growth in Prices in Period During the Wage Increases	11.7		9	5	12.2	8.6	9.9	12.6 -6	8.5

The Increase in Wages and Growth in Prices (Annual Averages)

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Minimum Wage, 48 Hours, in Dinars	30.160	40.144	44.564	48.256	54.704	64.704	85.072	95.056	95.056
(Percent)		33	11	8.3	13.4	18.3	31.5	11.7	
Rate of Growth of Annual Wage (All Sectors)	835	987	1,059	1,130	1,236	1,395	1,702	1,940	1,990
(Percent)		18.2	7.3	6.7	9.4	12.9	22	14	2.9
Growth in Prices (Annual Rate)		6.7	5.4	7.7	7.0	8.9	13.6	9	8.6

We Are Dealing with Hoarders by Taking a Firm, Decisive Stand

I asked the minister of national economy, "Great speculation in prices of rubber tires and hoarding have had a great effect on the owners of cars, and this has increased the artificial effect of this crisis. What steps has the ministry taken to end hoarding on the one hand and to provide tires in the market to meet requirements?"

He said, "I consider that the sector is very sensitive, and we have coped with the effects hoarders have made through a firm, decisive stand by taking a series of rapid measures.

"First, the members of the economic group have played a deterrent role through decisive surveillance and by acquiring the effects of all the hoarders. In addition, the department will take firm measures against all people violating the law.

"In the other area, steps have been taken to enlighten all importers and retailers. We have also imported 22,000 rubber tires which will be at the disposal of the owners of cars starting 10 August, and the department is watching out for everyone who contemplates violating the law."

11887

CSO: 4504/422

CIVIL SERVICE CHIEF DESCRIBES ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM PROGRAMS

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 69, 4 Aug 84 pp 59, 60

/Article by Tariq al-'Abid: "The Second Man in the Government Leads a Reform Plan: There Is an Intention To Abandon Money-Losing Organizations"/

/Text/ The public sector enterprises in Tunisia are the hub of the millstone of the domestic economy, because they control the strategic sectors and provide three quarters of Tunisia's exports. As far as providing job opportunities goes, they also employ about 200,000 persons; the volume of wages in this sector exceeds 3 billion Tunisian dinars a year (around \$2.1 billion), which equals 30 percent of all the wages paid out in Tunisia.

The public sector enterprises' great weight has caused them to influence the health of the whole economy and cast their shadow over the growth of other sectors one way or another. It has prompted the governments which have followed one another since the sixties to search for solutions to reform these enterprises' conditions and prevent them from becoming inflated and turning into a burden on the economy. However, all attempts at reform failed until it was decided to establish a specialized ministry for public sector and administrative reform affairs in 1980.

During discussions on the 1982 budget, Mr Mezri Chekir, the minister to whom this ministry was assigned at the start of the eighties, described to Chamber of Deputies the requirements which the reform of Tunisian management and public sector enterprises presupposed, stressing "The mobility of society and comprehensive development activity require that administration be guided and constantly given high self-perpetuation competence to enable it to assume its various tasks properly, in order to avoid all possible gaps between it and the changing state of affairs, or between it and the citizens, whose wants are increasing."

However, Minister Chekir posts reform not just as an economic and developmental necessity, but also as a political necessity, because the success of reform action results in strengthening the foundations of the government, while the failure of it results in their destruction.

In the light of this view, the subject of the reform of public sector enterprises was dealt with as a task requiring much stamina, starting with the amendment of stipulations and laws and ending with the change of comfortable habits and ways of thinking inherited over a long period of time. Chekir says, "Reform is at every moment the art of the possible, far removed from impulsive acts, and also far removed from acceptance of the state of affairs when the first obstacle arises. It is also the art of the possible in the face of the paucity of material and human resources and the concentrated nature of priorities in a developing country from which the citizen expects everything to be achieved in the shortest period of time."

How much of this notion of reform has been realized in actual practice? During each of the past 3 years attention has been given to a major focal point of reform. 1982 was the year devoted to decentralization, 1983 was the year of the organization of the administrative structure of the ministries and their branch offices in the provinces (governorates), while the year 1984 was given the slogan of "the year of the plan to reform the general enterprises," the plan which the Tunisian Council of Ministers approved at a meeting it held recently under the chairmanship of President Bourguiba in person.

In the context of the first focal point, decentralization, departments were brought together to oversee management and supervise spending and expenditures in the public enterprises and the branches of ministries in the various provinces, in order to fend off the dangers of laxity, corruption and speculation with the money of the government and the enterprises. This measure had economic and political goals at the same time, alleviating pressure on the capital and making living and working conditions easier in the inner regions, providing social stability, preserving balance among areas and limiting the phenomenon of migration to the capital, which had become widespread over the decade of the seventies, one fifth the population of the country concentrating itself in the city of Tunis, whose population is now greater than 1 million.

The second focal point entails the organization of the administrative structure of the ministries. In 1983 an administrative redistribution was carried out in the Ministries of Economy, Equipment, Housing, Cultural Affairs and Youth and Sports in accordance with requirements of the development of activities in these ministries in the areas of surveillance, coordination, ongoing training of personnel, and other areas.

This new organization was accompanied by the reform of conditions in the National Computer Science Center, which is the backbone of the information sector in Tunisia. This was established in 1976 to organize and coordinate public sector enterprises' acquisition of computer equipment, and it prepares and trains the necessary staff to operate this.

The reform process which was carried out in the center had the aim of attaining two main goals:

Limiting its commercial expansion so that it would not affect the future growth of computer services, which it is hoped will register an important development extending to all sectors.

Distinguishing between two types of activity the center carries out, first, its role as a stimulant and motive force for the growth of computers in Tunisia, and second, an organization to provide computer services to the ministries and departments.

In the context of the third focal point, the reform of public sector enterprises, the fifth development plan (1982-86) spelled out a program to reform these enterprises, then the Council of Ministers, at a meeting it held, approved a brief interlude for establishing a committee comprising the ministers whose ministries contain enterprises belonging to the public sector and a number of specialized experts in the oversight field. This committee inspected the enterprises and set down its observations in reports which were obtained for formulating a comprehensive reform plan.

AL-TADAMUN has learned from trustworthy sources that there now is the intention to get the government to relinquish some small and intermediate enterprises belonging to the public sector, which constitute a heavy burden on the government budget because of their chronic losses; these enterprises will be given to development banks or to the private sector.

The sources added that a higher committee was formed to take care of these enterprises and settle their circumstances no later than October 1984.

A well informed economic source mentioned to AL-TADAMUN that the intensification of surveillance over transactions the enterprises made with foreign companies in the recent period, when the Council of Ministers discussed a deal which the Industrial Chemical Fertilizer Company had intended to conclude with a French company, led to a decision to postpone the completion of the transaction and search for other companies with proposals, giving a Japanese company the chance to present a higher-quality, lower-cost bid than the French one. The transaction was finally concluded with the French, after they lowered the value of the first bid by about a third.

In addition to that, the plan to reform the management of public sector enterprises stipulates that Tunisians are to be made to participate as much as possible whenever foreigners make a study or conclude a transaction, through participation in firms producing studies or consulting firms or by being in charge of construction in parts of the transaction.

With respect to the transactions, priority will also be given in supplies to Tunisian products, whenever they are on a par with foreign products in terms of value and do not exceed them by more than 20 percent in price.

Observers consider that the magnitude of the plan to reform public sector enterprises will impose heavy political and technical burdens on the Ministry of Civil Service and Administrative Reform. They link the enormous

size of these burdens to the appointment of Mezri Chekir to head the ministry in 1980. Thekir has long experience in government activity, since he has been with Mohamed Mzali in all the high-level positions he assumed, from minister of defense to minister of education, minister of health, minister of youth and sports and finally the office of the prime minister.

In addition to that, Chekir coordinates government activity and chairs preparatory meetings the ministers hold to study files before they are presented to the Council of Ministers. He is the person who manages the central departments of the Office of the Prime Minister (the head of the cabinet), and he is also the person who takes Mohamed Mzali's place when the prime minister travels abroad. In the social area, he plays a major role in maintaining links with the unions, because the leadership of the Federation of Workers considers him an acceptable negotiator and a party with which it is satisfied, and maintains good relations with him.

This great (and hidden) political role the minister of civil service and administrative reform plays has made persons who are knowledgeable about the matters beneath the surface in Tunisian politics assert that Chekir is the second man in Mzali's government; indeed, some observers have commented on the broad role he plays through a singular phrase which says, "If a plan was found for the deputy prime minister in the Tunisian government, the candidate for taking charge of that plan would be Chekir."

There is no doubt that the task of reforming public sector enterprises is a heavy one, and requires a man with long standing experience and high competence. Will Chekir succeed in restoring vitality to three quarters of the Tunisian economy?

11887

CSO: 4504/422

VARIOUS CURRENT LABOR QUESTIONS, CONDITIONS EXPLORED

Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 3 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Lutfi Nasr: "In a Conversation with the Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Affairs: The Ministry's Doors Have Not Been Closed to Journalists"]

[Text] Some people say that publicity about the activity of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has recently diminished, to a point where it is now rare, as opposed to an earlier time, when its activity would cover the pages of papers and magazines -- which is desirable, because it is believed to be one of the most important services in the country, and, by virtue of its composition, is considered to be three ministries in one, labor, social affairs and social insurance.

Some people also make the comment that the doors in the ministry were once open but are now almost closed.

When we asked Mr 'Abdallah al-Madani, the deputy minister, the second person in the ministry as everyone knows, about the reason, he said, "That is because our policy in the ministry is for us not to talk until after something has been done, that is, when we have a tangible piece of work before us we will talk about it and announce it."

In any event, a number of questions which need answers from officials in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs are now circulating among people.

What has been done by the Arabization committee, which was formed by issuance of a Council of Ministers decree a long time ago? When will the committee start choosing the exemplary workers who are to be honored throughout the country, in the framework of the companies, in the performance of its task? What has the Ministry of Labor done and what was its role in the dispute which arose between the worker and management representatives in the joint labor committee in the Gulf Airline Company? What is the secret behind the things people are whispering about, that the activity of the general committee of workers of Bahrain has not yet been noticed? What is the position of the organizations and the companies on the project of 10,000 trainees and the project on vocational apprenticeship, and the employment of

natives who need work? What has the Higher Training Council been doing? What has the Higher Labor Service Council been doing?

Mr 'Abdallah Rashid al-Madani, the deputy minister of labor and social affairs, answered all these questions frankly and clearly.

Here is the text of the conversation with his excellency:

[Question] A decree forming the special committee to select exemplary workers, to honor them throughout the country in the context of their companies, was declared recently. When will this committee start its task?

[Answer] This committee was formed on the basis of distinguished membership which was in keeping with this great task, since it includes the minister, the deputy minister and the director as well as representatives of the private sector. The Department of Labor now is in the process of preparing the agenda for this committee's first meeting, determining the steps proposed by the Labor Department for the approach the committee will pursue, and also setting out bases, criteria and ways for carrying out the decree issued forming the committee and defining its tasks.

He stated, "As you know, the decree establishing the committee was issued in summer, that is, at a time when most members of the committee are outside Bahrain. For that reason it was considered better to wait before holding the first meeting, in order for the committee to meet with all its members and for us to benefit from all views, and it is hoped that that will happen early next October, God willing."

[Question] It is said that the celebrations honoring the exemplary workers will be held in December, that is, during the celebrations of the national holiday.

[Answer] It is too early to answer this question. It must be left to the committee, which prefers that its resolutions be unanimous.

The Arabization Committee

[Question] The papers have published much about the Arabization Committee. It has been said that the committee has been almost missing in carrying out its task, which is a great national mission; what does your excellency the deputy say?

[Answer] Of course, I am the chairman of this committee. Unfortunately, at the time the talk about the committee's shirking its task was published, I was outside Bahrain and was not able to answer or state the truth at the right time.

The fact is that the Arabization committee works very hard at carrying out its mission. It is now in the stage of gathering data and information from inside the ministries, because how can the committee adopt recommendations or draw up an Arabization plan before it becomes acquainted with the actual state of affairs in the ministries?

Mr 'Abdallah Rashid al-Madani said,

"This committee has an active secretariat. Through its forms and field questions, this secretariat has covered all the ministries in the government and the authorities belonging to them. We have actually started to gather this data and information preparatory to analyzing it and presenting it in a form which will reflect actual conditions. In the middle of August, the secretariat will finish gathering this information and will prepare a report which will be presented to the committee at its next meeting; that, God willing, will be in October. In the light of these studies and this report, the Arabization committee will prepare the draft of a working paper which it will present to the competent ministerial committee, and the ministerial committee will in turn present the material in this paper which it considers appropriate to the venerable Council of Ministers so that it may issue its decree on the policy of Arabizing work in the government system."

Before the End of the Year

[Question] That is, Arabization decrees, or an Arabization policy, will be issued before the end of this year?

[Answer] I believe that the committee will have completely finished its task before the end of this year.

Mr 'Abdallah al-Madani added, "I would like to say that the press is always in a hurry. It is part of our policy in the ministry not to talk until a thing has been accomplished. When the Arabization project is completed, we will be receptive to conveying it to the people through the press. It is the Council of Ministers that will take the final decision on this important matter. The issue of Arabization is still a matter of great interest on the part of the Ministry of Labor, and I believe that the decision which will ultimately be reached in this area will be compatible with what everyone aspires to, with God's permission. All we ask for is a little patience."

On the Dispute in the Gulf Air Joint Committee

[Question] Your excellency the deputy minister, news was published recently in the papers about the existence of a dispute among the workers' representatives, and the representatives of management, inside the joint labor committee in the Gulf Airline Company, which reached the point where workers' representatives were prompted to announce a decision to suspend their membership in this committee, while specifying certain demands. I believe, as was also published, that the workers' representatives have informed you of this by letter. What was the role of the Ministry of Labor, and what is your opinion on this subject?

He replied, "The dispute which occurred was a very ordinary one. From our viewpoint it is evidence of health, not evidence of conflict or severe differences in opinion, although I considered that the workers acted hastily in declaring the suspension of meetings and talking to the press about that. That is wrong, and I so informed the workers' representatives, because when workers' representatives disagree with the representatives of management,

that is something normal, and when they reach the point where they are unable to resolve this dispute, the proper approach is to summon the Ministry of Labor to intervene and reconcile the two parties, or work to narrow the differences in views."

He said, "In any event, I am not accusing anyone or making any individual specifically responsible for what has happened, because, as far as I know, the decision to declare the suspension and talk to the press was a collective one on the part of this committee, or, more precisely, the workers' representatives on the committee."

He added, "We have been following up on this matter since the beginning. The workers were won over to our viewpoint and abandoned their position, the issue of the suspension was actually withdrawn and they sent a letter to management declaring their receptivity to the resumption of the committee's meetings and the holding of an open dialogue on all the issues on which there are differences. I believe that the Gulf Air management has the wisdom that will enable it to rise above all the existing disputes and resolve them as if they had not happened."

He said, "Disputes between the two sides of production are a normal phenomenon. The Ministry of Labor is most ready always to offer opinions and counsel to the two sides to help them transcend all obstacles, so that these committees may perform their goals which have been set out, including resolving any problem which might rise to the surface and participating in developing work and production. I personally expect that a meeting will take place between the two parties in the near future."

This Does Not Cause Us Anxiety

[Question] Do these disputes cause the Ministry of Labor anxiety?

[Answer] Not at all. As I told you, we consider this to be a healthy phenomenon, as long as the dispute is in the interests of the job. However, if this dispute is aimed at harming the country's interests, the ministry will not be silent about that. The higher interests of the country are above all considerations.

[Question] Has what happened made the ministry re-evaluate the role of these committees?

[Answer] Not to a great extent. The experience of the company joint committees has been positive and sound. They are still offering sacrifices and realizing their desired goals. Indeed, to the contrary, we have the goal of enlarging on this experiment. I believe it is unreasonable for a minor dispute in a committee to cause us to review the matter of the joint committees as a whole.

[Question] It is said that management's side in the joint committee is stronger, the side that has every thing in its hands. For this reason we find that this side is arbitrary, in some committees, which irritates the workers' side and causes it anxiety. What is his excellency the deputy minister's opinion on this?

[Answer] My opinion always has been that this committee is in effect an instrument for mutual understanding between the two parties to production. No party has the right to act arbitrarily or tyrannize the other party, because if these committees do not achieve the goal of increasing production and solving the workers' problems there will then be no point to them. Gulf Air has not been remiss in giving the workers their rights -- indeed, to the contrary, it has been liberal with them in terms of profits and employment benefits. It has not happened that the side of management has acted arbitrarily toward the workers' side in Gulf Air.

What Have the Committees and Councils Been Doing?

[Question] Some people wonder what some councils and committees, for instance, the General Committee of Workers of Bahrain, the Higher Training Council and the Higher Workers' Services Council, have been doing.

Mr 'Abdallah Rashid al-Madani, the deputy minister of labor and social affairs, said, "These committees and councils exist and are performing their work as thoroughly as possible, although the Higher Workers' Services Council is now being reorganized to perform its part in a better fashion.

"The General Committee of Workers of Bahrain is performing its mission as well as it can, since it is represented in a number of other councils and committees such as the Higher Training Council, the board of directors of the General Social Insurance Authority and the National Anti-Illiteracy Committee, and the workers' representatives in these committees are helping to draw up government policy in all of these sectors."

Approval of the Charter

[Question] It is said that the special activity of the General Committee of Workers of Bahrain has almost been suspended, because you are the reason for the delay in the discussion of this committee's charter.

His excellency said, "The approval of the charter has been completed, and the reason for the delay is the difference in views on pro forma matters, or the formulation of some phrases. The bill will come out in a few days. Moreover, his excellency the minister of labor and social affairs has given this committee full power to engage in all activities which lie within its areas of competence, whether the bill of the charter is issued or not. The failure to issue this bill is not an obstacle to the committee's offering its services to the labor sector in Bahrain."

The Phenomenon of Fugitive Workers

[Question] Have you, in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior, managed to eliminate the phenomenon of fugitive foreign workers in the country?

[Answer] This phenomenon will not end as long as there is foreign labor in Bahrain, as long as there are employment offices in this country which have become exploitative in nature, and as long as there are job opportunities in the country, because foreign workers always seek out employers who can give them more.

He went on, "It is true that this phenomenon of evasion is now much less severe than it was before, but we would be wrong if we were to think that it can disappear for good."

Cooperation from Organizations and Companies

[Question] What is his excellency the deputy minister of labor's opinion on the degree of cooperation between the organizations and companies and the various training projects in the country, especially the project on the 10,000 trainees, the vocational apprenticeship project, and so forth?

[Answer] It is true that the obstacles the organizations put in the way of the execution of these projects were great at the beginning, but, to tell the truth, these obstacles have disappeared now. Again, I would be offending the truth if I said that these obstacles will disappear for once and for all.

He said, "The fact also is that the number of people enrolled in the 10,000 program is increasing every year, the resources and equipment available to this project are developing, and the person in charge of this project is now from Bahrain, rather than a foreign official, which is a substantial achievement. In brief, I can tell you that the process of training in Bahrain is now continuing to improve, because all bodies are aware of its feasibility and its great usefulness for them. Therefore, we are constantly developing these programs, and think of new programs by which we can serve the general interests of the country."

The Employment of People from Bahrain

[Question] Are the work entities cooperating with you in employing trainees from Bahrain, whether they are graduates of the 10,000 project or the vocational apprenticeship project?

[Answer] Yes, the bulk of these companies and organizations are working with us with a very high degree of cooperation and receptivity to employing natives of the country.

He added, "At the beginning, we relied on the Manpower Development Department to employ people from Bahrain. Now, however, we are relying on the Unemployment Registration Department. This office has realized very good results in employing people from Bahrain, because granting permits to bring in foreign labor or extend the residence of foreigners is done through that. Therefore, it is not permissible to grant permits to employ foreigners when there are persons from Bahrain who want to work. I can tell you that we have succeeded in this."

Mr 'Abdallah al-Madani said, "Let everyone know that foreign workers have come to Bahrain through our own agreement and under our aegis. We are the ones who have asked them to come to our country, through our own will. No one has imposed them on us. All the workers in Bahrain are performing a great duty and great effort, for which they are to be thanked. We can only acknowledge this on their behalf. However, I would like to say that the

foreigners must not forget that their status in this country is a temporary one, and when there are natives who are applying for work, they must be given priority in their own country. This is the least form of faith, and I believe that no one would blame us for that."

The deputy minister of labor and social affairs concluded his conversation by saying,

"When there is someone from Bahrain who wants to work, we have to give him the chance to replace the foreigner, or at least to be on a par with him in equal jobs."

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CSO: 4404/618

UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS UP

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 8 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Aaron Sittner]

[Text]

Between 22,000 and 25,000 Israelis will be jobless by the end of this year, Employment Service director Baruch Haklai fears. And one of the most unpleasant aspects of this situation will be that young people just out of school or university may find themselves starting on their "careers" with a period of extended unemployment.

Haklai, who earlier this month reported a 20 per cent increase in job-seekers during July (compared with June), sounded his warning about the year-end jobless rate at a meeting with his top aides this week. The meeting discussed the effects on employment expected from the imminent budget cuts, a freeze on government and public sector hiring and a halt to new orders by government agencies.

Employment Service statistics show that the job market began to deteriorate last October. Before then, the country's employers would report on plans to lay off an average of 300 workers per month and these would easily be placed in other jobs.

Beginning in October 1983, however, the notices of planned dismissals increased in volume. At first they ranged at about 600 per month. By the beginning of this year, the average number of planned layoffs

each month stood at 1,000.

Haklai said: "The government policy of a freeze on hiring and spending will force workers in the services to look for production-type jobs, especially in export industries. And the policy is also to encourage incoming members of the labour force to head straight for industry.

"However, this process is not a mechanical one. It requires time - and that means months rather than weeks. People will come under pressure, and the Employment Service must gear itself right now for hard times.

"At the end of 1983 there were 11,000 unemployed people in this country. At the end of this year, the number is expected to double or even reach 25,000."

Meanwhile the Labour and Social Affairs Ministry has launched a vocational training-retraining subsidy scheme, which it hopes will allay the difficulties many people will encounter as layoffs increase.

Under the scheme, the Employment Service will send job applicants to factories for apprenticeship, with the plant receiving up to IS20,000 per month per applicant for the training. This arrangement would last for six months, with the trainee's output during the period belonging to the company.

WEAPON DEALS WITH U.S., SOVIETS DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 236, 18-24 Aug 84 pp 28-30

[Article by Muhammad 'Ali Qasim: "Kuwait Flirted with Moscow and U.S. Moved; SAM-8 Missiles for Kuwait Have Changed Washington's Gulf Plans"]

[Text] The U.S. administration has been seeking for a time to punish Kuwait by shaking a stick in its face in one way or another. Washington is not pleased to see this Gulf state adopt an independent national policy by opening the door to both Washington and Moscow simultaneously and by following a wise foreign investment policy, especially in Europe and the United States. This provoked problems between the two countries, especially before the dismissal of Watt, the former secretary of the interior. What broke the camel's back of relations between the two countries was Kuwait's rejection of the U.S. nomination of an ex-U.S. ambassador to Israel to be its ambassador to Kuwait. Contrary to general belief, some experts believe that the U.S. hand was not far from the Suq al-Manakh crisis because this crisis is almost a replica of the crisis that happened on the U.S. stock exchange nearly 100 years ago. Thus, with a feeble pretext Washington refused to sell Kuwait Stinger missiles. But Washington quickly regretted its decision when it learned that Moscow gave Kuwait a "carte blanche" insofar as Soviet weapons were concerned.

In light of the feverish escalation in the severe tension witnessed by the Gulf area as a result of the Iraq-Iran war and in light of the possibility of an expansion of the war to include in the combat operations targets belonging to other countries in the area, it is natural for attention to focus on the military and strategic conditions of these countries and on the intrinsic capabilities they possess in terms of protecting their security and defending their vital interests from any foreign attack that may be launched against them.

This attention, displayed by all military and political circles in the world, has been accompanied by urgent questions about the degree of the operational effectiveness of the Arab Gulf states and in terms of armaments in confronting attacks to which they may be subjected, whether by land, by air or by sea. But these questions have not been the same for all countries included under the canopy of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is comprised of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the Sultanate

of Oman. All Western military observers and analysts agree that the Saudi armed forces, especially the Air Force and Air Defense Force, are capable of repelling any kind of attack, not only attacks against the kingdom's territories but also attacks that may be aimed against targets outside Saudi territories, as proven by the downing of the Iranian F-4 Phantom plane by F-15 Eagle fighters of the Saudi Royal Air Force over Gulf waters a few weeks ago when Iranian bombers tried to attack an oil tanker near the port of Ra's Tannurah.

It is noted that Iran, despite all the threats it has made about its intention to paralyze maritime and oil shipping in the Gulf if Iraqi air raids on the Iranian port of Kharj and on ships heading to and from the other Iranian ports in the area continue, has avoided attacking Saudi targets since the downing of the said F-4 plane.

This is what has caused observers to expect Iranian attacks to be diverted to other Gulf countries for numerous geographic, political and military reasons. It seemed that Kuwait was the Gulf state on which the Iranian choice fell and thus Iran started air attacks against Kuwaiti and other ships and tankers near Kuwait's coastline.

It is against this particular background that the recent Kuwaiti armament efforts have gained special importance. It was inevitable and logical that the Kuwaiti command would exert the utmost efforts to bolster and strengthen its defense capabilities in the various spheres and under the current strategic conditions in the Gulf which dictate that each of the area's states possess sufficient means to establish a capable and effective defense in their territories if they are to be able to protect their security and their vital strategic interests and to repel attacks launched against them.

What is interesting about the issue is that in its efforts to implement its defense programs, Kuwait has never proceeded from a position of relying on a single source of armaments and that it has always followed a balanced policy that allows it to establish cooperative military relations with more than one foreign side by selecting its armament and equipment needs wherever they are available and in the manner dictated by the Kuwaiti forces' requirements and intrinsic priorities. Consequently, it is not at all surprising that Kuwait would turn to the Soviet Union to get arms whose acquisition obviously constitutes a considerable positive gain in terms of modernizing its defense capabilities in a number of vital spheres.

Old Dealings

In fact, the latest military agreement reached between Kuwait and Moscow is not the first of its kind. Kuwait was the first among the Gulf Cooperation Council member states to obtain Soviet weapons when it concluded in the late 1970's an important deal in accordance with which various types of weapons were delivered to the Kuwaiti forces in the early 1980's and which now constitute a fundamental part of the Kuwaiti arsenal. The Soviet weapons obtained in that deal include the following equipment:

Frog-7 surface-to-surface tactical missiles (original Soviet name is Luna) which have a range of 70 km. These missiles are fitted with highly explosive warheads weighing 500 kg each. This was the first time the Kuwaiti Army acquired this type of missile. Moreover, Kuwait is still the only Gulf state (excluding Iraq) whose arsenal includes surface-to-surface missiles.

Antiaircraft surface-to-air SAM-7 missiles. These are shoulder-launched missiles suitable for intercepting raiding aircraft flying at low altitudes and at close range.

Self-propelled antiaircraft guns (mounted on armored vehicles) of the SU-23 variety (also known as Shilka). These radar-guided guns are considered the most effective in the world. They are four-barreled guns with a 23-mm caliber.

Limited Number and Modern Equipment

Naturally, the Kuwaiti armament efforts did not stop at this limit in the subsequent years but rather included numerous programs implemented at the various levels and in a manner reflecting clearly the Kuwaiti command's determination to enhance the quality of its forces and of its military capabilities. It may be necessary to say that if the Kuwaiti forces are small in number in comparison with the numerical criteria ordinarily present in the Arab area, considering that the total number in these Kuwaiti forces does not exceed 12,400 troops, then this is not due to what may be considered disinterest on the part of the Kuwaiti authorities in the issues of defense and armaments. Rather, this small number simply represents the country's demographic reality and the limited requirements of the country's geographic size. In contrast to this numerical size, it has been noted that the armaments of the Kuwaiti military force are characterized by the inclusion of some of the latest equipment available in the world.

In the past few years, Kuwait has been careful to supply its forces with the weapons required to insure its defense needs in various spheres. It has done so by relying on varied international sources, especially the United States, France, Britain and West Germany, in addition to the Soviet Union. As a result, the Kuwaiti forces have been able to achieve several important accomplishments in their land, air and naval forces. Regarding the land forces, Kuwait got in the early 1980's a total of 160 Chieftain tanks, which are main combat tanks, from Britain. The Chieftain is one of the most capable tanks operating in the world at present. This is in addition to a number of Scorpion light tanks. The Kuwaiti army has, moreover, acquired several hundred M-113 armored vehicles from the United States, including vehicles equipped with anti-armor TOW missiles. From France, Kuwait has acquired armored personnel carriers and 80 self-propelled 155-mm heavy field guns, in addition to Hot and Milan anti-armor missiles.

In the past decade, the Kuwaiti Air Force has occupied a special place in the ladder of defense priorities. Whereas this force was confined to a small number of British-made Lightning and Hawker Hunter fighters in the early 1970's, it has now been turned into a modern and effective combat force by

acquiring in the late 1970's and early 1980's a total of 18 sophisticated Mirage F-1 fighters (the number will rise to 30 because of Kuwait's purchase of 12 additional aircraft of this type a few months ago) and 30 Skyhawk A-4 bombers. Kuwait was the first to acquire this type of bomber. Moreover, Kuwait recently ordered 12 British-made Hawk training and support aircraft which can be used for combat missions and for bombing and attacking ground targets. The Kuwaiti command has also been concerned with bolstering its air defenses and has obtained from the United States an antiaircraft air defense system consisting of six batteries of improved Hawk missiles which are capable of intercepting raiding aircraft flying at various altitudes and at distances of up to 35 km.

At the naval level, Kuwaiti building programs have included eight assault boats produced by Lurssen, a West German firm. These boats have been fitted with anti-vessel surface-to-surface Exocet missiles, which have a range of nearly 60 km. Kuwait has also concluded with France a contract for the purchase of six Super Puma helicopters which are also to be fitted with air-to-surface Exocet missiles which have proven very effective against ships in the British-Argentine Falkland war and in the Iraq-Iran Gulf war.

Interest in Bolstering Air Defenses

The Gulf war in particular has been behind the speed-up of the Kuwaiti defense building program at a rate exceeding the regular programs, which were being carried out gradually and in a balanced, methodical manner. Kuwaiti officials felt the need to enhance the level of the defense necessary to protect the country's various vital installations, especially the oilfields, the oil refineries and, of course, the oil-exporting ports and the navigation lines heading to and from the Kuwaiti oil and commercial ports.

To achieve this defense task which occupied top priority in the scale of Kuwaiti interests, efforts were exerted with the United States to supply the Kuwaiti Army with the latest defense systems developed by the U.S. war industry, namely Stinger antiaircraft missiles which can be hand-carried and shoulder-launched. The advantage of these missiles, which are similar in principle to the Soviet SAM-7 (Strella), is that they are capable of seeking their targets in all directions instead of having to be fired at the aircraft from the rear in order to seek the heat generated by the aircraft engines, which is the case with most infrared ray guided missiles (i.e. heat-seeking missiles). Moreover, the Stingers are less susceptible to confusion by balloons and heat flares that can be fired by raiding aircraft for the purpose of misleading the other types of missiles mentioned above.

U.S. Restraint and Soviet Approval

Despite Kuwait's evident need for these missiles, the Reagan administration refused to respond to Kuwait's request for them without any convincing justification (except for fear of arousing the anger of Jewish voters in the year of the presidential election campaign, of course). The Kuwaiti reaction to the U.S. refusal was largely harmonious with the traditional defense policy which has long been followed by Kuwait on security and armament issues

and which has always provided for an approach that resorts to alternative sources capable of supplying Kuwait with its needs. Thus came the visit which the Kuwaiti minister of defense made to Moscow recently and which produced the new armament agreement between the two sides. Whereas the details and provisions of the agreement concluded between Kuwait and Moscow are not yet fully clear, it is certain that the agreement is so important and big that it has surprised most of the observers who had been watching it. AL-MAJALLAH has learned from reliable Western sources that the said agreement, valued at nearly \$327 million, includes new types of weapons largely compatible with Kuwait's needs. Moreover, Soviet officials have underlined their readiness to supply Kuwait with all the sophisticated weapons and equipment it requests in the future.

The important factor on which the emphasis is focused at present is the possibility of supplying the Kuwaiti Army with sophisticated Soviet SAM-8 anti-aircraft missiles. If this proves to be true, Kuwait will be the third [sic] country after Syria, Jordan and Iraq to get these sophisticated weapons, keeping in mind that these missiles have not yet been exported to any [other] foreign country, including Moscow's allies in the Warsaw Pact. It is worth noting in this regard that the SAM-8 missiles were introduced into service in the Soviet forces in the mid-1970's, that they are mounted on a highly maneuverable armored vehicle and that they are radar-guided against targets which include raiding aircraft flying at low altitudes and at high speeds. It is also to be noted that every vehicle is capable of carrying six missiles of this type and of launching them at once or in batches against several air targets simultaneously.

Constant Cooperation with Washington

If the recent Kuwaiti-Soviet deal has surprised most Western observers, including the U.S. administration, which tried at the outset to minimize the importance of the deal (as indicated on a certain occasion by U.S. Vice President George Bush who expressed doubt that the two sides actually agreed on the deal), the current general belief is that this is no more than an attempt to "salvage" whatever can be "salvaged" and to acknowledge Washington's grave mistake, that is, to start with, its refusal to respond to the Kuwaiti requests. It is on this particular basis that it becomes possible to explain the amazing U.S. interest in announcing two military agreements concluded recently between Kuwait and Washington and in stirring much media and press clamor over them, perhaps in an endeavor to prove U.S. goodwill toward the Kuwaiti defense needs and as a signal of Washington's readiness to meet these needs when necessary. Pentagon sources revealed only a few days after the announcement of the Kuwaiti agreement with Moscow that the U.S. approved an \$87-million deal to improve the Kuwaiti air defense system and to modernize its U.S.-made Hawk missiles so that these missiles may become capable of receiving and absorbing information supplied to them by the AWACS' operating in the Gulf area. A few days after revealing this deal, Washington also announced another agreement with Kuwait stipulating that the United States train 150 Kuwaiti pilots in the next 3 years.

Again, what can be said in this regard is simply that Kuwait has proven the success of its policy very calmly and with considerable experience by being able to cooperate with both superpowers simultaneously to insure that Kuwait's defense and strategic needs and priorities are met without bargaining. This provides perhaps a lesson to many Third World countries seeking to protect their security and their independence.

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CSO: 4404/609

SALAH KHALAF DISCUSSES ADEN AGREEMENT, ARAB, SOVIET RELATIONS

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 69, 4 Aug 84 pp 29-32

[Interview with Salah Khalaf by Rashid Khashshaneh: "Abu Iyad in Interview with AL-TADAMUN: Five Important Tasks in Coming Phase; Path to Damascus Is Open"; in Tunis, date not specified⁷]

[Text] The Palestinian reactions to the Aden agreement can be divided into three kinds:

The first kind constitutes essentially a position of support, but with numerous reservations and with criticism against the agreement. This kind of reaction believes that the agreement resorts in several instances to revolutionary phrases, is at times content with reiterating slogans and is inclined toward mercurial positions vis-a-vis the disputed issues -- mercurial positions that are remote from realism and the scientific approach required for every political act. We notice this opinion among some Fatah leaders in Tunis. Hani al-Hasan is the leader who has perhaps best expressed this opinion.

The second type of reaction is a stance that condemns the agreement and denounces those who took part in the negotiations that have resulted in it. This is the stance of the National Alliance organizations that have embarked on an open conflict with the Democratic Alliance organizations because the latter have approved the national unity agreement.

The third kind of reaction is a position of absolute support for the agreement and considers it an important turning point on the path of bringing about Palestinian national unity and an advanced step for gathering the Palestinian National Council and of restoring bonds within the Arab ranks. This is the position of the majority in Fatah and in the Democratic Alliance organizations. Abu Iyad is perhaps the leader who best reflects this current because he is the man closest to the position of the other organizations. Therefore, the positions expressed by Abu Iyad can be considered the common denominator between the resistance factions.

AL-TADAMUN met with Abu Iyad in Tunis 1 week after Abu al-Lutf's return from Damascus and on the eve of the conclusion of the national unity agreement in Algiers and discussed with him all the issues raised in the Palestinian arena and between the PLO on the one hand and Syria, Jordan and Egypt on the other in order to explore Fatah's and the PLO's conception of the Palestinian action plan in the post-Aden phase. Following is the text of the interview:

[Question] Let us start with Aden. How was the agreement reached and what is your assessment of its content and of its expected impact on bringing about Palestinian national unity?

[Answer] The dialogue with the four organizations lasted nearly 2 months. In Aden, agreement was reached on all the political issues raised. There was a pause [hitch] only over Abu 'Ammar's visit to Cairo. But the negotiators reached a solution to the effect that the visit violated Palestinian National Council resolutions. A political agreement and an organizational agreement were reached. The disputed issues were left to be discussed by the Palestinian National Council. This was announced at the Algiers meeting on 13 July. A date for a comprehensive dialogue with all the organizations will be set.

[Question] And what if some organizations refrain from attending?

[Answer] Those who attend are welcome and those who do not take part in this dialogue are entitled to attend the Palestinian National Council. Moreover, the brothers in Aden agreed that the latest date for convocation of the National Council will be 15 September 1984. We are content with the agreement and consider it an important and bright spot in this phase and in the wake of the atmosphere of estrangement that has prevailed. It is the first step on the path of rearranging the affairs of the Palestinian house in the wake of the Beirut and Tripoli events and of the rift in Fatah.

[Question] There are those who say that the points of disagreement were not major and that the Syrian role is what delayed the conclusion of an agreement throughout this period. Is this true?

[Answer] Truly, I say that when Abu al-Lutf met with President Hafiz al-Asad a few days ago, one of the points which the Syrian president stressed was the point underlined by his words: "We have encouraged the Aden dialogue and we have encouraged the Algiers dialogue." Personally, I don't believe the Syrians could contribute to obstructing the dialogue because if they wanted to do so they would not have permitted the other Palestinian sides to go to Algiers or to Aden to take part in the dialogue. But there are some pretexts cited by a number of organizations to throw the blame on Syria's shoulders. Syria may have a certain position toward a part of Fatah but this position does not affect the essence of our dialogue with the other organizations.

[Question] What is your assessment of the position of the quadripartite alliance organizations toward the disputed issues throughout the rounds of the dialogue?

[Answer] Their position was, as the Palestinian proverb says, "once hot and once cold." At times, the issue of dialogue was ripe in their eyes and they embarked on the dialogue with open minds and at others they displayed displeasure. But the recent Aden meetings were good, especially in terms of their implementation of the provision concerning the Algiers meeting in which the comprehensive agreement was declared. All these are positive points. What is of interest to us is the outcome because it is not right for the PLO institutions to remain idle and paralyzed. At present, the Executive Committee is idle, the Central Council is idle and the National Council is also idle. It is necessary to revive these institutions so that we may put an end to the escape from responsibility. The Aden agreement has put all concerned face to face with their responsibilities.

[Question] Did Abu al-Lutf go to Damascus on his personal initiative or was he dispatched officially by the leadership?

[Answer] Abu Iyad was dispatched by the leadership on an invitation from President Hafiz al-Asad. The meeting was positive and dealt with all the issues raised in the arena, including the Aden dialogue. We are optimistic over this meeting and anticipate good coming out of it. We believe that it is a start, especially because this is the first time President al-Asad has received a Palestinian leader since he got sick. Abu al-Luft has been the first to meet with the president. This meeting has a special meaning because Abu al-Luft acts in two capacities. He is a member of Fatah Central Committee and the head of the PLO Political Department. This is why this meeting has special significance. It has actually been a very positive and frank meeting.

The issue of the relationship with Syria is not, of course, an issue easy to settle because there are sides that are hurt by any relationship between Syria and Fatah. This is why these sides try to sabotage this relationship with a statement here or a statement there. But we are determined to restore the relationship with Syria to its normal course.

[Question] What are the faults which the Syrian side finds with a part of Fatah?

[Answer] If we want to count the faults, then we would find many faults in each other. However, President al-Asad and brother Abu al-Luft tried to settle them with reproof. I believe that the round was very important because the topic of discussion was very important and led to other rounds.

[Question] What are the other meetings that have taken place between Syrian and Palestinian officials recently?

[Answer] This was the most important meeting, especially since agreement was reached at the highest level, particularly on the Syrian side.

[Question] Then there have been other meetings?

[Answer] No. In fact, there have been no other meetings. All that is being reiterated is pure speculation on the part of the press.

[Question] And have there been meetings with Abu Musa and Abu Salih?

[Answer] No, there have been no meetings. The two are now in disagreement with each other. Abu Salih is on one side, Abu Musa on another and Abu Khalid al-'Imlah on a third side. Their plan is as good as dead and talking about it is like "beating a dead horse," as the Palestinian proverb goes.

[Question] Is there a possibility of their return to Fatah under certain conditions?

[Answer] We welcome anybody, except for the 10 who broke away. Those who committed the crime (the 10) will not return.

[Question] A meeting took place last Monday, 9 July, between the quadripartite alliance organizations and the four organizations opposed to the Fatah leadership under the chairmanship of 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar. Is it likely that Abu Mayzar will play the role of middleman between the dissident organizations on one side, the quadripartite on another side and Fatah on a third side?

[Answer] Regrettably, the meeting was a failure and ended with the participants assaulting each other at the session because the faction of Jibril and Ghawshah and the Fatah dissidents rejected the Aden agreements and considered all those who have taken part in them traitors. Consequently, what happened was tantamount to a farce and was the topic of conversation in all the salons of the Syrian capital. They assaulted each other with clubs and chairs.

[Question] If we move from Damascus to Beirut where the political situation in Lebanon is casting its thick shadows on the conditions of the resistance, how do you evaluate the Syrian role in solving the Lebanese crisis?

[Answer] Since the assumption of power by Karami's cabinet, constructive steps have been taken, and if this cabinet follows up on them soundly, the situation may settle down, especially after the reopening of the airport, the port and the crossing points and in light of the almost total observation of the ceasefire. I believe that Syria has played a positive role in achieving and improving this situation and we hope that this improvement will continue because Lebanon is exhausted by the extensive shelling and fighting. However, I see in the latest agreement a long truce and not an end to the conflict because unless sectarianism is uprooted,

unless a secular constitution is promulgated and unless political sectarianism is abolished, it will be very difficult for the situation in Lebanon to change. At present, political sectarianism is dominant and occupies geographic positions. This political sectarianism has become dominant because of the geographic position. We find the Maronites on one mountain and the Druze on another and find that Beirut is almost the stronghold of the Sunna. This means that the country is divided and that political sectarianism is distributed geographically. If people mingled with each other, it would be possible to abolish sectarianism quickly. But the situation is different now.

[Question] Do you have forces in South Lebanon?

[Answer] We fully support the Lebanese forces fighting the occupation. They are Lebanese forces. As for us, we have had no forces since our departure from Beirut. But we support the Lebanese national forces in the south morally and with all other means.

[Question] Do you have contacts with the National Salvation Front?

[Answer] The Salvation Front has ended and is torn apart.

[Question] I mean the forces formed by this front that are still active in the arena?

[Answer] We have contacts with the Lebanese National Movement and with the Amal Movement because the latter is a broad movement that has played a major role in regaining West Beirut. This is why our contacts with them have been firm and have never been severed.

[Question] If we examine Jordanian-Palestinian relations, we would find that the inlet to these relations is the agreement signed last February which calls for a joint diplomatic movement. It is on the basis of this agreement that King Husayn went to Britain and the United States to speak in the name of the Palestinians and the Jordanians and Abu 'Ammar went to China to speak in the name of both sides. Has this coordination reached a ceiling or are there other expected developments?

[Answer] What was actually agreed upon was for joint delegations to tour some capitals, not for King Husayn to represent the Jordanians and Palestinians or for Abu 'Ammar to represent the Palestinians and the Jordanians. But this did not happen and the two delegations did not go together because the Jordanian minister of information found the formula strange and said "no joint delegations." However, there is fruitful cooperation with Jordan, even though this cooperation needs more trust due to the continuing Jordanian-Palestinian sensitivities.

We say that as long as Jordan clings to the PLO as a sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and as long as it acknowledges that the Palestinian people have the right to establish an independent Palestinian state, relations will improve and develop.

But I believe that there are hands in Jordan that are constantly trying to tamper because they are not pleased with this agreement and they try to sabotage it.

[Question] Do some project that the current reconciliation with Syria will be reflected in tepid relations between the PLO and Jordan?

[Answer] I don't believe so because there is also a tendency toward a Syrian reconciliation with Jordan. Cables were recently exchanged by President al-Asad and King Husayn. Therefore, there is no contradiction. Syria objects if Jordan plans to march with the Reagan plan and to go along with the "Jordanian option" raised by the Israeli Labor Party. We share this Syrian objection. We are against Reagan's plan and against the projection of a Jordanian option. What is important is that there is no linkage of the sort you pointed out in Jordanian-Palestinian and Syrian-Palestinian relations.

[Question] Some Palestinians believe that President Husni Mubarak's course entrenches the gradual departure from the Camp David policy while others oppose this option, citing as evidence the Egyptian government's reiteration of its adherence to the Camp David accords on all occasions. How do you view the horizons of Palestinian-Egyptian relations in the coming phase.

[Answer] I have a position on this issue. I believe that any contact with Egypt should be based on official Egyptian promises that such contacts will strengthen the current hostility to Camp David in Egypt, which seeks ultimately to get rid of Camp David. The Egyptians cannot, of course, say: we will get rid of Camp David. They are not ready for such a decision, which is not an easy one. Insofar as we are concerned, it is difficult for us to establish broad and firm relations with Egypt while the Israeli flag is flying over Cairo. This is very difficult for us. If there were any solution to the Palestinian issue offering agreements other than those offered by the proposed solution, one may view the question positively. But we feel at present that the Egyptians are incapable of getting rid of Camp David. However, I have said and I continue to say that Husni Mubarak is not al-Sadat. Moreover, I consider the step he has taken recently to restore the relations with the Soviet Union, and also with Bulgaria, a positive step. But the return of Egypt to the leadership of the Arab ranks requires other steps. Egypt cannot resume the leadership in the phase of the Camp David accords. This is impossible because it means that the Arabs will be led from the positions of surrender and capitulation to Israel. We fully aspire for Egypt to resume the leadership of the Arab ranks and President Husni Mubarak has the popularity that enables him to tell the Arabs: This is how much weapons, money and support I need to get rid of Camp David. This is better for Egypt. Should President Mubarak take such a step, we will complement it. But if he does not, the relationship will be difficult and even Egypt itself will not be able to withstand it. Let us take in this regard a simple indication, namely the Palestinian Research Center that has been moved to Egypt but whose opening has not been approved yet. So there are restrictions.

This does not, of course, mean that I support the theory that says: "We must remain far from Egypt." It is necessary to move closer to Egypt. But we should move closer by as much as we can to influence it to move further from the Camp David policy and from the accords.

[Question] What about the Palestinian delegation's visit to Moscow, what did the Soviets tell the delegation and what is their position toward the Palestinian national unity and toward the relationship with Syria?

[Answer] The Palestinian delegation's visit to Moscow came in the wake of Abu 'Ammar's visit to Cairo, i.e., at a time when the Palestinian relationship, especially Fatah's relationship, with the Soviet Union was tepid. The most important issues we discussed were the issues of national unity and of relations with Syria, the Arab situation generally and the international situation. We also discussed the method by which to revive the situation and to formulate a mechanism for the Soviet plans proposed to solve the Palestinian issue. These are the issues we discussed. For their part, the Soviets focused heavily on the issue of national unity and asked us to be patient and tolerant in order that we may be able to absorb this phase. I believe that they put some pressure on a number of brothers in order to facilitate, not obstruct, matters. The gist of it is that the Soviets support the unity of the PLO and are for non-intervention in its internal affairs, for a clear political program of national unity and for an organizational program that underlines collective leadership. We then discussed Syria and Palestinian-Syrian relations. The truth is that they have exerted major efforts with the Syrians. I believe that this visit has erased the traces of the tepidity and that we have embarked on active relations whose results have emerged in the Soviet media in particular.

[Question] A meeting was held recently between a PLO delegation and the Israeli Rakah Party in Prague and the two sides agreed to develop the methods of common action. What is the content of this agreement?

[Answer] The meeting was a periodic meeting. This is why it did not discuss a specific issue. Our relationship with Rakah is, of course, a strong relationship because it is a party that plays a role in protecting the Palestinian people living in the occupied land. Rakah's role in this respect is a major role.

[Question] In your assessment, what are the ramifications of the Labor Party's return to power in Israel on the area?

[Answer] To start with, we make no distinction between the Labor Party and the Likud. Both are bad. I use a special phrase in this regard. Whenever I am asked about the difference between the two parties, I answer: "The difference between them is like the difference between Pepsi Cola and Coca Cola." Therefore, we make no distinction between the two. On the contrary, the danger of the Labor Party perhaps lies in the fact that its leaders who take charge of government affairs are extremely smooth

diplomats who speak like doves and act like hawks. You find, for example, Abba Eban as minister of foreign affairs in the Labor Party in contrast to Shamir in the Likud. The latter is repulsive whereas the former is a logical man and a smooth speaker. This is why the Labor Party is more dangerous to us.

On the other hand, the Labor Party may raise the "Jordanian option" to drive a wedge between the Palestinians and the Jordanians. Both parties (Labor and Likud) are not much different on the issue of the settlements. On top of all of this, the United States favors the Labor Party, coordinates more extensively with it and solves more problems with it than it solves with the others because Israel is facing enormous problems. It is experiencing a deficit of nearly \$21 billion and this deficit has affected Israeli economic life. The presence of the Labor Party in power will enhance U.S. aid, thus alleviating the impact of the crisis. This is why we believe that the Labor Party is no less dangerous than the Likud.

[Question] What impact do you expect the U.S. elections to have on the conditions in the area and on enhancing or obstructing the dynamism of peace?

[Answer] I believe that there is a constant U.S. policy in the Arab area. Insofar as we as a people are concerned, this policy is against the PLO and against our national cause. Presidents change and their words and statements may change but they are all equal in opposing our cause, i.e., opposing the essence that is important to us. We once felt optimistic over Carter because he raised the slogan of human rights and spoke of a homeland for the Palestinians. His secretary of state Cyrus Vance issued a joint communique with Gromyko. But only 24 hours later Moshe Dayan arrived in Washington and invalidated the joint U.S.-Soviet communique. This is what happened with Carter. Then the Reagan plan followed. If you examine this plan, you will find that it is constantly inclined toward Israel's interest. The central issue that concerns us, namely the issue of the PLO and of an independent state, is totally absent and any solution offered by the plan ties this issue to Jordan. This is why there is a danger in having the Israeli Labor Party in power and in having Reagan return to the White House simultaneously because the two will then exert pressure on Jordan to embark on the "Jordanian option" projected by the Labor Party. They may withdraw from some territories to induce King Husayn to enter into the process.

[Question] In contrast to these conceptions that you have projected, what ideas do you have of the PLO's action plan in the coming phase?

[Answer] I imagine that the number one duty facing us at present is the issue of Palestinian national unity and of the convocation of the Palestinian National Council. This issue has priority. The second issue is the necessity of restoring our relationship with Syria. We are working toward this end with a totally positive and open-minded

approach. Third, we must exert utmost efforts with Syria and with others to end the drain of the Iraq-Iran war because this war is ultimately harmful to the entire Arab nation, to Palestine and to Syria in particular. Fourth, we must formulate in the next summit a conception of an Arab political and diplomatic movement, without excluding the military option. This is why I have noted the importance of the relationship with Syria. Fifth, we must discuss the issue of Egypt seriously: how to restore it to the Arab ranks and rid it, scientifically and not emotionally, of the Camp David shackles and of the accords it has concluded with Israel. I believe that if we do these things, we will insure that Arab solidarity will rally behind the Palestinian issue. In the past 2 years and in the wake of the Beirut events, the Palestinian issue has experienced some sort of a freeze because of the events that have developed, the split that has emerged and the inter-Arab and Palestinian-Arab disagreements that have surfaced. The issue cannot be revived unless efforts are exerted along these five axes. If we devote attention to these issues, we will be ultimately able to develop our relations with our friends in the world, be they socialists or non-socialists. We must also not estrange the European countries. We must keep after them, even if they are slow, not enthusiastic for movement and subject to U.S. domination. Moreover, we must move in the U.S. arena itself in order that we may develop a public opinion sympathetic to us. It is my opinion that we have the human and material resources in the U.S. arena. Let me give you an example. I have met two Palestinian doctors who came from the United States carrying with them propaganda plans costing \$0.25 million but the Arab League could not afford them because it does not have sufficient funds. This is shameful. This entire nation with all the oil it possesses does not have such a meager sum to finance such a propaganda plan. This is truly a farce. Any Arab country can finance such a plan from a secret fund for an intelligence officer.

We are supposed to move in this arena. This is not shameful because we do not hate the American people but hate the U.S. administration which stands against us. Why shouldn't we win over U.S. public opinion?

These are the most important stations at which we must stop in the coming phase.

[Question] Let us turn to the second station, Syria. Is it likely that the leadership or part of the leadership will return to Damascus if the reconciliation is achieved according to what is required at the Palestinian level?

[Answer] Abu al-Lutf's visit has opened the doors for a resumption of relations. We hope that another meeting in which either Abu al-Lutf alone or Abu al-Lutf and a number of the brothers participate will take place. I believe that the road has been opened now. We are eager for this relationship because neither can Syria dispense with the PLO nor can the PLO dispense with Syria. Therefore, it is natural that neither side is pleased with the estrangement. I believe that it is time for us and for the Syrian leadership to wake up and watch out for the elements that may

try to sabotage the relationship again. We should block any gap that anybody tries to open. Why should Syria and the Palestinians stay far apart? I believe that, thanks to the wisdom of President Hafiz al-Asad and the wisdom of our brothers in the Palestinian leadership, we will achieve a result with which we will mend the rift and end the disagreement.

[Question] Insofar as the third task is concerned, talk is being reiterated about a PLO role in ending the Gulf war. What role, in your opinion, awaits the organization?

[Answer] We are exerting the utmost efforts in this regard. We have not severed the relationship even with Iran. We believe that ending the war is in the interest of both sides and in our interest as Palestinians. In the past, we dreamt of a real front extending from Beirut to Damascus to Baghdad and to Tehran and actually uniting the Arab nation behind it, with our friends in the world finding a real Arab force. If this Arab force is not created now, we will continue to stand in the same place.

[Question] There have been published reports to the effect that you have asked the Tunisian Government to make your temporary offices in permanent offices. Is this true?

[Answer] Nothing of the sort has happened because there is no disagreement over a permanent office or a temporary office. Tunis was our headquarters before our departure from Beirut. We have a good relationship with Tunisia and with the Tunisian people -- a relationship we will not forget.

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CSO: 4404/613

'ARAFAT DISCUSSES EGYPT, SYRIA, OUTCOME OF ISRAELI ELECTIONS

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 70, 11 Aug 84 pp 14-15

[Interview with Yasir 'Arafat, PLO Executive Committee chairman, by Muhammad al-Majali: "Abu 'Ammar to AL-TADAMUN: Cairo Is Moving Away from Camp David; Nobody Is Preventing Me from Visiting Damascus"; in Amman, date not specified]

[Text] Amman--With the freeze engulfing Egyptian-Israeli relations, Palestinian leader Yasir 'Arafat, the PLO Executive Committee chairman, is actively and constantly reminding everyone of the need to correct the flaw created by the Camp David accords through exerting efforts to return Egypt in order that Egypt may regain its Arab position as an essential step in correcting the equation. AL-TADAMUN met with Abu 'Ammar in Amman and asked him in the following interview about the development of relations between the PLO and Egypt and the PLO and Syria and about other issues pertaining to the essence of the cause:

[Question] Let us begin by asking: what is new in the relationship between the PLO and Cairo and do you plan to visit Egypt?

[Answer] I am eager to visit Egypt at the earliest chance and as soon as Palestinian and Arab circumstances permit me. Yes, I will visit Egypt and I have not severed the relationship. Our relations with President Mubarak have not been severed at any time. I must reiterate here what I have already said, namely that our destiny as Palestinians is not to be a local or regional liberation movement. We are undergoing the painful labors of the great birth of our Arab nation. I say that our destiny is to struggle in order to correct the flaw created with the departure of Egypt and with the inflaming of the Gulf war. We are struggling to return Egypt so that it may assume its position in the Arab nation. In this, we are not asking for the impossible. We cannot tell Husni Mubarak to tear up Camp David. Rather, we are saying: move away from the Camp David policy. This is why our National Council was precise when it said "far from the Camp David policy." Egypt has now begun to take steps to remove itself from the Camp David policy, especially when it mobilized its naval and air forces to help protect the Palestinian forces departing from Tripoli. Moreover, there are the statements which President Husni Mubarak uttered in front of Reagan from the same spot on which al-Sadat had stood. Mubarak spoke of the PLO, the Palestinian people's rights and the right to self-determination. Mubarak then severed relations with Costa

Rica and El Salvador. There is also the problem of Taba and of the fighting which occurred there, the issue of closing the consulate in Eilat and the restoration of normal relations with the Soviet Union in its capacity as a friend of the Arab nation and of the Palestinian people. All these manifestations constitute a correcting of the flaw.

Add to this the special efforts exerted by the PLO, whether with the nonaligned countries, with the Islamic countries or at the international level, to put an end to the Iraq-Iran war. After the death of President Ahmed Sekou Toure, I have taken the initiative personally and called for convening the Islamic Efforts Committee so that it may exert the utmost effort to end this war. We are in a race with time on this issue.

[Question] What about the Syrian-Palestinian negotiations?

[Answer] The visit of brother Abu al-Lutf was successful.

[Question] Will the Syrian decision banning your personal entry to Damascus be disregarded soon?

[Answer] No comment. Nobody can prevent me from visiting this sweet-smelling city. Nobody can prevent Yasir 'Arafat from visiting Damascus.

[Question] What about the future joint steps you have discussed with King Husayn?

[Answer] We agreed from the outset on unified action and on a joint policy to confront politically and economically what may happen against our people in the occupied land, to face the organized official Zionist terrorism against our people which is supervised by official figures in the Israeli government and in the Israeli Army and to confront the Judaization of the Islamic and Christian sites, considering that this Judaization has already begun. There is at present a complete scheme against the Islamic and Christian sites in Jerusalem and in Palestine. We have also agreed to confront all the schemes projected in defiance of the Arab nation and to coordinate our steps at the Arab and international levels. There is coordination and there are joint steps to confront all the current events and developments in the area.

[Question] Do you attach any hope to a political settlement through the UN-sponsored international conference which you advocated and which the Soviets have recently advocated?

[Answer] A nation that drops its military option is destined to vanish. If there is some talk about the political solution, then I would like to declare that a political solution does not come through begging for it. The political solution comes through the balance of power. We demand peace and we have never abandoned this demand. When I went to the United Nations, I said: I carry the olive branch in one hand and the rifle in the other. Regrettably, they did not respond. The biggest proof of this lack of response is the election program of both the Likud and the Labor Party. We called for holding an international conference in the wake of the 1973 war. The Geneva

conference was held. But then, regrettably, came the Camp David accords and the equation was muddled. After that, a new tragedy, called the Gulf war, was brought upon us. This is why we call for a political solution through an international conference. But the United States and Israel will not approve such a conference and the area's conditions do not help its convocation.

[Question] Insofar as the international conference is concerned, is Resolution 242 considered its basis?

[Answer] In fact, there is a joint plan which the UN secretary general has discussed with me. I am not at liberty to divulge this plan's details because this is up to the secretary general. We listened to him and gave him our opinion. He is supposed to have discussed this issue with the Soviet leadership. As you know, the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc approve the international conference and they have even adopted the call for this conference. To repeat, we approve the convocation of an international conference to settle the Middle East issue--a conference to be attended by all the parties concerned under the banner of the United Nations and with the participation of the Security Council members.

[Question] Do you think that the conference will achieve the Palestinian position in solving the Palestinian issue?

[Answer] Is it reasonable for us to take part in a conference that does not achieve our demands?

[Question] Under the canopy of the circumstances being experienced by the PLO and by the area generally, are you optimistic over the future?

[Answer] There is a difference between him who lives the event and him who makes the event. We are the event makers in our Arab area. This is why the others said that I am pessimistic when I spoke of the dark tunnel. When I was in 'Alayh on 16 March 1982, I said: I am waiting for Sharon in order to fight him here in 'Alayh. At the time, my brothers in the Lebanese National Movement said: Abu 'Ammar, the people feel pessimistic over what you have said about fighting the Israelis in 'Alayh. Is it possible that the Israelis will reach 'Alayh? I told them: the military equation dictates that the Israelis occupy 'Alayh if they want to occupy al-Damur, as Sharon has said. We tried to deploy our forces in the mountains but were prevented from doing so. Beirut was blockaded from the mountains because there were no joint forces there. The presence of Palestinian forces in the mountains was banned. I say these words for the sake of history.

[Question] How do you see the picture of the general conditions in light of the Palestinian reunification efforts which have been concluded with the signing of the Aden agreement in Algiers?

[Answer] The most important thing we have accomplished is to foil the U.S.-Israeli conspiratorial scheme in which some Arab parties got involved. After our steadfastness, we have been able in the PLO to put our house in order to a large degree and to repair the damage caused by the plot. We should not

perhaps forget what Alexander Haig, Sharon and Begin said about the objective being that of hitting the basic political, military and organizational structure of the PLO. But if we backtrack a little, we will find that there were naval battles between us and Israel at the end of the month of Ramadan of this year, both in North Lebanon and in the Haifa area where the Lebanese and Palestinian shores witnessed naval battles between us and the Israelis. There were also the military operations carried out by the joint Lebanese-Palestinian forces.

Previously, we were reserved on this issue and we said that these operations were acts of purely Lebanese resistance. We said this out of fear of Israeli acts of revenge against our Palestinian camps in the south. But in the wake of the massacre in 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp and after the constant strikes against our camps in South Lebanon, it became difficult for us to conceal the military effort exerted by the joint Lebanese-Palestinian forces. I say proudly that this Palestinian effort through which we participate with our Lebanese allies has dragged the Israelis into the dilemma of a war of attrition. Moreover, there is the complete Israeli blockade of the town of Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip, where the forces of aggression tried to conceal what happened inside the town. But it is certain that very big operations have been carried out in the Strip against the Israeli forces. The only information leaked about these operations is information about the enemy's blockade of the town. Therefore, they have failed to strike the organization's basic military structure. I do not want to reveal more on this issue. But I do ask: where is Haig? I beg the Arab reader to read Haig's memoirs so that he may see for himself Haig's acknowledgment of the failure of the U.S.-Israeli scheme. I also ask: Where is Begin who refused even to utter my name and who called me the bearded man? He is now retired in his home, washing his hands every 5 minutes because he is suffering from a case of depression he developed when he discovered that his aides and his ministers had deceived him and did not inform him of the size of the Israeli human losses, whether in South Lebanon, in the Beirut blockade or in the war of attrition in which Israel's losses exceeded its losses in all its previous wars with the Arabs. I also tell Sharon: "Not every bird's flesh is edible. Our flesh is bitter. It is true that we have lost our position in Lebanon but we have not lost the ability and the flexibility to fight at all levels. Rather, that which seems harmful may turn out to be beneficial."

[Question] Do you expect certain changes in case the Israeli Labor Party forms the new cabinet?

[Answer] I do not make a distinction between the Labor Party and the Likud. They are two faces of the same coin. But the Labor Party is skillful in its ability to break its isolation. On the occasion, I wonder: why talk with such importance about the Labor Party victory? Do people imagine that the "help" will come from the Labor Party or the Likud? This in itself is a catastrophe. To me, the Labor Party and the Likud are the same. There is an ugly expansionist Zionist entity and our Arab nation must confront it. I hope that the Arab press will not fall into this scheme.

[Question] What do you hope for from the meetings and dialogues held with the Israeli Communist Party?

[Answer] I am elected by a Palestinian National Council and the council calls for establishing relations with the progressive forces in Israel. Rakah Party is one of these progressive and democratic forces. Therefore, I am carrying out what the National Council approved in the political program of its 16th session.

[Question] Has a final date been set for the convocation of the Palestinian National Council?

[Answer] I declared last February that we can get the council together at any moment. We have a sufficient majority in the council to insure its convocation. But we are eager to have political consensus. It is true that this is difficult in democratic action because it means giving the minority the opportunity to overwhelm the majority. But one of the sources of our strength is that we try to insure a political majority, not just a numerical majority. This is why we have opened our hearts to the Algiers and Aden dialogues and to the lobbies in between them. As for the Palestinian National Council, it will, according to the agreement, be held between the middle of August and the middle of September.

8494

CSO: 4404/610

'ARAFAT DISCUSSES WEAPONS INDUSTRY, SOUTH LEBANON OPERATIONS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 236, 18-24 Aug 84 pp 24-25

[Interview with Yasir 'Arafat, PLO Executive Committee chairman, by 'Arafat Hijazi: "AL-MAJALLAH in Palestinian Weapons Factory; Officers from Arab Armies Train with Palestinian Revolutionaries"; on return flight from tour of Maldives, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, date not specified]

[Text] AL-MAJALLAH accompanied Yasir 'Arafat, the general commander of the Palestinian revolution, on a tour which lasted 2 weeks and included a number of Arab and Islamic countries in an attempt to paint a picture of the revolution's current reality and of its future strategy. The Palestinian leader gave AL-MAJALLAH the opportunity to accompany him on his visit to the Maldives Islands, Malaysia and Brunei to inspect with him a Palestinian weapons factory and to review units of the sophisticated Palestinian land, air and naval forces. The climate prevalent in all sites and meetings was the climate of the military option which Abu 'Ammar has expressed, saying that it is the slogan of the coming phase.

During their ceaseless training, the Palestinian infantrymen cross more than 50 km daily on foot, carrying all their weapons and full gear and passing through various contours of rugged mountains, rivers, valleys and plains under extreme heat and in fatal cold. We also saw Palestinian pilots flying their fighter and interceptor planes and their helicopters, all of which carry the Palestinian insignia and the Palestinian flag. We inspected the early production of Palestinian guns and missiles manufactured under the supervision of Palestinian scientists and we saw a large number of officers from some Arab armies wishing to benefit from the Palestinian experience in weapons-manufacturing train [in these factories]. I also met with men of the Palestinian Navy in their white uniforms while conducting naval exercises in their boats, which have become an important part of the Palestinian army's fleet.

In the Republic of the Maldives, which consists of 1,200 islands, AL-MAJALLAH saw the name of Yasir 'Arafat written on the airport facade in letters bigger than those of the name of the republic. AL-MAJALLAH also saw the street walls covered with pictures of the Palestinian leader and posters blocking the horizon and raised in the streets and the squares calling for the liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine under the leadership of Abu 'Ammar, all this even

though the inhabitants of the islands had been waiting in the streets and the squares for more than 12 hours.

Rally and Objection

In the Kingdom of Malaysia, the ambassadors of the United States, Britain and West Germany presented a query on the reasons why the PLO chairman was accorded a reception exceeding those accorded kings and presidents. We saw there a fervent popular rally unprecedented in this Islamic kingdom.

In Indonesia, the officials were more surprised than we were when Abu 'Ammar held a press conference which was attended by a larger number of journalists and media people coming from all parts of Asia than the number of people who ordinarily participate in a popular rally!

As for what happened in Brunei-Dar es Salam, it was unprecedented. While 'Arafat and the Sultan of Brunei were performing noon prayers at the main mosque, crowds came to greet 'Arafat and then kidnapped him and went touring around the mosque's outer yards, calling for the liberation of Jerusalem. The army and the police were able to do nothing in the face of the onrush of the masses around 'Arafat. Many people fell exhausted as a result of the sweeping pressure of the masses.

Palestinian Weapons

While flying back, AL-MAJALLAH asked the Palestinian leader in the presence of Nabil 'Amr, 'Arafat's adviser:

[Question] There is no doubt that all we have seen in the past 2 weeks evokes a degree of optimism in the soul. But you heard the preacher at the Friday prayers in Dar es Salam call in his speech, which had been prepared specially for the occasion of your visit, for Islamic unity and jihad [holy struggle] and appeal to the Islamic states to set up weapons factories and not to rely totally on external sources. We must talk about this hope for a weapons industry, especially since we have seen a factory for the production of Palestinian guns.

[Answer] (Abu 'Ammar hesitated initially but then said:)

This is not the first time we have manufactured weapons. We had factories in Lebanon. The factory you visited is not the only one. Three other Palestinian plants have begun producing weapons.

[Question] What weapons are produced?

[Answer] We have achieved a scientific and technological level compatible with the production of any weapon. But we focus at present on producing the weapon which the Palestinian fighter needs mainly, namely the RPG-9. We are also developing the Grad BM-13 and BM-21 missiles, the first with a range of 12 km and the second with a range of 25 km. We have been able to develop

both missiles and to combine them in the Palestinian Grad, which has a range of 33 km. This missile has proven to be very successful in the tests.

[Question] May we know where you acquired the plants and who are the experts who helped in the production and development?

[Answer] There is no country in the world that will agree to sell us a weapons plant. But the PLO includes in its ranks a select group of Palestinian scientists who have set up our weapons plants on their own. There is a fact that must be made known, namely that every weapon consists of parts manufactured originally for purposes other than for the production of weapons. Most of the parts are American, French, German and Russian and our scientists and experts have assembled them and programmed them electronically without help from anybody and without the knowledge of anybody. A number of military commanders of fraternal Arab countries have asked us to train their experts in our plants. We now have in every weapons plant a number of Arab brothers being trained by us.

Full Manufacturing

[Question] Do these plants assemble the parts or do they produce all the parts needed by a gun or a missile?

[Answer] We do not purchase a single part to be added to a gun or a missile. We produce even the smallest parts in our plants. It is a 100 percent Palestinian missile or gun. In addition to this production, we have also been able to produce the munitions needed by our weapons and we are now capable of relying completely on our own weapons.

[Question] In an interview with AL-MAJALLAH a few months ago, you said that you will not drop the military option. Do you think that the construction of these plants is the embodiment of this slogan?

[Answer] Yes, it is the symbol of our will. We must realize that the miracle accomplished by the PLO after its departure from Beirut and then from Tripoli lies in the reorganization of our forces, especially when we were faced with fundamental difficulties in distributing these forces among 10 Arab countries, namely Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, North Yemen, Democratic Yemen, Tunisia and Algeria. This saddled us with a major and difficult logistical burden in terms of military control and discipline, in addition to other burdens emanating from the new conditions. But we overcame these difficulties in record time and restored our military strength to what it had been before the Lebanon war. This is in addition to the significant military experience gained by these forces--an experience which, to put it very modestly, is equal in its depth to military experiences at the international level. As the entire world knows, what we faced was not the Israeli military force alone but a military force supported by all the criminal electronic U.S. weapons which were used for the first time with the capability which this superpower enjoys--a superpower which took an actual part in this war at the military, political, financial, propaganda and intelligence levels. These new difficulties motivated us to try new logistical means and a special

type of mobilization that enables us to rush our forces to the spot we want with the least degree of difficulty and in a short time.

The issue is not confined to military training. Rather, I feel proud of the fact that our Science Committee has resumed its activity at full capacity. There is, moreover, the development we have introduced to our intrinsic capability to produce numerous types of military equipment which we manufacture ourselves. At the same time, we have been able to coordinate our efforts with our partners in the Lebanese arena in the military operations carried out in the south even though we have been stabbed in the back in this period, keeping in mind that a decision was taken at a meeting of the Executive Committee at the beginning of 1983 that all military communiques would be issued in the name of the Lebanese forces and not in the name of the Joint Committee. I personally opposed this decision, which has been implemented because it was adopted by the majority.

It seems that Palestinian blood had to be shed in another massacre, meaning the massacre of 'Ayn al-Hulwah and al-Miyah Wa Miyah, which was perpetrated by Lahd's forces and the Israeli forces, in order that the effective Palestinian role in the operations in South Lebanon may be revealed, especially in the wake of the statement made by the Israeli Defense Army coordinator in Lebanon to justify these massacres when he declared that the Palestinians are behind the majority of the operations carried out against their forces. The justification cited by the commander of Lahd's forces for the criminal operations against our camps in the south was similar. Moreover, Israel has reopened Ansar Camp which now contains 1,700 Palestinian detainees and 350 Lebanese detainees. This is in addition to the acts of piracy perpetrated by the Israeli Navy against a number of vessels heading for Beirut and Tripoli after this navy had sealed off the ports of Sidon and Tyre in search of the Palestinians responsible for the operations carried out in the south. I must also note the naval clashes which took place between us and the Israelis across Tripoli and Haifa. In the wake of those clashes, the Israelis launched their rabid and brutal attack on al-Aranib Island where 22 Palestinians and Lebanese were martyred. This is why I have now called the Military Council and my brothers in the Executive Committee to reconsider their decision and to announce officially the operations carried out by our forces now that Israel has become convinced that we carry out these operations under the name of the Lebanese forces.

It goes without saying that we could not have resumed our military operations so quickly if we had not set up the weapons and missiles plants which have proven their efficiency.

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CSO: 4404/610

LIBYAN-MOROCCAN ALLIANCE CONSIDERED BLOW TO KHOMEYNI

London KEYHAN in Persian 6 Sep 84 p 1

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The announced Libyan-Moroccan union shakes one of the pillars of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. From the day Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni came to power, Libya, along with Syria, has been considered the most fervent ally of the Islamic Republic, while Morocco is considered one of the most undaunted enemies of the ayatollah's rule.

The Libyan-Moroccan union which evolved at an unexpected meeting between Colonel Moammar Qadhdhafi and King Hassan II was ratified toward the end of last week by the peoples of the two countries. In both countries, government officials claimed that the voting was 99.9 percent in favor of the plan for the union.

Immediately after the announced union between the two North African countries, the ayatollah's government warned Qadhdhafi not to fall into the "trap of world arrogance." The Islamic Republic's propaganda attacks against Qadhdhafi and King Hassan have intensified. The Libyan ambassador has left Tehran and his replacement has not yet been sent. Relations between Tehran and Rabat have been cut since early February 1978.

The union whose architects are Hassan II and Qadhdhafi is truly cause for astonishment. The king of Morocco is one of the closest friends of the United States in the Arab World while the ruler of Libya is considered the long-time friend of the Soviet Union in Africa.

The policies of the two countries toward Iran have been diametrically opposite. During the thick of the Islamic revolution in Iran, King Hassan angered the ayatollah by playing host to the late Mohammad Reza Shah. Subsequently the king of Morocco entertained the son of the latest shah, soon after the latter had announced his claim to the throne. In the past 3 years, Reza Shah II has been residing near Rabat, the capital.

On the other hand, Qadhdhafi has been a strong supporter of Khomeyni and kept close touch with leaders of the Islamic revolution through Ayatollah Mohammad Montazeri, the son of Ayatollah Hoseyn Ali Montazeri. Naturally, relations between Qadhdhafi and Khomeyni never really warmed up following the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr, Lebanon's shiite leader. (Sadr disappeared in 1978 while on a trip to Libya. He is related to Khomeyni.)

During the 4 years of war between Iran and Iraq, Libya has stood at Iran's side while Morocco has been on Baghdad's. Libya has tried to procure arms needed by Iran, while Morocco, on the contrary, has even gone to the extent of sending "volunteers" in its support of Iraq.

Another important point is that Morocco has an agreement with the United States under which the latter can make use of military port facilities along the Moroccan coast, while Libya has a similar agreement with the Soviet Union and is host to hundreds of military personnel from the eastern bloc.

How long will this treaty of opposites last? God knows. But it must be pointed out that Qadhdhafi has not been normally a faithful friend. Up until now, he has produced nine other alliance treaties with various Arab countries and thrown those treaties into the dust. King Hassan, on the other hand, has set Proteus as an example to follow and heeds this advice: In a quickly changing world, change faster every moment.

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CSO: 4640/398

IRAN

REVOLUTIONARY BODIES TO USE FOUNDATION FOR OPPRESSED FUNDS

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 23 Aug 84 p 12

[Article: "Foundation for the Oppressed Supervisor at a Press Conference: A Number of the Foundation's Economic Units to Be Made Available to Revolutionary Organizations"]

[Text] SOBH-E AZADEGAN CORRESPONDENT: At a press conference yesterday, the Supervisor of the Foundation for the Oppressed commented on His Holiness the Imam's recent authorization for the sale of the foundation's municipal lands in an organizational house cleaning, and the status of the foundation's other units.

Mr Tabataba'i began by referring to His Holiness the Imam's (May the Line Long), recent authorization of the sale of the Foundation for the Oppressed's municipal lands for the construction of homes and the Guardian Council's ruling that these lands are exempt from article 10 of the Municipal Lands Law. He said: A staff to organize this edict has now been formed in the Foundation for the Oppressed called the Land Staff, which is charged with identifying the foundation's lands and villages throughout the country, as a preliminary step in the construction of homes for oppressed people.

With regard to the cost of building these residential units, he said: The expenses for building such units will be met by using foundation assets such as jewelry, carpets, small gardens, and other financial resources.

He commented on the foundation's house-cleaning project and the transfer of a number of its industrial and agricultural service units to revolutionary organizations. He said: With authorization from His Holiness Emam Khomeyni (May the Line Long), a significant amount of the foundation's resources is being turned over to revolutionary organizations, with government coordination and the support of national officials. A list of the main ones includes gas stations throughout the country, guest houses, second-class hotels, shares in the foundation's hospitals, small companies and factories, the foundation's own shares in companies and factories, stores, all the foundation's ice plants, travel agencies, a number of villas and motels, a significant quantity of sheep, gardens scattered throughout the country, a printing press, a field for cultivation, a relatively large industry in one of the southern provinces, weaving and textile factories, second-class cinemas throughout the country,

small bakeries and mechanized bakeries, small poultry ranches in the provinces, date orchards, floral greenhouses, and property and land holdings in the provinces.

The value of the units to be transferred is close to two billion rials; 60 percent of them will be given to the Imam's Aid Committee, 20 percent to the Quality of Life Organization, 20 percent to the Fifteen Khordad Foundation, and the transferred movie houses will be given to the art section of the Islamic Propaganda Organization.

A number of other units will also be transferred to the Housing Foundation, and the Union of Islamic Student Societies.

He added: Upon completion of this project the Foundation for the Oppressed will no longer have property in 18 provinces; we will have only service offices.

He noted that around 80 percent of the foundation's assets are in Tehran, 5 percent of them are in the provinces to be transferred, and the remaining 15 percent are in other areas. He said: After the completion of the house-cleaning project, the Foundation for the Oppressed will only have about 200 large economic units, and its most important activities will be expended in home construction.

The Supervisor of the Foundation for the Oppressed commented on the foundation's home construction project, which began in the year 1362 [21 March 1983 - 20 March 1984]. He said: 20 thousand residential units have been begun, and about four thousand of them have been completed and assigned for occupancy in the provinces of Yazd, Semnan, Zanzan, Esfahan, Hormozegan, Khorasan, Khuzestan, and Bakhteran. It is hoped that the remainder will be completed and assigned for occupancy by the end of the current year [20 March 1985].

He also added: In addition to carrying out this plan, the foundation has also constructed the following villages in the war zones or for refugees - Martyr Raja'i Village in Fasa, with 1,052 units, Abazar Village in Azna with 982 units, 1,208 units in Jahram, and ten thousand units in Dezful and Shadegan. Our correspondent asked the Supervisor of the foundation: How many of the foundation's companies made a profit last year and how much tax did they pay? He answered: The foundation now has about 150 factories, 120 in Tehran and Zanzan and the rest scattered elsewhere. They are all showing a profit now without exception, but they have problems, which are as follows: 1 - Accumulated losses. In previous years these factories had accumulated millions of tomans in losses, and we must now compensate for the losses of previous years. 2 - Bank debts. In previous years these debts were paid by affiliated units; the profits of these factories are now mostly taken up with bank debt repayments. A very important issue to which you referred is the issue of taxes. These figures are astronomical. Because the years 1356, 1357, and 1958 [21 March 1977 - 20 March 1980] were the crisis years of the revolution, there were confusion and setbacks in these offices. The Ministry of Finance taxed them heavily because of very minor deficiencies, and in

recent weeks they drew money out of the foundation's account without notifying the foundation. One of the problems is really this very issue of taxes. An example is the TLP Company, owned by the condemned Khayyami; taxes on this company are now 280 million tomans, which the Office of Finance assessed at the highest rates. The Office of Finance took 100 million tomans of this out of the company's account two years ago, and this company now has to pay whatever profits it makes for back taxes, and cannot presently help. He was asked: It has been reported that you have forced oppressed renters to vacate houses belonging to the foundation, and that you are selling them at prices the oppressed cannot afford to pay. What justification is there for this? He answered:

We do not justify this, we deny it; there was nothing that we would wish to justify. After land, the greatest assets of the Foundation for the Oppressed are property and estates, and we said earlier that we have around 14,000 files on estates throughout the country. Most of these properties and estates are for the disposal and use of government offices and organizations. As for oppressed individuals, after the victory of the revolution in the years 1357 and 1358 [21 March 1978 - 20 March 1980] a significant number of the Foundation for the Oppressed's homes were occupied. First of all, I cannot say with certainty that all of the occupiers were oppressed people. We know of cases of individuals having two houses taking over foundation houses. In the Khaniabad-e No project we carried out in Tehran where we built about 500 residential units. It is natural that a family of oppressed individuals who may now be occupying a home worth 50 million tomans, or even ten other families, cannot pay for this house. We sell such houses to them on terms with long-term payments and evacuate them. It is natural, however, that we deal severely with those who already have houses and squat in the ones we have, and you know that it is now impossible to evacuate these houses and consider them guilty without a court order.

Our correspondent asked the foundation supervisor about His Holiness the Imam's recent authorization and the manner of turning lands over to the oppressed. He announced:

An important point which I must make is that the Foundation for the Oppressed does not have the right to simply transfer the ownership of land. We will not do this, because it is forbidden in the Municipal Lands Law. The Imam's authorization is for these lands to be converted to homes and made available to the oppressed, but not the land itself. It is natural that we will write a set of guidelines for assigning possession of these homes, and that we will set various prices. In accordance with the Imam's edict, we will assign the homes at no charge in some cases, in some cases at the wholesale price, and in some cases at a 10 to 15 percent profit. An important point is that much of the Foundation for the Oppressed's land is commercial, rather than residential property; it is natural that the foundation must use these lands for investing on residential lands.

Mr Tabataba'i was asked: It is rumored that many of the idolaters will be able to recover their property. Is this true? He answered: We deny this rumor. It is true that a number of them have already recovered their

property, but I must say that the Foundation for the Oppressed had no responsibility in these cases. We carry out the verdicts of the Islamic revolutionary courts. There have been cases where property and units were released or returned to their owners after 5 years of management; this has to do with the judicial powers.

He named the indebtedness of units attached to the foundation as another of the problems of the Foundation for the Oppressed. Examples given were the Hotel Hayat, with more than 900 million tomans indebtedness, the AIP Organization, with 1.5 billion rials, and a palace in Mazandaran with 200 million tomans.

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CSO: 4640/379

IRAN

NEW MINISTER: LACK OF PLAN AN INDUSTRIAL DILEMMA

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Aug 84 p 22

[Interview with Minister of Industries Gholamreza Shafe'i by mass media reporters; date and place not specified]

[Text] In order for our country to be self-reliant, more investments must be made in national and major industries to enable us to procure our currency.

This statement was made by Engineer Gholamreza Shafe'i, the new minister of industries of our country, in an interview with reporters of the mass media. He said: Our industry can be characterized by its dependence on various kinds of raw materials, machinery and technology and its deficiency in terms of technical knowledge.

He added: There are some uncertainties in our industries in regards to investments in various government, cooperative, and private sectors. Agreements in principle which are issued may confirm these uncertainties.

He said: At the present time, 50 percent of the industries affiliated with this Ministry are located around Tehran. With the implementation of a ratification concerning the 120 km restrictions, this uncontrolled growth has been prevented.

In regards to the difficulties of industry and the lack of an industrial model in the society, he said: Since, on the one hand, we want to prevent waste and to have Islamic standards govern our lives and, on the other hand, there is a tendency to have everything available in the country regardless of whether or not the need is true or artificial. He pointed out: Since artificial needs also existed in the past, it is necessary for the authorities and even for the people themselves to define a consumption model in order to plan the real model accordingly.

Then we can determine in what areas investments must be made and what industries must be supported. Concerning the changes in the industries, he pointed out: The Ministries of Industries, Heavy Industries, and Mines and Metals must cooperate. At present, there are explored minerals which can provide the needs of some of our industries, and there are cases of no work having been done on the mines at all. With the cooperation of these ministries, these difficulties can be identified and resolved.

He said: At the present time, factories exist in other countries similar to those in our country whose production output is two and a half times that of the factories in our country. In order to achieve such actual production, our managers, workers, and planners must work harder.

On the other hand, the quality of goods must be raised. After the revolution, given the imposed war, the economic embargo, the low quality, the imported raw materials, and the age of the machinery and molds, the quality of goods was lowered. With the efforts of the Iranian institute for industrial standards and research, the standards of goods must be raised. Concerning the future programs of this Ministry, he said: Planning centers for 70 industrial fields must be created alongside the factories, and considering the shortage of manpower in the areas of planning and manufacturing, our managers must report their needs to the Ministries of Education and Higher Education in order to see that the forces needed are trained. He then announced the priorities of our industries, which must be employed as follows:

That agreements in principle primarily be issued for the private, government, and cooperative sectors in agricultural, rural, animal husbandry, and livestock areas. The fields of chemical and pharmaceutical industries must be created with consideration for the oil, gas, and coal resources existing in our country.

Also, construction, cement, and textile industries must be created and developed to enable us to achieve self-sufficiency in this area. In conclusion, he mentioned other priorities to be electrical, electronic, and cellulose industries respectively.

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IRAN

PROJECT FOR GAS TRANSFER TO BANDAR 'ABBAS UNDERWAY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Aug 84 pp 1, 2

[Interview with 'Ali Akbar Qasemi-Naraqi, general manager of national gas company of Hormozgan, by KEYHAN; date and place not specified]

[Text] Bandar 'Abbas, KEYHAN reporter: "With the discovery of the large natural gas reservoirs in Sarkhun of Bandar 'Abbas, the plan for the gas refinery to be used by the thermal power station of Bandar 'Abbas and Sarcheshmeh copper was put into operation."

This statement was announced by Engineer 'Ali Akbar Qasemi-Naraqi, the general manager of the national gas company of the Province of Hormozgan, in an exclusive interview with KEYHAN. He said: With the operation of Sarkhun project No 1, the fuel problem of Bandar 'Abbas Tavanir company will be resolved next year.

In this interview, referring to the planning for industrial projects to utilize natural gas energy, including the thermal power plant of Bandar 'Abbas and Sarcheshmeh copper, in regards to the procurement of gas, he said:

Concerning providing the intended industries to handle the projected gas shortage, exploration and drilling procedures were conducted in the Genu mountains in the Sarkhun area, a suburb of Bandar 'Abbas. After the discovery of large natural gas reserves, the planning for the natural gas refinery to be used by the Bandar 'Abbas power plant as well as Sarcheshmeh copper company of Kerman is underway.

In this connection, referring to the general policy of the Ministry of Petroleum concerning the replacement of natural gas for moderately distilled fuels (kerosine, diesel fuel, and gasoline), Engineer Qasemi-Naraqi said: There are expansive programs involving the natural gas of the region of Hormozgan, including the Sarkhun project, which is located 35 km from Bandar 'Abbas and has large natural gas reserves. Its operation has

been divided to three projects according to the following timetable.

Sarkhun Project No 1

Since Qeshm refinery cannot satisfy the needs of Bandar 'Abbas power plant, the Bandar 'Abbas power plant makes up its shortage of fuel from mazut, which is not economically feasible. Hence, the Sarkhun No 1 project to supply natural gas to Bandar 'Abbas Tavanir company, which has 50 km of transmitting lines 22 inches thick, sends 7 million cubic meters of standard liquid gas (250 million standard cubic feet) to the power plant. With the operation of this unit, which, God willing, will start next year, the fuel problem of Bandar 'Abbas Tavanir company will be resolved. It should be explained that the work on the implementation of this project by the contractor began in July and the total cost of this project will be 1,650 million rials.

Sarkhun Project No 2

In order to supply natural gas to the Sarcheshmeh copper factories and the villages and cities of Kerman Province, the national gas company is preparing the implementation of Sarkhun project No 2, with a designed capacity of 7 million standard cubic meters (250 million standard cubic feet). It will have a transmitting line 400 km long and, God willing, will begin operations from 21 March 1989. It must be explained that this refinery has been designed for a capacity of up to 500 million cubic feet.

Sarkhun Project No 3

Also, in order to prevent the burning of the liquids obtained from liquid gas, which accompanies natural gas, it has been determined that a 12,000 barrel refinery will be created next to the Sarkhun facilities, along with the above-mentioned projects, for which the preliminary planning is underway. In this process, liquid gas, gasoline, and other fuels will be produced, which will help greatly to supply fuel to this deprived area. It should be explained that the implementation of the Sarkhun project, including the above-mentioned projects, with a capacity of 500 cubic feet of gas daily, will be equivalent to creating a crude oil refinery with a daily capacity of 100,000 barrels, in terms of heating capability and replacing liquid fuels.

10,000

CSO: 4640/381

IRAN

NEW ECONOMIC POLICY, WAR, AIR PIRACY DISCUSSED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 4 Sep 84 pp 3, 14

[Interview with Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi by radio, television, and press reporters on 3 Sep 84; place not specified]

[Text] Reminder:

Political service. Yesterday morning, Engineer Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the prime minister of our country, participated in a radio, television, and press conference with domestic and foreign reporters and responded to their questions concerning the new economic policy of the government regarding the involvement of the private sector in economic issues, the war, the air piracy conspiracy, the conspiracy of global oppression against the Islamic revolution, and other issues.

Yesterday, ETTELA'AT published a summary of this interview and today, the detailed text of the interview follows.

According to our reporter, first the prime minister addressed the foreign correspondents, recommending that they report the news truthfully. Then the first question was asked by the correspondent of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic concerning the economic affairs of the country. The prime minister said:

Following the recent statements of the imam of the nation, I issued a circular letter. Meanwhile, another circular letter was sent to the executive organizations to prepare programs conforming to the imam's decree in their activities, because the entire government program is coordinated in this area. In regards to the statements of the leader of the revolution, they are a reminder that brings to the attention of the government the great forces and talents existing throughout the society.

Naturally, the government of the Islamic Republic should make use of these resources in a desirable manner, towards the political growth and blossoming of the country.

This has been the imam's line from old times, to place the main emphasis of the political and economic sectors on the people. This directive follows the same line. God willing, the government will follow this directive with all its power.

No Change Has Taken Place in Our Economy

Then the reporter of KYODO from Japan asked: What problem in the five-year economic policy of the country has resulted in this decision by the government?

The prime minister said: We are not faced with any particular problem. The current economic policies of Iran have evolved from previous policies. If you look closely at the five-year plans that the government has presented to the Majlis, you will see that a greater share of economic activities is given to the private sector. In this area, I do not think a fundamental change or revision has been made.

This news agency asked another question: Can the new economic policies of the Islamic Republic be considered a change and do these policies mark the beginning of a free economy or are they merely short term and temporary?

Engineer Musavi responded: As I pointed out in response to the first question, we do not consider this stage a turn towards a free economy by any means, but we consider it a new attention to the forces that have high capability in regards to investments and other characteristics.

He added: In this regard, the leader of the Islamic revolution made a recommendation and it is natural for the government to pay attention to this issue. We do not think that this is a change towards the Western kind of capitalist economy, because the characteristics of an Islamic economy are unlike the Western or Eastern economies.

Diplomatic Language Backed by Military Might

In response to a question by the reporter for the Japanese newspaper ASAHI, the prime minister said:

We have always carried out diplomatic activities backed by the might and power which has existed in our nation. We do not find diplomatic language effective without power behind it. Take, for example, the early years of the revolution, when we were the target of violent threats and attacks, or the first years of the

war, when we were faced with such a situation. Our policies were given attention in the world from the time that we inflicted deadly blows on the regime of Saddam. At present, our diplomatic actions are inseparable from our plans and strategies in the war. For this reason, we must ask the question in this way: Has Iran's position changed in the war which has been imposed upon it? Have the objectives of our country changed? I must say, no, our objectives have not changed, by any means, since the beginning of the war. These objectives have been fully explained to world public opinion, and the overthrow of Saddam is one of these objectives. Hence, the war and our activities on the diplomatic scene will continue until this issue is achieved.

Characteristics of the New Majlis

In response to another question by this correspondent, the prime minister said:

A new Majlis has been formed and the spirit dominating in this Majlis is naturally different from that of the previous one.

Of course, following these changes and the refusal of the Majlis to give a vote of confidence to five ministers, the international mass media tried to find a possibility of conflicts among the political factions in our country. But the truth is that if attention is paid to the events in the Majlis, the discussions that took place and the names, you will see that the Majlis was beyond such calculations and these false hopes of the great powers who analyze any movement in our country with the hope of conflict and unrest and who have interpreted this issue in the same way, whereas, this issue must be interpreted in this form [as published].

Plan for Purchasing Rice

The ETTELA'AT reporter asked: Considering that the rice harvesting season is approaching, what is your program in this connection, given that many of the farmers believe that the purchase of rice by the government has not been in their best interests?

In response to our reporter, the prime minister said: In this area, the honorable minister of commerce is involved in extensive discussions both with the clerics of Gilan and Mazandaran and with those who have opinions in regards to rice and its distribution. We think the results of this action will soon be clear.

The Conspiracy of the United States and the Leaders of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council

Again, our ETTELA'AT reporter asked: At the same time that plans are being discussed to dismiss Israel from the United Nations, the United States has asked the leaders of the countries which are members of the Persian Gulf cooperation council to hold a meeting in that country. How do you analyze the relation between these two actions?

Engineer Musavi said: We believe this is a sort of mobilization of forces, because certain pressures are placed on us in the United Nations in connection with the war. We all know that this war and the direction our nation is following in this regard conflict with the interests of the United States and the reactionary countries supporting Saddam's regime.

A European reporter asked: What possibilities are you investigating to end the war as soon as possible? He responded:

We do not find any other possibility but the fall of Saddam as soon as possible.

In response to a question by another news agency, he said: One of the characteristics of the Islamic revolution is that it has had an alert and profound leader who has given the necessary warnings and directives to the government and the authorities whenever necessary. In this connection, as well, what will happen? On the whole, we do not see anything different from the goals and actions of the revolution previously. If the imam's statements are noted, in which he emphasizes support for the oppressed and the downtrodden, even calling the government a government serving the oppressed, the line of the government becomes clear. This shows that the main line is support for the oppressed.

Also, in response to another question by this news agency, concerning the newly established Ministry of Information and its activities, the prime minister said:

During the short period since its establishment, this ministry has been trying to organize the information organizations of the country. This is precisely one of the main goals of this ministry.

He added: In regards to domestic and foreign intelligence, such as domestic security and counterespionage, we do not consider them to be separate. The duty of the Ministry of Intelligence is to collect and organize these various intelligence units.

In response to the correspondent of the Arabic program of the Voice and Vision concerning the situation of Saddam, the prime minister said:

We do not think that this regime has become stronger than before. Of course it is true that this regime has received sophisticated weapons from the Eastern and Western powers and it appears that the regime is in a better position in terms of arms. However, if we pay careful attention, our victory over Saddam has come in spite of the heavy equipment and the stronger organization of Saddam. In continuing the war and the victories that we have achieved, we have in fact proven the slogan of the victory of blood over the sword. The issue which is publicized now is in fact a pretext to preserve Saddam for a few days, which shows the unstable position of Saddam within and outside his borders.

Activity of the Private Sector in Industries

The (N.B.C.U.) reporter of Japan asked about the activities of the private sector in the industrial sector on the basis of the Constitution. The prime minister answered.

In this case, the heavy industries of the country are at the disposal of the government. The private sector can invest in other industries along with the cooperative sector. In this connection, the government has always been encouraging and of course this encouragement has become stronger since the statements of the imam. We have invited all the forces who can to invest in this area.

Then, in response to another question by this reporter in regards to the Iranian stock market, he said:

This aspect has become stagnant in our regime, which, of course, does not mean that it does not exist at all. We believe that with the expansion of the private sector, this market will again reappear, but under Islamic regulations. Naturally, the government must guard against the artificial price fluctuations in the market which might result in the accumulation of wealth by a number of middlemen. In addition, at the same time, this aspect should help the economy of the country.

Saddam's Propaganda Tactics

Then, in response to another question by the reporter of this news agency concerning the recent propaganda tactics of Saddam involving the freeing of Iranian captives, the prime minister said:

The action of the regime of Iraq in this connection is hypocritical. Given this fact, we can reach a correct analysis

of the subject. Here, it seems appropriate to point out that, on the whole, a number of our captives in Iraq are citizens who were captured during the first days of Iraq's aggression on the soil of our country. Among this group, there are old men and women, a few of whom are occasionally freed, and the regime of Iraq states that these are the prisoners who are released unilaterally. Otherwise, we think that the regime of Iraq does not have the courage to release our brave combatants. If it frees them, they will recount the crimes which the regime of Saddam commits inside Iraq.

In any case, with this action, the regime of Iraq is trying to cover up its recent crime of air piracy.

Reason for Delay in War Operations

As the interview continued, the reporter for JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI asked about the delay in the war operations.

In this connection, the prime minister said: We must pay attention to the interests of the fronts. Delays in the operations in no way reflect a change in the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As I pointed out in response to one of the questions, we consider our diplomatic actions as resulting from our powerful Islamic actions on the fronts.

Hence, the issues must not be separated and interpreted one by one.

Supervision of Government and Activities of the Private Sector

Then, the reporter for JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI asked a question concerning the procedures for supervision of the government over the activities of the private sector. Mr Musavi responded:

As I pointed out in response to one of the questions, the issue has many sides. Under ordinary circumstances, when supply and demand regarding one item are balanced, and when that item is not an essential one, we find it unnecessary for the government to interfere. But, when one item is vital for the people and we are unable to offer that item to meet the people's demand, the government will interfere as much as is necessary. Again, I must point out that interference does not mean taking charge of all goods and items.

Iran's Efforts to Retrieve the Hijacked Passengers

Then, concerning the activities of the government to retrieve the Iranian passengers, the service personnel, and the hijacked aircraft from the regime of Iraq, the prime minister said:

The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in extensive activities throughout the world, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the national Islamic Republic airlines. It seems that the regime of Iraq is committing another crime on top of its other crimes. Nowhere in the world can you find a precedent for an airplane being hijacked, its passengers detained by force for 10 days, and a regime trying to make use of the passengers for propaganda purposes. Such actions are considered a threat to the entire world. We declare that such actions will result in nothing but the expansion of terrorism and fear in the area of global air security.

Possibility of an Overall Attack by Iran

The Japanese (TU-BU-ES) reporter asked: Is it possible for the Islamic Republic of Iran under the present circumstances to engage in an overall attack on the fronts?

The prime minister responded: As has been announced frequently, our forces are in an excellent position on the fronts and are prepared to engage in expansive operations; our attack may take place at any moment. We are capable of starting this attack and inflicting blows on the regime of Saddam.

In response to a question of another reporter concerning air piracy in Iran, the prime minister said:

The Islamic revolution has endangered the interests of the United States and other superpowers in the area, and it has many enemies in the region and in the world. These enemies are not wise individuals who believe in divine and humane values. We consider such actions very natural, because when a regime endangers the interests of these superpowers, it is natural for such incidents to occur.

He continued: They hint themselves that they are the perpetrators of such actions. Meanwhile, the regime of France supports these terrorists. This is one problem. Another problem is that at this juncture, we are confronted with two or three strategic operations. Although we have seen expansive operations in this area in the past, at this time, it is natural to remember that such actions cannot have any effect on our regime. He added: These actions are related to the great wave that the Islamic revolution can create in the hajj pilgrimage among 1 billion Muslims of the world. In order to curb the effect of this wave and this movement in the world, these actions take place. Meanwhile, we are at the threshold of war week, and we know that the enemies of the people, the agents dependent on the large powers and those who are supported by France, have declared this week in which the people support the combative operations and war actions and shout their slogan, "war, war until victory,"

as a week to support Saddam and oppose the war. We think that this issue is connected to those issues. The final point is that these propaganda bugles are maneuvering mostly on this issue. We might have several airplane hijackings in the world every day, but the media has generally become indifferent to this issue. However, due to the sensitive situation of the region and the strong hostility which exists towards the Islamic revolution, it seems that the propaganda organization of the world escalates this issue more than usual.

In connection with the Afghanistan problem, the prime minister responded to the correspondent of SOBH-E AZADEGAN:

In connection with the Afghanistan problem, we have already stated our strong position and we think that the fate of Afghanistan will not be determined except by the direct involvement of the people of Afghanistan in the decision making process, and no agreement which is signed or is to be signed will help resolve the Afghanistan problem.

In response to a question concerning Article 44 of the Constitution, the prime minister said:

We think that Article 44 is valid, as before. However, the conditions that have been stated in the foreign trade bill might undergo some changes. Since the recent directives of the imam of the nation, the question has been raised whether or not there should be a foreign trade bill now and whether we do or do not want to implement Article 44. I think this is an incorrect picture of the statements of the imam of the nation. Here I must point out that in connection with the vast concentration of the economy in the hands of the government, the government had not by any means taken any measures and this would be in clear violation of the Constitution. This is one point. Another is that the government has been obliged to always adhere to the directives of the leader of the revolution. These directives are to clarify what is stated in the Constitution and Islam. For this reason, I think that this issue should be dealt with in this form and not in the manner referred to, in possible violation of Article 44 or other articles.

In response to a question by the reporter for MAINICHI SHIMBUN, who asked whether the large number of hijackings are not the result of public discontent, Mr Musavi said: If air piracy in the country were a reflection of the discontent of the people, this discontent should have meant more on 30 August, but we see that such terrorist acts occurred at that time, and yet we see the vast support of the people for the revolution. The predictions of the mass media concerning the overthrow of the regime were as images on water and it has become clear that the regime is based on the support and contentment of the people.

Such analyses fall precisely within the framework of the same policies that the global mass media are trying to inject into public opinion. He added: The regime of the Islamic Republic cannot stand without the contentment of the people. The Friday prayer ceremonies show this reality. It must be said that organized terrorism is behind air piracy; when a regime has rebelled against great powers and endangered their interests, such problems are natural for it. We want the nations in the region to govern their own destiny. It would be surprising if there were no conspiracies against the regime.

Another correspondent asked: President Mitterrand has recently visited North Africa and has met with King Hassan twice. What is your opinion on the policy of France with regard to the Middle East, particularly in its support of Iraq, and in Lebanon, Morocco and North Africa?

The prime minister responded: Mr Mitterrand has thus far proved to be a very skilled artist in his ability to contact anti-people governments, forces, and terrorists. I think that such actions and such trips are not separate from the views of the Mitterrand regime in regards to world issues. Whenever there are reactionary, anti-people regimes, France has consistently tried to establish relations with that force. France's policies in Vietnam and Algeria, its support for Israel, King Hassan, the Iraq regime, and terrorists who murder the people and are protected by the French police all show such a view.

In conclusion, the prime minister thanked the participating reporters.

10,000

CSO: 4640/403

IRAN

BRIEFS

AFGHAN IMMIGRANTS REGISTRATION--Shemiran, KEYHAN correspondent. The Tehran Governor General's Office announced: The registration of and issuance of identity cards to all immigrant Afghan brothers and sisters continues in specified areas of the cities of Tehran, Karaj, Rey, Varamin, and Damavand. Afghan immigrants who have not yet registered must go to the location nearest their residences to receive identity cards from the Governor's Office, with which they may benefit from particular facilities and resources, such as registering their children in schools, obtaining coupons for essential goods, traveling, moving, and so on. The issuance of cards in the registration areas is compulsory for everyone. Obviously, after the deadline for the identity plan, which is 22 September of this year, those Afghan immigrants who do not have identity cards will be dealt with decisively in accordance with the law. [Text] [Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Aug 84 p 2] 10,000

CSO: 4640/381

END